Political economy of climate policy by Wangler, Leo Urban
Thema
Political Economy of Climate Policy
Dissertation




Rat der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät
der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
am 13. April 2011
von: Diplom Volkswirt Leo Urban Wangler
geboren am: 18. April 1981 in: Berlin-Schöneberg
x
Gutachter:
1. Prof. Dr. Andreas Freytag (Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena)
2. Prof. Dr. Werner Güth (Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik Jena)
3. Prof. Dr. Gert Tinggaard Svendsen (University of Aarhus)
Datum der Verteidigung: 22.06.2011
x
“Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a
world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own
best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.”
(Hardin, 1968, p. 1244)
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k another single player
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List of Symbols xix
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M vehicle mass
Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich modelltheoretisch, empirisch und experimentell
mit dem Thema der Klimapolitik aus einer politökonomischen Perspektive. Der Ansatz
der Neuen Politischen Ökonomie versucht, die ökonomischen Modelle um den politis-
chen Prozess zu erweitern. Die Motivation für dieses Vorgehen steht in einem engen
Zusammenhang mit der Erkenntnis, dass es unzureichend ist, die ökonomische Analyse
auf Probleme des Marktversagens zu reduzieren. Neben Marktversagen können durch
den politischen Prozess Probleme generiert werden (sog. Politikversagen).
Im Rahmen einer positivenAnalyse kann die Neue Politische Ökonomie Erklärungsan-
sätze liefern, die eng mit der Fragestellung verknüpft sind, warum bekannte Ineffizien-
zen den politischen Prozess überdauern. Dieses Problem lässt sich in vielen Fällen
durch Partikularinteressen erklären. Aus einer normativen Perspektive lassen sich die
resultierenden Erkenntnisse für Politikempfehlungen heranziehen. Vordergründig sind
dabei jene Handlungsalternativen (zum Teil auch Handlungsbeschränkungen z.B. auf
konstitutioneller Ebene) die es dem Staat ermöglichen seine Handlungen möglichst
unabhängig von Partikularinteressen durchzuführen.
In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden verschiedene Fragestellungen analysiert. Da es
sich bei dem Thema um ein sehr weites Forschungsfeld handelt, liegen die Arbeiten
teilweise recht weit auseinander; gewähren aber in ihrer Gesamtheit einen umfang-
reichen Einblick in das zugrunde gelegte Thema. Durch die Fülle an Veröffentlichungen
und die Breite des Spektrums war es nicht möglich, alle veröffentlichten Quellen zur
Klimapolitik in die Arbeit zu integrieren. Für die vorliegende Arbeit sind die folgenden
Fragestellungen von besonderem Interesse:
• Was ist unter der politischen Ökonomik der Klimapolitik zu verstehen?
• Inwiefern ermöglicht das implementierte System zur Förderung von erneuerbaren
Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG)) eine effiziente Ausbreitung der
Technologie?




• Warum haben Regierungen Anreize, in recht großem Umfang in erneuerbare
Energien zu investieren, obwohl andere Länder ein Trittbrettfahrerverhalten offen-
baren?
• Inwiefern ermöglicht die internationale Politikkoordination in Form von interna-
tionalen Umweltabkommen (IEAs) das Erreichen langfristiger Ziele?
• Welche Rolle spielen Institutionen wie sog. "‘Mindestbeteiligungsregeln"’ (MPRs)
zur Steigerung der Effizienz von internationalen Umweltabkommen?
• Wie beeinflusst der Abstimmungsmechanismus die Anwendung bestimmter Poli-
tikinstrumente?
• Welche Lehren lassen sich aus den einzelnen Beträgen für die Klimapolitik ableiten?
Das einleitende erste Kapitel bildet die Grundlage für die Arbeiten der nachste-
henden Kapitel. Die Problematik des anthropogenen Klimawandels wird aus der
Sichtweise der Klimaforschung wiedergegeben. Die gegenwärtigen Forschungsergeb-
nisse bilden die Grundlage für die ökonomischen Modelle. Diese versuchen Kosten-
und Nutzenaspekte des Klimawandels zu evaluieren. Die Folgen des anthropogenen
Klimawandels lassen sich als Teil des weltwirtschaftlichen Strukturwandels verste-
hen. Wie sich der Strukturwandel vollzieht, ist mitunter auch davon abhängig, welche
wirtschaftspolitischen Instrumente angewandt werden, um den Folgen des Klimawan-
dels zu begegnen. Im Anschluss an die Darstellung der verschiedenen Handlungsalter-
nativen (Politikinstrumente zur Bekämpfung des Marktversagens) wird das Thema in
einen politökonomischen Rahmen gebettet. Es folgt ein Überblick über die einzelnen
Kapitel.
In Kapitel zwei steht der Sektor für erneuerbare Energien in Deutschland im Vorder-
grund der Betrachtung. In einem ersten Schritt werden institutionelle Reformen analysiert,
die die Verbreitung von GTs bedingen. Auch die Kostenargumente sind Gegenstand der
Analyse. In einem zweiten Schritt wird anhand eines theoretischen Modells der insti-
tutionelle Regelrahmen aus Effizienzgesichtspunkten analysiert. Anhand des Modells
lässt sich aufzeigen, dass von der Ausgestaltung des Regelrahmens Kostenineffizienzen
zu erwarten sind. Ineffizienzen werden durch die politische Gewichtung der tech-
nologiespezifischen Interessengruppen verursacht. Ein Ergebnis des Modells ist es,
dass relativ hohe Grenzkosten eine suboptimal hohe Diffusion der GT implizieren,
wohingegen relativ niedrige Grenzkosten mit einem zu niedrigen Angebot einhergehen.
Das dritte Kapitel befasst sich mit dem Strukturwandel im Energiesektor. Dabei
stellt sich die Frage, inwiefern die politikinduzierte Nachfrage nach erneuerbaren En-
ergien Innovationen hervorgebracht hat. Die ökonometrische Analyse kommt zu dem
Ergebnis, dass eine Veränderung der Marktgröße sowie die Marktgröße selbst (beides
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sind Proxy für die Nachfrage) positiv mit Patentanmeldungen (als Proxy für Inno-
vationen) korreliert sind. Zusätzlich wird zwischen dem Stromeinspeisegesetz und
Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz auf einen Strukturbruch getestet.
Die Effekte internationaler Abkommen auf die nationale Politik und deren Entschei-
dungsträger bildet den Schwerpunkt in Kapitel vier. In diesem Zusammenhang spielen
internationale wettbewerbspolitische Aspekte eine wichtige Rolle. Mit Hilfe eines Erklär-
ungsansatzes der strategischen Handelspolitik wird die globale Perspektive des Kyoto-
Protokolls mit den energie- und umweltpolitischen Maßnahmen auf nationaler Ebene
(mit einem Fokus auf Deutschland) verknüpft. Der theoretische Rahmen kann den ver-
meintlichen Widerspruch auflösen, dass manche Länder relativ hohe Beiträge zum Kli-
maschutz leisten, obwohl andere Länder trittbrettfahren. Ausschlaggebende Größe sind
dabei die zukünftigen Exporterwartungen. Dies wird mit Hilfe eines ökonometrischen
Modells überprüft. Als Proxy für zukünftige Erwartungen dienen Patentanmeldungen
im Ausland (mit Deutschland als Prioritätsland).
Das fünfte Kapitel versucht experimentell zu testen, inwiefern die Implementierung
von Meilensteinen helfen kann, bestimmte (langfristige) Ziele zu erreichen. Dabei führt
das Nichterreichen eines Meilensteins dazu, dass mit einer gewissen Wahrscheinlichkeit
das vorhandene Vermögen zerstört wird. Inwiefern Meilensteine die Effizienz erhöhen,
wird anhand hoher Anforderungen und niedriger Anforderungen untersucht. Das
Experiment fußt auf einem 2X3 Faktor Design. In einem ersten Schritt werden die Ergeb-
nisparameter des Öffentlichen-Güter-Spiels verändert und in einem zweiten Schritt
die Wahrscheinlichkeit, durch welche der Verlust des vorhandenen Vermögens bedingt
wird.
In Kapitel sechs werden Mindestbeteiligungsregeln (MPRs) theoretisch analysiert.
Diese sind in die meisten IEAs integriert. Es stellt sich die Frage, inwiefern MPRs inter-
nationale Entscheidungsprozesse beeinflussen. Unter einer MPR wird ein Abkommen
gesetzlich bindend, wenn ein bestimmter Grenzwert in Bezug auf Mitgliederzahl oder
Beitrag erreicht wird. Die theoretische Grundlage liefert ein Kartellspiel (mit offener
Mitgliedschaft) unter der Annahme heterogener Länder. Die Wahl der Mindestbeteili-
gungsregel ist ein endogener Entscheidungsparameter in dem zugrundegelegten Spiel.
Im siebten Kapitel stehen erneut Fragen zur Effektivität und Effizienz bestimmter
klimapolitischerMaßnahmen imVordergrund. Diese lassen sich anhand einer vorgeschla-
genen Regulierungspolitik der Automobilindustrie von Seiten der Europäischen Union
analysieren. Die Diskussion der wirtschaftspolitischenMaßnahmen kann demonstrieren,
dass unterschiedliche Entscheidungsmechanismen für unterschiedliche Politikinstru-
mente Verzerrungen hervorrufen. Der ausgearbeitete Vorschlag führt zu Wettbewerb-
sverzerrungen und beschränkt die Konsumentensouveränität. Die Diskussion verweist
auf zwei wichtige Gesichtspunkte: Erstens, im Bezug auf privaten Personenverkehr sind
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marktbasierte Instrumente, die auf der Nachfrageseite angewandt werden (Steuern oder
Zertifikate), von Vorteil gegenüber marktbasierten Instrumenten, die Angebotsseitig
implementiert werden. Zweitens, die Anwendung verschiedener Wahlregeln für unter-
schiedliche Politikinstrumente führt zu Verzerrungen bei politischen Entscheidungen.
Das achte Kapitel widmet sich den Schlussfolgerungen, den zentralen Resultaten
der verschiedenen Kapitel und zusätzlichen Politikimplikationen.
Chapter 1
On the Political Economy of Climate
Policy
1.1 Introduction
The problem of climate change is part of the current policy debate. Even though climate
change is not perceived as being a new problem, and has its beginning in the 19th
century, it is an issue that seems to be gaining more and more attention. One reason for
this can be found in increasing empirical evidence from natural science indicating: (1)
the problem of climate change is severe, and (2), it is of an anthropogenic nature.
However, perceptions of the climate change problem differ among citizens, organiza-
tions, sectors of society and countries. One reason might be that different groups within
a society (e.g. different industries) are differently affected by the climate change problem
and its related abatement costs. The same is true if one looks at countries instead of
industries. It can further be observed that also among scientists the problems occurring
from climate change are discussed controversially. These observations are related to the
fact that the climate change problem is a complex one. Beliefs are still important in order
to make a clear statement about its impact.
Beside the uncertainties about how to adequately react on climate change related
problems, it can be observed that policies attempt increasingly to implement measures
directed toward sustainablity.1 Therefore, the current increase in the relevance of the
climate change problem is also affected by the formation of new interest groups that
mainly benefit from climate abatement policies.
It is the aim of this doctoral thesis to contribute to a better understanding of how
structural change in the economic system changes (economic) opportunities and, hence,
1The United Nations (UN) Commission on Sustainable Development has, in its Brundtland report,
defined sustainable development as follows: Sustainable development is a “development that meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Hauff, 1987, p. 46).
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the related interests. In order to do so the economic models have to be extended by the
political process. This is mainly done from a positive perspective. However, it is also the
objective to make use of the results from the different studies to derive lessons for policy
making.
This introductory chapter is aimed at establishing a basis for the understanding
of the research contributions in subsequent chapters. The chapter is structured as
follows. In section 1.2 current studies about the climate change problem are reviewed.
This is done from a natural science perspective before the topic is approached from
an economic perspective. In section 1.3 structural change is described in more detail,
the main argument being that climate change causes structural change independent of
policy making. In case that policy implements measures aimed to reduce the related
burdens policy influences, the climate change related structural change. What follows
is an overview of the available policy instruments that can be applied to internalize
externalities. Related advantages and problems are also part of the discussion. In
section 1.4 economic structural change is combined with the topic of political economy.
The choice of policy instruments is discussed from the perspective of different groups
within society that are able to influence political decisions. At the end of section 1.4 a
short overview of the following chapters will be given.
1.2 Problems Related to Climate Change
1.2.1 Climate Problem and Awareness
From a natural science perspective, the problem of climate change is related to the fact
that greenhouse gases (GHGs),2 which are concentrated within the atmosphere, have an
impact on the climate. Greenhouse gases, like carbon dioxide, absorb radiation coming
from the earth and partly reflect it back. Estimates predict that without any atmosphere
the temperature on earth would be minus 18◦C on global average. The concentration of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is held responsible that the average temperature is
15◦C on average (Latif, 2010, p. 4).
From the time of the industrial revolution onwards, there has been a steady rise in
the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. This growth in GHGs is of
an anthropogenic nature. It is stated that the stock of CO2 has increased by 40 percent,
the stock of CH4 has increased by 120 percent and the stock of N2O by 10 percent.
Additionally, there was an increase in HFCswhich are now declining – due to successful
policy measures implemented as a result of the Protocol of Montreal. The major concern
2Different gases are labeled as greenhouse gases. Water vapor, for instance, is also labeled as a green-
house gas. In the actual debate on the climate change problem six major gases are of importance: carbon
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), halocarbons (HFCs) and
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).
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is with the increase in concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere, as it is responsible for
about two third of the increase in temperature (Latif, 2010, p. 4).
The phenomenon of the so-called greenhouse effect became known in the 19th
century. In this respect, it is important to mention the French physicist Fourier, who
compared the influence of the atmosphere on the climate to the heating of a closed space
beneath a pane of glass (Fourier, 1827). A considerable number of experiments on the
radiative properties of greenhouse gases, like water vapor and CO2, were conducted by
John Tyndall, a British physicist. He found out that “perfectly colorless and invisible
gases and vapors” can absorb and emit radiant heat (Tyndall, 1861). Toward the end of
the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century the first theories were postu-
lated linking changes in the climate to changes in CO2 concentration in the atmosphere
(e.g. Arrhenius, 1903).
The first theories about the anthropogenic nature of climate change lost significance
when Wood (1909) found that the relationship was not comparable to the heating within
glasshouses. In glasshouses most of the heat is generated through a lack of convection
and advection rather than emitting and re-emitting longwave radiation through the glass.
It could be shown that the radiative component generating heat within glasshouses
accounts only for about 20 percent of the heat. The anthropogenic nature of climate
change was further diminished in importance when Milankovitch (1930) established a
different model explaining the nature of climate change. Changes in temperature were
explained by changes in the distance between the sun and the earth due to variations in
the orbit.
However, despite these findings, further research was conducted (Callendar, 1938;
Scherhag, 1939). New dynamics entered into the debate with models computing the
impact of a steady increase in emissions for the long-run (Plass, 1956; Callendar, 1961).
Plass (1956) concluded that a doubling in CO2 concentration would increase the average
temperature by 3.6◦C. A major critique came from Kaplan (1960) and Möller (1963). Ka-
plan (1960) made the point that the water content of the atmosphere was not integrated
into the model. Möller (1963) was able to show that the predicted radiation effect is very
sensitive to changes in model assumptions, like the implementation of humidity and
cloudiness.
Today, different models have been established to compute future changes in the
climate. By comparing the different models it can clearly be observed that the predicted
outcomes differ.3 This variation can be used as a measure of the uncertainty related to
climate change models (Räisänen, 2007). However, it has to be kept in mind that this
method very likely underestimates the related uncertainty, the reason being that the
3For a model intercomparison see also: http://www.clivar.org/organization/aamp/publications/
mips.htm
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biases of the individual models partly cancel each other when the multimodal mean is
calculated (Räisänen, 2007, p. 6).
Previous modeling mistakes, as well as the still existing uncertainty as to the model
outcomes, have resulted in criticism that the predictions are too unreliable to serve as
background for public policy. However, this assessment is far too easy, as the debates, as
such, did lead to steady improvements in climate models. The adaption of the models
over time also did not change the general message that an increase in CO2 emissions will
increase the global mean temperature. It seems more convincing to interpret modeling
predictions in the direction that they estimate future developments of the climate based
on the current knowledge (important determinants are available data and computing
capacity). The models somehow help to understand the impact of current decisions
for the well-being of future generations. This is one reason why it seems to be wise
to take the model predictions seriously. From a political economy perspective, one
should expect that even under certainty policy-makers are not able to react in an optimal
manner to the climate change problem. In general, however, the related uncertainty
very likely aggravates this problem instead of reducing it.
1.2.2 Climate Research and Climate Policy
Research in the field of climate change benefited notably through the research conducted
by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). It created a global database and
tried systematically to foster the improvement of climate models. With the development
of models able to forecast future developments of the climate, the public interest in the
topic of climate change increased remarkably. Large international conferences received
more and more public attention (for an overview compare Sardemann, 1997).
In 1961 there was a symposium organized by the United Nations Educational, Sci-
entific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) together with the WMO on Changes of
Climate where the impact of changes in CO2 on the climate were part of the discussion.
An additional outcome was the establishment of a working group trying to improve the
database and methodology for climate modeling. Two years later (1963), a conference
about the “Implications of Rising Carbon Dioxide Content of the Atmosphere” took
place. Participants of the conference agreed that an increase of CO2 concentration of 100
percent can generate an increase in temperature of about 3.8◦C.
The Stockholm conference on the Human Environment (1972) can be seen as a
starting point for climate policy making (Linnér and Jacob, 2005). The international
community agreed that an increase in temperature of 2.0◦C would likely cause melting
of the polar ice caps, rising sea levels and, as a result, a loss of land areas. There
was, in addition, the fear that the world might also experience global cooling due to
particle emissions. As a result, the international community agreed to “be mindful of
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activities in which there is an appreciable risk of effects on climate, [...] [to] carefully
evaluate the likelihood and magnitude of climatic effects [...] [and to] consult fully other
interested states when activities carrying a risk of such effects are being contemplated or
implemented” (UN, 1972). The first world climate conference, labeled as a “conference
of experts on climate and mankind”, took place in Geneva in 1979. It was initiated by
the WMO, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the International
Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU). It concluded that climate change is a serious problem
that asks for political action in order to counter its consequences for social and economic
development (Linnér and Jacob, 2005, p. 405).
In 1985, a workshop on climate change took place in Villach (Austria). Participants
of this workshop made clear statements about the anthropogenic nature of climate
change due to the increase in concentration of CO2 and other greenhouse gases within
the atmosphere (WMO, 1986). An Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG) was
established, which can be seen as a prototype for the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate
Change (IPCC) founded in 1988.
The IPCC was initiated by the WMO and UNEP. Its task is to inform about actual
knowledge on anthropogenic climate change. In order to do so, the IPCC evaluates
results from current research. The results are then published as assessment reports. They
serve as background information for the climate conventions. The IPCC consists of three
different working groups providing expertise in the following fields:
1. The science of climate change;
2. Impacts, adaption and mitigation;
3. Socioeconomic and cross-cutting issues.
The IPCC itself states that “because of its scientific and intergovernmental nature, [it] [...]
embodies a unique opportunity to provide rigorous and balanced scientific information
to decision makers. By endorsing the IPCC reports, governments acknowledge the
authority of their scientific content. The work of the organization is therefore policy-
relevant and yet policy-neutral, never policy-prescriptive” (IPCC, 2010). This seems to
be important if one keeps in mind that the assessment reports are highly influential as
they serve as the basis to formulate the climate conventions.
1.2.3 Climate Predictions
It could be observed that during the last century the world temperature increased on
average by about 0.8◦C (IPCC, 2008). As a consequence Arctic ice decreased in the last
30 years by about 30 percent and during the century the see level increased by about
20 centimeter. As previously explained, parts of these changes are not anthropogenic,
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but rather than internal. However, current studies claim that the internal increase in
temperature is only responsible for about 25 percent of the change in temperature. At
least 50 percent of the remaining change in temperature seems to be related to an increase
in GHG emissions (Latif, 2010, p. 6).
The complexity of the climate carries with it the threat that changes happen rather
slowly before they pass a certain threshold causing catastrophic consequences. This
is often referred to as “irreversible climate change” (Solomon et al., 2009, p. 1704).
The thresholds as such are difficult to estimate. However, even if one were able to
stabilize current CO2 emissions the stock of CO2 within the atmosphere will still increase
for approximately the next 100 years, as most of the greenhouse gases remain in the
atmosphere (persistency of the climate) for several decades. This shows that even under
a strict climate regime stabilizing the emissions of greenhouse gases does not cut the risk
that there is likely to be an increase in catastrophic climate events. Two major lessons
can be drawn from combining persistency with irreversibility:
1. The climate might still undergo change even if climate policy is successful;
2. Due to the complexity of the climate, surpassing certain thresholds might destabi-
lize the whole climate system causing catastrophic consequences.
The IPCC assumes that without effective measures to limit GHG emissions the global
mean temperature in 2100 will have increased by 4◦C. Some predictions go even further
and estimate an increase of 6◦C for the business as usual (BAU) scenario (IPCC, 2008).
It is expected that extreme weather events will increase and that there will be a rise
in sea level by at least one meter. The Arctic ice will melt rapidly (it may already be
free of ice by the middle of this century), similar to mountain glaciers. This will also
affect the availability of drinking water in these areas, leading to dramatic results. As
a further consequence, it might also be that sea currents change or disappear, causing
drastic changes in temperature in the affected regions. Another fear is that an increase
in mean temperature can cause the disappearance of permafrost, freeing additional CO2
and aggravating the problem of climate change due to an increase in CO2 concentration
within the atmosphere (Latif, 2010, p. 7).
In order to keep the risks of climate change at a level that remains manageable, most
scientists agree that the increase in temperature should not exceed a maximum of 2◦C,
compared to the pre-industrial time (which implies that the concentration of CO2 in
the atmosphere should not exceed a level of 450ppm). In order to achieve this goal,
emissions of GHGs have to decline by 50 percent by 2050 and by about 80 percent by
2100 (Latif, 2010, p. 11). The empirical evidence, however, shows that emissions have
increased since 1990 (from 1990 until 2008 by about 40 percent).
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1.2.4 Economic Predictions
The previous results serve as a background for economic research in the field of climate
change (a survey is given by Aldy et al., 2011). The emissions of CO2 are supposed to
generate negative externalities. According to Baumol and Oates (1988) two conditions
have to be fulfilled to speak of an externality: First, “an externality is present whenever
some individual’s (say A’s) utility or production relationships include real [...] variables,
whose values are chosen by others [...] without particular attention to the effects on A’s
welfare”. Second, “the decision maker, whose activity affects others’ utility levels or
enters their production functions, does not [..] pay in compensation for this activity an
amount equal in value to the resulting [..] costs to others” (Baumol and Oates, 1988,
p. 17). Indeed, this definition can be related to anthropogenic climate change. This is one
reason why the economic interest in the problem of climate change has increased over
time. Of particular interest are the welfare effects. The major results from the related
literature are summarized in table 1.1.
Table 1.1 shows selected characteristics of economic studies on the impact of climate
change. The first column is dedicated to the underlying assumption on the long-term
increase of the global mean temperature. The forecasts on the development of the
temperature in general build on the assumption that the concentration of greenhouse
gases within the atmosphere doubles (compared to the pre-industrial time). The second
column of table 1.1 shows the estimated impact on welfare in the future expressed in
changes of gross domestic product (GDP). The third column summarizes the predicted
change in GDP in those regions which are assumed to be most affected by climate
change. The fourth column identifies those regions. In the fifth and sixth column the
same information is given for those regions which are supposed to be least hit by climate
change and which benefit in most of the cases.
Studies coping with the economic effects of climate change have to make assump-
tions about the future development of the climate. These assumptions imply predictions
on future emissions, sea level rise, changes in rainfall and storminess to mention only a
few of them. In a second step the changes have to be translated into economic conse-
quences (Tol, 2010, p. 14). Two approaches can be distinguished in climate modeling,
the enumerative approach and the statistical approach.
Studies by Fankhauser (1995), Nordhaus (1994b) and Tol (1995, 2002) can be related
to the enumerative approach. This means that the estimates of the physical effects of
climate change are obtained from natural science papers. They serve as a starting point
to make predictions on health of the population or the general impact climate change has
on a certain region. The physical impacts are then evaluated with prices and added up in
a further step. In order to make the costs comparable with current values, extrapolated
costs have to be discounted. The discount rate is one variable which is highly under
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TABLE 1.1: Estimated welfare loss due to climate change (as equivalent income loss
in percent, estimates of the uncertainty are given in bracket as standard deviations
or 95 percent confidence intervals)
Warming Impact Worst-off region Best-off region
Study (◦C) (%GDP) (%GDP) (Name) (%GDP) (Name)
(Nordhaus, 1994b) 3.0 -1.3 – – – –
(Nordhaus, 1994a) 3.0 -4.8 – – – –
(-30.0 to 0.0)
(Fankhauser, 1995) 2.5 -1.4 -4.7 China -0.7 Eastern Europe
and the former
Soviet Union
(Tol, 1995) 2.5 -1.9 -8.7 Africa -0.3 Eastern Europe
and the former
Soviet Union
(Nordhaus and Yang, 1996) 2.5 -1.7 -2.1 Developing 0.9 Former Soviet
countries Union
(Plambeck and Hope, 1996) 2.5 -2.5 -8.6 Asia 0.0 Eastern Europe
(-0.5 to -11.4) (-0.6 to -39.5) (w/o China) (-0.2 to 1.5) and the former
Soviet Union
(Mendelsohn et al., 2000) 2.5 0.0b −3.6b Africa 4.0b Eastern Europe
0.1b −0.5b 1.7b and the former
Soviet Union
(Tol, 2002) 1.0 2.3 -4.1 Africa 3.7 Western
(1.0) (2.2) (2.2) Europe
(Nordhaus and Boyer, 2003) 2.5 -1.5 -3.9 Africa 0.7 Russia
(Maddison, 2003)a,d,e 2.5 -0.1 -14.6 South 2.5 Western
America Europe
(Rehdanz and Maddison, 2005)a,c 1.0 -0.4 -23.5 Sub-Saharan 12.9 South Asia
Africa
(Hope, 2006)a, f 2.5 0.9 -2.6 Asia 0.3 Eastern Europe
(-0.2 to 2.7) (-0.4 to 10.0) (w/o China) (-2.5 to 0.5) and the former
Soviet Union
(Nordhaus, 2006) 2.5 -0.9 – – – –
(0.1)
a The global results were aggregated.
b The top estimate is for the “experimental” model, the bottom estimate for the “cross-sectional” model.
c The study Mendelsohn et al. (2000) does only include market impacts.
d The national results were aggregated to regions for reasons of comparability.
e The study of Maddison (2003) only considers market impacts on households.
f The numbers used by Hope (2006) are averages of previous estimates by Frankhauser and Tol (1996); Stern (2007)
adopts on the work of Hope (2006).
Own illustration following Tol (2010).
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debate (Nordhaus, 2007; Weitzman, 2007). In general it can be said that translation of
the climate effects into monetary terms relies on a cost benefit approach. Studies on the
evaluation of mortality risks or the future development of agricultural prices serve here
as a benchmark for the estimated costs (Tol, 2010). One problem seems to be that two
very complex methods are combined together. If there are biases in the models from
natural science then they add up with possible biases within the economic models.
The study of Mendelsohn et al. (2000) can be related to a statistical approach. This
approach tries to estimate welfare effects (based on cross-sectional country specific data)
by using observed variations in prices and expenditures. They are than extrapolated in
order to make predictions on future cost developments. In this case also the choice of the
interest rate has important effects on the results. One critical assumption of the statistical
approach is that it assumes the observed variation to be constant over time. As the
climate is very complex and crossing certain thresholds may change the behavior of the
climate (Solomon et al., 2009), this assumption seems to be too restrictive. The statistical
approach is also used by Maddison (2003) and Nordhaus (2006). Maddison (2003) uses
the estimation approach to look at country specific patterns of aggregated household
consumption while Nordhaus (2006) uses empirical estimates of the aggregated impacts
of the climate on income levels across the world. Again, the underlying assumption
that the observed spatial patterns remain constant over time might be too restrictive
(Tol, 2010). A general critique that is related to all cost benefit approaches is the use
of the GDP as a variable measuring welfare effects. An approach trying to overcome
the related problem is to use happiness as a determinant for the cost benefit analysis
(Maddison, 2003).
It can be seen that both described approaches have shortcomings and advantages.
The major advantage of the enumerative approach seems to be that they use the models
from natural science as their foundation. But this might be problematic as the models
from natural science might already be biased. One of the most critical issues is related
to extrapolation as it can cause substantial biases within the estimates (Brouwer and
Spaninks, 1999). Further difficulties arise with the assumptions made about adaptation.
Statistical studies have the advantage that they take real world differences instead of
extrapolated differences as the basis for calculations. But there is also a problem related
to causality as regional differences are mainly explained by climate differences. It can
further be questioned whether statistical methods are able to cope with the complexity
and non-linearity of the climate.4 Another critical issue is that important aspects of the
climate, like sea level rise, do not have much spatial variation (Tol, 2010, p. 17).
As shown in table 1.1 economic models also differ in their predictions about future
developments. Nevertheless, the presented models show similarities in some points
(Tol, 2010).
4This critique, however, also holds for different model approaches.
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1. The welfare effects related to a doubling of atmospheric concentration of GHG
emissions are relatively small (measured in changes of GDP). If it is estimated
to be equivalent to the one year growth rate of the global economy then over a
longer time period the effect of climate change on changes in GDP seems to be
unimportant. This is one reason why policy recommendations based on these
models very likely come to the result that rather slight than strict GHG reductions
should be undertaken.
2. The studies done after 1995 find that climate change generates welfare losses
as well as welfare gains and that a slight increase in temperature seem to be
accompanied by welfare increases.5
3. Even though climate change seems to generate welfare gains in certain regions,
the related welfare losses in other regions are predicted to be higher. Most of the
studies relate the welfare losses to the low income countries.
4. The estimates of economic effects of climate change seem to get less pessimistic
over time.6
5. Uncertainty related to economic models on climate change is vast and right-
skewed. If one takes the example of a model which assumes average warming in
temperature of 2.5◦C, then the average welfare effect of climate change is about
−0.7 percent of GDP (with a standard deviation of 1.2 percent).
1.2.5 Critical Assessment
These general results arise from the fact that most of the models are based on similar
model assumptions and databases. Some model assumptions are very strict, which
also limits the explanatory power of the models. The following example shall make
this more clear. If one keeps in mind that global mean temperature under the BAU
scenario may well exceed the 3◦C benchmark of the models (e.g. to 5◦C) then forecasts
might result in much higher economic costs. The predicted welfare effects are only
reliable if policy is able to stabilize greenhouse gases at a level which does not allow
an increase in temperature on a level that exceeds the benchmark of the models. The
empirical evidence so far seems to point more in the direction that it will be very difficult
to approach emission targets that allow to stabilize the climate below these defined
thresholds (Latif, 2010, p. 11).
5However, one of the most critical issues in the context of climate change is that there are no studies
estimating an increase of more than 3◦C. This assumption is very optimistic as the studies from natural
science predict that such changes are possible (see subsection 1.2.3).
6One major reason for this is the implementation of adaptation capacity within the models which
somehow moderates the estimation outcomes of the first models.
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Another discussion results from the observation that most damage from climate
change is predicted to happen in developing countries. This implies that developing
countries are highly dependent on the climate policy implemented in industrialized
countries. But the problem is also intertemporal, as the benefits from climate change
abatement policies will mainly effect future generations (again, in particular, in poor
countries) (Schelling, 2000). Based on this observation one can argue that adaptation
policies might be better suited for developing countries than the reduction of CO2
emissions. This raises the question about the right adaptation policies (Schelling, 2000;
Lomborg, 2006). Another aspect is that one can expect that aid policy in the near future
will more and more be diverted to the climate (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2007).
There are studies which try to evaluate the impact that strict emission reduction
within developed countries has on developing countries (Tol and Dowlatabadi, 2001; Tol
and Yohe, 2006). These studies come to the result that the reduced growth of developed
countries (due to emission reductions) also effects developing countries negatively (e.g.
due to a slowdown in exports). As the economic slowdown also reduces the provision
of primary health care in developing countries it might be a better strategy to focus on
development policy rather than CO2 emission reductions. Tol (2005) comes to a similar
result. He shows that economic development is a cheaper way of reducing climate
change induced malaria, compared to reducing CO2 emissions. However, this argument
cannot be translated to coastal protection (Tol, 2007). Further, there is the argument that
high-income countries may find it cheaper to pay compensation to poorer countries
instead of investing in expensive abatement technologies. It is likely that the payment, as
such, will be given in form of technical and financial assistance for adaptation (Paavola
and Adger, 2006).
So far, the discussion has shown that the climate change problem is very complex
and it is difficult to derive optimal policy recommendations from cost benefit analysis.
Another result is that the climate change problem requires international solutions. Fur-
ther, it turns out that there is no clear consensus on how to optimally distribute climate
change policies among industrialized (with a focus on abatement policy) and developing
countries (with a focus on adaptation policy). From an economic point of view it seems
to be more attractive to focus on adaptation policies in developing countries rather
than CO2 mitigation policies in industrialized countries. However, as long as economic
growth is still accompanied by increasing CO2 emissions, economic development will
conflict with climate protection policies (e.g. China) if climate abatement policies are
not cheaply available. Hence, there are good reasons to link the climate change prob-
lem to the development of abatement technologies. Green technologies (GTs) can be
more cheaply developed in developed countries. Independent from the location where
climate policy finally takes place, it seems that the major initiative has to come from
the industrialized countries, as adaptation policy is also costly. Whether industrialized
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countries are able to take the initiative depends on their capability to react adequately to
the climate change problem and to handle the related structural change.
In the absence of policy measures, anthropogenic climate change already causes struc-
tural change because of the related shift of external constraints on individual choices.
According to predictions from natural science, significant changes in external constraints
will happen in the future. The externality problem, together with the normative crite-
ria of sustainability, establishes the necessity for immediate policy intervention. The
application of policy measures, generally, can be seen as an exogenously implemented
“policy induced structural change” in the economy. In order to better understand the
socio-economic interrelationships that relate to structural change (that results from an
increase in temperature and/or the application of different policy instruments), the topic
of structural change is discussed in more detail before focusing on policy instruments
which are able to internalize externalities.
1.3 Structural Change and Climate Policy
1.3.1 What is Structural Change?
The previous section has shown how the climate change problem over time has entered
the policy debate. This can be explained by the change in external constraints making
socio-economic responses necessary. As the notion of structural change describes a dy-
namic process with interactions and interdependencies, this process has to be explained
in more detail. The ensemble on which structural change refers to is often described as a
system. The theoretical background for the following description of structural change is
mainly oriented on Hernes (1976) (see Timmermans et al. (2008) for an overview). This
general description of structural change is further extended with economic studies on
structural change.7
Structural change can be interpreted as a change in equilibrium. Equilibrium can
be seen as a stable structure. This stable structure implies a process that maintains the
stability but also maintains the process able to maintain stability. Structural change is a
process generating change in the (previous) stable structure (Hernes, 1976, p. 514). There
is continuous interaction between the micro and macro levels. Structural change has to
take this interrelationship into account (see also Rip and Kemp, 1998; Geels and Schot,
2007; Timmermans et al., 2008).
At the micro level individual decisions are of particular interest. The behavioral
assumption is that individuals “seek the best or, at least, satisfactory ways to realize their
goals; that this is done under bounded rationality, meaning that they act on uncertain
7Structural change from an economic point of view is mainly related to the field of evolutionary
economics and/or institutional economics.
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expectations and partial knowledge” (Hernes, 1976, p. 515).8 An overview on the
assumption of bounded rationality is given by (Kahneman, 2003).
On the macro level there is on the one hand the collective institutional set. Observ-
ables are for instance reward structure, language, legal rules and available products (to
mention only a few). On the other hand there are aggregative or distributive outcomes
of choices over alternatives. These variables can be measured in terms of marriage rates,
prices, CO2 emissions, and so on. Observable outcomes on the macro level are partly
under human control, can be the result of informal rules, may happen by chance and
are to a large extent unintended. This is why the properties of aggregated outcomes are
populations and not individuals (Hernes, 1976, p. 516).
What matters in the theory of structural change is the interaction between the micro
level and the macro level (e.g. Rip and Kemp, 1998; Geels and Schot, 2007; Timmermans
et al., 2008). This can be done by trying to specify how macro variables can be translated
into individual motivations. From the perspective of institutional economics it is from
particular interest to study the institutions influencing individual behavior (e.g. Hodg-
son, 1998; North, 2005). One general example would be that the market structure (e.g. in
form of competition) affects the market behavior of firms (e.g. price setting, marketing
strategies). Market access for green technologies over feed-in tariffs has an impact on
the individual demand for green technologies.
For particular cases the causality for the underlying relationship is not always clear
as social parameters have an impact on choices of individuals but the mechanism also
works the other way around, as individual choices of action change choice parameters
thus opening or destroying alternatives.9 One example would be that the consumption
of natural resources has an impact on future consumption and hence the choices on
consumption of natural resources of future generations. The dependence between micro
and macro level can also be demonstrated by cyclical development of prices. High
prices set the incentives for an increase in production which leads to lower prices in
the following period which slows down the increased production (so-called pork cycle)
(Hanau, 1927).
In order to understand structural change, it is important to be more explicit about
what a structure can be. “A structure is a configuration of parts, and a structural
8This implies that feedback mechanisms have an influence on individual behavior. Hence, individuals
modify their expectation for those cases where the outcome of action deviates from the intended result. If
actors accidentally find a better solution they also try to adopt it. Preferences of individuals are influenced
by different factors, such as abilities, rights and competences. Learning processes have an influence
on individual consumption patterns (compare also Witt, 2001). Individual plans influence individual
actions leading to results which are then again evaluated. This has an influence on decision making in
previous steps or rounds. Future plans by individuals are determined by future expectations (Hernes, 1976).
However, the described behavioral pattern is only stylized. Behavioral economics is one field of economic
research which subsequently contributes to a better understanding of individual choice and individual
behavior (cf. Levitt and List, 2007).
9The discussion whether demand has an impact on supply or whether supply has an impact on demand
can also be related to this problem (e.g. van den Ende and Dolfsma, 2005; Chidamber and Kon, 2009).
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Own illustration following Hernes (1976).
description is a characterization of the way the components in a set are interrelated”
(Hernes, 1976, p. 518). A further distinction to be made is between output structure and
process structure (compare also Timmermans et al., 2008). An output structure can be
categorized by integers which measure the outcome (e.g. CO2 emissions), the process
structure is related to the process that leads to the outcome and can be explained by a set
of equations (e.g. a growth model that connect economic growth to an increase in CO2
emissions). Another aspect to be aware of is that processes have their own structure,
as well. Hence, the overall CO2 emissions can be reduced even though the growth
rate remains the same. This is possible if a change in the process structure takes place.
Structural change, therefore, can be defined as the “discrepancy between the extant
structure and the processes which are responsible for creating the structure” (Ryder,
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The complexity in studying structural change lies in the difficulty in looking at the
dynamic interrelations between the processes.10 This requires to account for changes in
parameter values as well as for changes in the process structure. A further requirement
is that there is a feedback mechanism from the output structure to the process structure,
as well as from the output structure to the parameter structure. The particular interest
of evolutionary economics is to understand the dynamic economic processes for the
economy as a system (see Nelson, 1995; Fagerberg, 2003, for a survey of the literature).
Based on the three levels of structure mentioned above, four forms of structural
change can be distinguished. The first form is called simple reproduction. In the related
state of the art, production must be replicated in order to keep the process going (e.g.
Marx, 1978). In this case output structure, functional form and parameter values remain
unchanged (Hernes, 1976, p. 524). The second form is labeled as extended reproduction.
There is growth in the output, but functional form and functional parameter values
remain unchanged. The third and fourth forms distinguish between transformation and
transition. Transition can be defined as a change in the output structure and parameter
values (but not in the functional form), whereas transformation is a change in the func-
tional form leading to a change of the output structure and its development over time
(Hernes, 1976, pp. 526).
The previous description made clear that the climate change problem is inevitably
related to structural change. However, it is still an open question to which form of
structural change it has to be related. On the one hand, one can interpret climate change
as a problem generating changes in parameter values (e.g. rainfall, or temperature)
as done in the studies summarized at table 1.1. On the other hand there are studies
stating that the behavior will change significantly, after a certain threshold is overcome,
suggesting a change in the functional form (e.g. Stern, 2007; Solomon et al., 2009). There-
fore, if climate change increases continuously without a change in the functional form
the process is best described by the notion of transition. However, if the concentration
of CO2 within the atmosphere overcomes critical thresholds the climate can change
completely causing a system transformation. Beside the fact that this generates serious
harm to the environment, there is the problem that the new functional form very likely
will be unknown, making it even more difficult to react to.
The description so far has only focused on the climate as a system. If the economy
as a system does not react to those threats there will be an extended reproduction of
CO2 emissions increasing the stock of CO2 within the atmosphere with the described
consequences. The 2◦C target seems to be an attempt by politicians to reduce the risk
of substantial system transformation. If there is serious effort to fix the increase in
10Note that changes in the output structure are possible even if process structure and parameter structure
remain constant (e.g. if the system moves towards a new equilibrium Hernes, 1976, p. 512).
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temperature at a level of 2◦C (to come from extent reproduction to a level with simple
reproduction), this requires transition and transformation processes within the economy.
There are propositions to foster such a development. In the literature this is mainly
discussed under the notion of “transition management” (e.g. Rip and Kemp, 1998; Kemp
et al., 2007; Kern and Smith, 2008; Nill and Kemp, 2009). Innovations are one important
factor for structural change towards sustainability as they are able to influence the
parameter structure as well as the functional form (e.g. Dosi, 1988; Klepper, 1997).11
The most important lesson that can be drawn from the previous discussion is that
the externality problem resulting from the problem of anthropogenic climate change
generates structural change in the economic system. Research related to the climate
problem, generating new evidence about the impact of CO2 concentration within the
atmosphere, signals to politicians the need for policy reactions. This can be done by the
application of different policy measures. The application of certain policy instruments
changes the internal parameters of the system and/or the functional form in producing
economic output. The following section gives an overview of the different policy
measures that can be applied in the case of the climate change problem. The related
change in external constraints is policy induced, generating a “policy induced structural
change” within the economic system.
1.3.2 Environmental Policy
Different policy measures are available to cope with the climate change problem (com-
pare also Aldy et al., 2011, pp. 918). In this section regulations in the form of command
and control policies (CCPs) and voluntary agreements will be introduced before market-
based approaches (taxes and certificates) will be discussed. Further instruments, such
as joint implementation, negative rules and geo-engineering, are also part of the analysis.
Command and control policies
Command and control policies are often applied in the case of environmental problems
(Dietz et al., 2003, p. 1909). The general approach is to regulate the production process
to overcome the externality problem. The effectiveness of CCPs is closely related to
the applicability of monitoring (Hechter, 1988) and sanctioning mechanisms (Di Mento,
1989, p. 112).
CCPs can be technology-based or performance-based. Technology-based standards
require that firms use specified equipment, processes, or procedures. Performance-based
standards define a certain quantity related to pollutant emissions or polluting activities.
11At this stage one can also introduce the distinction between radical and incremental innovations.
Incremental innovations seem to be more related to the parameter structure and radical innovation more to
the process structure.
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They are more flexible compared to technology-based standards as regulated entities
are free to find solutions for the required levels of pollution reduction. This is one
reason why performance-based standards, in general, are seen to be more cost-effective.
However, technology-based standards may perform better in saving information and
administration costs (Stavins, 1997).
From a theoretical point of view, there are concerns related to CCPs as there is almost
no chance of meeting the optimal level of regulation. In theory, at the individual firm
level it would be possible to achieve static efficiency (marginal abatement costs are equal
to marginal damages) if the regulatory entity is informed about the pollution control
cost function. However, as this information very likely is not available, CCPs turn out to
be inefficient. Another problem occurs due to the fact that production processes within
the same industry differ (Stavins, 1997, pp. 300).
From a dynamic perspective, inefficiencies increase even more as the regulatory
standard increases entry barriers for potential new market participants (Buchanan and
Tullock, 1975). Another concern is related to innovations. Once the standard has been
implemented by the individual firm there are low incentives to develop or adopt cleaner
technologies. Under dynamic considerations technology standards are seen to be worse
than performance standards because technology standards constrain the technological
choices available and that reduces incentives to develop alternatives (e.g. Magat, 1979;
Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; Requate, 2005).
CCPs can also be criticized for their focus on “end-of-pipe” solutions.12 Another
problem occurs as CCPs very likely turn out to be cost-ineffective (Hahn, 1989; Newell
and Stavins, 2003). Many studies evaluating environmental policy instruments come
to the result that CCPs in most of the cases are inferior compared to other possibilities
(Bernstein, 1993; Stewart, 1992; Hahn and Stavins, 1991; Goulder and Parry, 2008).
Voluntary agreements
Voluntary agreements are policy instruments that are increasingly applied in environ-
mental policy (cf. Sinclair, 1997). Under such agreements there is the threat of mandatory
government intervention if certain benchmarks are not achieved voluntarily. Firm, spe-
cific incentives to agree on the “voluntary” political targets stem from the fear of being
confronted with more costly regulation if the voluntary targets are not met (Stavins,
1997, p. 302). Theoretically, voluntary agreements are similar to performance-based
standards, with the major difference being that sanctioning cannot be applied. The
incentive to stick to the accord stems from the threat of future sanctioning (in case the
standard is not met). What may follow are command and control policies.
12“ ‘End-of-pipe’ refers to ameliorating pollution just before the point at which it enters the environment
rather than seeking to prevent its generation in the first place” (Sinclair, 1997).
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Environmental taxes
The classic market-based approach is the so-called Pigouvian tax (Pigou, 1920) (for
simplicity also called environmental tax). The idea is to tax negative externalities
and/or to subsidize positive externalities. Social and private marginal costs can be
equalized by the price mechanism. One positive aspect related to environmental taxes
is that theoretically revenues can be used to compensate for those taxes which distort
incentives, such as income or corporation taxes. This double dividend is of particular
importance as the possibility of a fiscal neutral implementation of environmental taxes
might increase their acceptability (Pearce, 1991).
Compared to CCPs, environmental taxes have low compliance costs.13 The applied
tax will be common to all polluters. This allows for a search for different abatement
strategies depending on individual marginal abatement costs. If polluters have high
marginal abatement costs they very likely will pay the tax in contrast to polluters with
low marginal abatement costs. Transaction costs for environmental taxes are supposed
to be relatively low (Baumol and Oates, 1971, 1988). Under the assumption that the tax
is set at a level internalizing the externality, static efficiency is achieved. From a dynamic
perspective, there is further the incentive to adopt even cleaner technologies to escape
the related costs (Tietenberg, 1990). In theory, environmental taxes can be easily adjusted
to new information on the externality problem.
Even though environmental taxes theoretically have positive features, in practice
they confront severe problems. A general difficulty is the quantification and evaluation
of the externality. In many cases it is technically impossible to define and measure the
damage resulting from the marginal input of the good causing the externality. Apart
from this, there is the problem that the effectiveness to achieve the environmental target
depends on the price elasticities of demand. For instance, if the price demand curve
is very steep it is also possible that the necessary tax increase would generate hostile
reactions within society. Another problem stems from the fact that the deadweight
loss resulting from the carbon tax, to guarantee efficiency, would have to be evaluated
against the gains resulting from environmental protection. Tax incidence is a further
aspect that would have to be taken into account in order to evaluate the impact of taxes
appropriately (Pearce, 1991, pp. 942).
It can be seen that environmental taxes, in theory, have advantages compared to
command and control policies. However, difficulties relate to its application. Further
criticism stems from the Coase theorem (see part “negotiations”). The information
problems are substantial. In many cases, where environmental taxes can be effectively
applied, they very likely turn out to be inefficient. Even though environmental taxes
are market-based instruments they cannot be treated as a first best solution. From a
13The suggestion is that environmental taxes (as well as tradable certificates) can reduce compliance costs
compared to CCPs, by 50 percent and more (Tietenberg, 1990).
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more pragmatic perspective, there is, nevertheless, the possibility to make use of taxes
to control externalities “reasonably efficient” (Baumol and Oates, 1988, p. 159). This
approach is known as the charges and standards approach.
Charges and standards
In the case of the charges and standards approach, policy has to define a certain internal-
ization target that can be approached over tax adjustments (Baumol and Oates, 1971,
1988). The definition of standards can help to overcome the information problems re-
lated to the Pigouvian tax. Problems occur due to the uncertainty about the tax rate and
the time needed for the iteration process. What turns out to be difficult in practice is the
measurement of the externality. Further, there is the problem that the implementation of
charges and standards might evoke political protest. However, for some environmental
problems the charges and standards approach can be seen as a policy instrument with
some convenient properties due to its applicability.
Negotiations
The political instruments mentioned above overlook one important aspect: in many
cases the externality occurs mainly because property rights are not appropriately defined.
From this point of view, the role of the state in dealing with the externality problem
changes remarkably.
In his seminal article “The Problem of Social Costs”, Coase (1960) pointed out that
under well defined property rights and zero transaction costs voluntary negotiations are
able to generate a Pareto optimal outcome. One lesson that can be drawn for economic
policy is to make use of the legal system to overcome the externality problem. If one
agrees that it is the major role of the state to define and guarantee property rights, then
many environmental problems under the Coase theorem turn out to be a result of state
failure and not of market failure.
According to the definition of the externality problem there has to be one party who
is injuring and one party who is injured by the activity. From this point of view policy
making also changes, as the focus is not primarily on the injuring party. Both parties
compete on the consumption of the common good. Efficiency in economic terms requires
that marginal benefits of the injuring party are equal to marginal costs of the injured
party. This result is independent from the allocation of the property rights (invariance
thesis). Property rights can therefore be allocated to the injuring party, the injured party
or distributed to both of them. On the macro level the resulting outcome will be the
same. However, on the micro level the allocation of property rights affects individual
incomes.
The second lesson that can be drawn from the Coase theorem is that transaction
costs are one reason for market failure. This becomes more clear if one keeps in mind
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that externality problems exist even under defined property rights. Under the presence
of transaction costs the invariance thesis cannot be applied (the resulting outcome is
dependent on the allocation of the property rights). This brings up the question on the
role of institutions able to reduce the problem of transaction costs.
Without transaction costs, the negotiation solution can be seen as a policy option for
solving the externality problem efficiently. Also, from a dynamic perspective, efficiency
is maintained as the parties involved can realize gains if new abatement technologies
become part of the production process. There are continous incentives to innovate.
However, transaction costs can be supposed to increase with the parties involved. In
most of the cases the externality problem cannot be reduced to only two parties (as in
Coase, 1960). In the case of climate change one can well argue that all citizens (and future
generations) are involved in the externality problem. A further requirement is that all
actors know about the costs and benefits of the externality problem. Asymmetries in
power between the parties involved can be seen as a further problem. This again shows
that in many cases the definition of property rights is a necessary but not sufficient
condition in order to establish an efficient solution.
Tradable certificates
Parts of the problems can be solved if institutions are established that reduce transaction
costs sufficiently. Theoretically this requirement can be achieved if the state implements
an institutional setting (e.g. a market) that allows the exchange of property rights on
externalities.14 If the quantity is defined on a level able to internalize the externality,
the equilibrium price resulting from exchange in permissions indicates the social costs
imposed by the externality. Certificates will be allocated where efficiency is highest
which implies that costs for emission reduction are minimized. Incentives for buying
permits are given if abatement costs exceed permit prices, and incentives for selling
permits are given when permit prices exceed abatement costs. Trade will continue until
there is an equilibrium, meaning that marginal abatement costs are equal to marginal
certificate prices. If equilibrium is achieved for all market participants, allocation of
permits ceteris paribus has ex-post generated the cost minimizing result (Stavins, 1997,
p. 305).
The question for the government is how to allocate the certificates ex-ante. Different
opportunities exist:
• Firms can be given shares of the total permit volume for free (“grandfathering”);
• The certificates can be auctioned;
• Both approaches can be combined.
14The market might also evolve spontaneously through the initiatives of private actors.
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The major advantage in auctioning is that it solves some of the asymmetrical infor-
mation problems that are related to the difficulties estimating the demand for certificates.
The auction revenues can further be used to reduce other tax distortions. The major
argument for grandfathering can be found in a lower resistance from an industry that
now has to deal with the related increase in production costs. Grandfathering is further
related to the problem that it implements additional barriers for new market entrants.
This problem can partly be reduced with time limited certificates. Time limited certifi-
cates can also facilitate adjustments in response to new information. From a dynamic
perspective, producers have incentives to integrate pollution costs into their optimiza-
tion calculations. This has a positive impact on innovations (Stavins, 1997, pp. 306).
Joint implementation
One instrument which combines environmental protection with economic development
is the so-called joint implementation (JI ) approach.15 The idea is to set incentives for
emission reduction in other countries. If cooperation between countries takes place, there
is one party funding emission reduction in the other country. Joint implementation can
easily be combined with trade in certificates. Theoretically, there are many advantages
and disadvantages related to joint implementation (Barrett, 1995; Loske and Oberthür,
1994). Prime advantages are the following:
1. It might be a first step towards an international tradable certificate system;
2. Joint implementation is a cost-effective instrument that can be applied by industri-
alized countries to finance emission reduction in developing countries;
3. Emissions can be reduced in countries where abatement costs are low.
Beside the positive aspects, problems are identified. One problem results from the fact
that most developing countries do not have specific emission reduction targets. This
makes it difficult to determine the impact that joint implementation has on the overall
emission reductions of the country. Smaller projects may not come to fruition through
joint implementation because of high transaction costs. Many problems in developing
countries are a result of loosely defined and non-existing property rights, which again
increases transaction costs. Due to monitoring difficulties, there are project specific
incentives to report too high positive impacts for the environment (principal agent
problem) (Stavins, 1997, pp. 311).
Negative rules
In the case of externalities, one could restrict property rights to internalize the exter-
nality. In contrast to command and control policies, rules have to be adjusted in the
15In the context of the Kyoto-Protocol, JI is also referred to as clean development mechanism (CDM).
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form of restrictions. The restrictions can be implemented in the form of negative rules
(Hayek, 1978). Static efficiency can be achieved. From a dynamic perspective, one major
advantage can be found in the flexibility and freedom that is given after the negative
rules are defined. Incentives to innovate are high. However, difficulties occur if it
becomes necessary to adjust the rules to changing knowledge. For the formation of
stable expectations, property rights should also be stable (Wegner, 1998, p. 221). This
requirement very likely cannot be fulfilled in the case of environmental problems.
Geo-engineering
One relatively new policy instrument discussed in the literature is so-called geo-engi-
neering (cf. Keith, 2000). This solution is primarily related to the climate change problem.
The idea of geo-engineering stems from the natural experiment of the eruption of Mount
Pinatubo in the Philippines in 1991 (Crutzen, 2006). The injection of sulfur dioxide into
the stratosphere had significant impacts. Estimates have determined that the mean
temperature decreased by 0.5◦C.
As mentioned previously, there are two forces affecting the world climate. First, there
is the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, and second, the amount
of radiation that strikes the earth (also depending on the solar cycle and Milanovitch
cycles). In contrast to an investment into abatement technologies, geo-engineering
would have an impact on the world climate through the second force mentioned above.
Therefore, geo-engineering can be defined as “solar radiation management” (Barrett,
2008). If effective, geo-engineering can be seen as a substitute to emission reduction.
However, even though this offers new opportunities on climate change policies, so far
the concept lacks “broad support from scientists” (Cicerone, 2006). Supporters of the
idea mainly refer to the study by Crutzen (2006), which seems to point in the direction
that geo-engineering is feasible.
What is important in current debates on geo-engineering is that spacial patterns of
the world climate are supposed to remain constant even under local application of geo-
engineering (Govindasamy and Caldeira, 2000; Govindasamy et al., 2003). Knowledge of
geo-engineering becomes extremely valuable, as single countries may be able to change
the world climate system on their own. The theoretical prediction is that coordination
problems will be less severe than in the case of climate change mitigation policies
(Schelling, 1996). From a political point of view this raises questions about international
policy because of the related conflict potential (Barrett, 2008; Victor, 2008). Economically
the idea of geo-engineering seems to be highly attractive due to its cost argument.
Compared to mitigation policies geo-engineering is expected to cost almost nothing (cf.
Nordhaus, 1994b; Teller et al., 2003; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2003). Further, there is the
argument that geo-engineering could help to gain additional time to find solutions for
Chapter 1. Political Economy of Climate Policy 23
stabilizing the climate. Supporters of the idea are optimistic that geo-engineering can
help to reduce the risk of climate destabilization (Wigley, 2006).
Albeit geo-engineering seems to be an interesting option for policy making, it raises
important questions. One problem occurs with the path dependency resulting from geo-
engineering. Once this policy option is established, it has to be maintained continuously,
as CO2 concentration within the atmosphere keeps increasing. According to Matthews
and Caldeira (2007), an abrupt halt of this policy is problematic, as it can cause a severe
climate change with temperature increases. The complexity of the climate seems to
indicate that it is dangerous to believe that it can be managed like a production process.
The above discussion has shown that many processes are understood only weakly. The
application of geo-engineering might generate unintended harm. A general criticism is
that geo-engineering comes very close to what can be considered as “pretence of know-
ledge” (Hayek, 1964, 1975). It might be that further research on the topic finds more
convincing arguments for its applicability. So far, the knowledge is rather limited. There
is also the possibility that increasing knowledge will discover additional unintended
problems, thus reducing the attractiveness that seems to be attached to geo-engineering,
especially from an economic point of view. However, independent of the direction the
perception of geo-engineering evolves, the high economic gains suggest that further
research on this topic will be applied (there is no prisonners’ dilemma related to the
funding of research on geo-engineering).
The discussion has shown that different options can be applied. All in all, market-
based approaches havemajor advantages over command and control measures. Tradable
certificates are a promising tool for emission reduction in the context of anthropogenic
climate change. What has not been introduced, until now, is the distinction between
national and international levels of decision making. This distinction is important, as
many national policies effectively applied on the national level turn out to be ineffective
from an international perspective. This raises the question about the degree of interna-
tional coordination.
Policy coordination and the Kyoto-Protocol
Theoretically, global environmental mitigation policies constitute a global public good
because of international spillovers (Ostrom, 1990). The increasing rivalry in consumption
onGHG emissions relates anthropogenic climate change to the “tragedy of the commons”
(Hardin, 1968).16 Investment into climate change policies is confronted with high free-
riding incentives.
To a certain degree common good problems can be internalized over international
policy coordination. As this also reduces competition between countries, the need for
16There is rivalry in consumption but exclusion of additional users is not possible.
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coordination has to be evaluated carefully (Klodt, 1999). Competition among jurisdic-
tions can serve as an instrument to discover a “social desirable outcome” if the optimal
solution is not known ex-ante (Tiebout, 1956). If there is a high degree of uncertainty,
it is optimal to limit coordination to the definition of a benchmark for emission reduc-
tion. This allows for the establishment of ex-ante competition over optimal solutions
to achieve the defined target. International policy coordination can be used to define
quantity targets, e.g. for emission reduction. Regarding environmental problems, policy
coordination is common and often applied (Barrett, 2003, pp. 165). Many studies analyze
international environmental agreements (IEAs). This string of literature tries to explain
the formation of IEAs, its related welfare effects and the impact of institutions mainly
on the stability of IEAs (for an overview see Barrett, 2005; Brink, 2002; Finus, 2008).
From a political perspective, the Kyoto-Protocol (KP) can be interpreted as an IEA
aimed at coordinating international climate policies. Signatories to the KP have to
achieve certain CO2 emission reduction targets measured in a percentage of the base
year 1990. The time frame for GHG reduction is from 2008 to 2012 (Böhringer, 2003;
Böhringer and Vogt, 2004). The average emission reduction of GHG (from a global
perspective) is to be 5.2 percent until 2012 on 1990s baseline emissions (for a more
detailed discussion on the KP see chapter 4, p. 86). The long-term success of the KP also
depends on achieving a follow-up agreement (cf. Helm, 2008).
The presentation of the different policy instruments already raises questions related
to the decision making process, nationally and internationally. Questions that could
be raised (to mention only a few) are: Why are command and control policies applied
in many cases, even though from a theoretical point of view they are not a first best
solution? What are the national incentives to invest in climate abatement technologies
when international policy coordination fails in many aspects? What generates the
incentives for national governments to become members (or non-member) of an IEA?
What kind of rules can be endogenously applied to reduce free-riding incentives to
participate in IEAs? How does climate change-related structural change effect the
formation of interest groups at the national level and hence the outcome of political
decisions nationally and internationally? What is the impact of voting rules on the
choice of particular environmental instruments? In order to deal with these and related
questions, the climate change problem has to be looked at from a political economy
perspective. The topic of political economy is introduced in the following section. After
defining political economy, a short overview of research contributions in the field of
the “political economy of climate policy” is given. Different interests within society on
environmental policy and its instruments are summarized as a next step. Finally, there is
a short overview of the chapters of this thesis that are related to the “political economy
of climate policy”.
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1.4 Political Economy of Climate Policy: An Introduction
1.4.1 Definition and Basic Assumptions
Political economy and economics were synonyms until the early 20th century. This
changed when economics evolved to be the term denoting a discipline, and political
economy was used to describe different phenomena within the discipline (Groenewe-
gen, 1987; Besley, 2007). Today, the notion of political economy is closely related to the
extension of economic models about collective decision making. Nevertheless, there are
still differing concepts of political economy. As a result, political economy can only be
defined broadly, as a clear cut definition would exclude some research fields in this area.
For the remainder of this thesis the following interpretation of political economy will be
used:
“[Political economy] refers to the study of the collective or political processes through which public
economic decisions are made” (Oates and Portney, 2003, p. 327).
From the previous description of policy instruments, it can be seen that from a pure
economic perspective there are different propositions on how to design optimal (efficient)
measures internalizing externalities. Theoretically, market-based instruments are supe-
rior to other approaches because of the predicted static and dynamic efficiency. However,
if it comes to the implementation of policy measures, it can often be observed that (1) the
first best solution is not applied (this goes in hand with inefficiencies), and/or there are
(2) problems related to effectiveness. For applied economics, there is the complicacy that
besides market failure there is the problem of state failure. From a positive perspective,
political economy studies the underlying process leading to these unintended outcomes.
From a normative perspective, the findings from political economy can also help to find
solutions for the inefficiencies resulting from state failure (cf. Vanberg, 2005). In what
follows the focus will be on the political economy of environmental policy, mainly from
a positive perspective. Normative questions are further elaborated in the last chapter of
this thesis.
In order to explain decision making outcomes on the macro level in many cases
the median voter model serves as a background (cf. Mueller, 2003, pp. 231). In this
framework collective decision making is an outcome of the voters’ preferences in the
context of direct democracy or indirect democracy (decision making is delegated to
elected representatives). As the underlying assumption is the application of majority
rule, the median voters’ preferences determine decision making outcomes (Black, 1948;
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Downs, 1957).17 Even though the median voter model is central to many political
economy models, in many cases it is a too simplifying assumption.
Another model describing decision making is the theory on regulation, or the so-
called Stigler and Peltzman model (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976). This model assumes
that regulated entities have certain possibilities to apply pressure on the regulatory
authority. Possibilities to apply pressure are public campaigns of criticism, the threat of
losing jobs, the threat of quitting the budget generating relationship (over outsourcing)
and/or campaigns resulting in a loss of votes for the incumbent government. Pressure
is applied in order to escape (or reduce) the burden of regulation. It might also be that
regulation turns out to be beneficial for the regulated entities. The regulating agency
offers services in exchange for the maintenance of the relationship with the regulated
sector.18 The model is closely related to the theory of bureaucracy (Niskanen, 1968,
1971). The Stigler and Peltzman model is useful for explaining problems that come with
environmental regulation. An example is given by the regulation of the GT sector in
Germany.
One further model serving as a background to understanding policy making on
national and international levels builds on Olson’s (1965) seminal contribution on “the
logic of collective action”. As with the theory of public goods, interest groups are
confronted with free-rider problems. In many cases this limits the capability to organize
common interests and to influence decision making to support these common interests.19
One possibility to overcome this free-rider problem is to provide some direct services to
themembers of the interest group. Inmany cases groupmembership is also coercive (as a
result of interest groups being successful in lobbying for mandatory group membership).
In both cases, it comes down to organized interest groups being able to enforce (or
maintain) their interests. These interests mostly deviate from common interests (e.g. the
interests of the median voter). In many cases lobbying takes place in order to generate
rents and/or to maintain rents and this increases inefficiencies. The price (in terms
of social costs) is then paid by those who are not able to organize their interests (e.g.
consumers).
1.4.2 Political Economy of Environmental Policy
One early contribution on the political economy of environmental regulation comes
from Buchanan and Tullock (1975). They focus on the incentives at the firm level and
argue that emission standards are preferred to emission taxes because they can increase
profits. Profits are assumed to be positively affected because emission standards serve as
17Representatives are elected over majority vote.
18For a brief discussion of some model limitations compare Oates and Portney (2003).
19Under majority vote one can define common interests as the interests that are related to the median
voter.
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an entry barrier for new firms. The situation is different for charges (taxes), as they have
to be paid by established firms and new firms. The model builds on the assumption
of incomplete competition and on the assumption that regulated industries are able to
exert their preferences over the instrument that is applied (in contrast to the consumers
who are relatively worse off compared to the charges approach). This basic framework
has been extended (e.g. Coelho, 1976; Dewees, 1983; Yohe, 1976).
What can be influenced by interest groups is the stringency (or effectiveness) of
environmental regulation. Lobbying can be applied at different points of the decision
making process with different impacts on stringency (Magat et al., 1986). The role of
institutions (e.g. for decision making) has been analyzed by Campos (1989). He is able to
show that different voting procedures, as well as other forms of legislative institutions,
have an influence on the political outcome. An influential model has been developed by
Becker (1983). The underlying assumption is that interest groups use political power
to benefit from redistribution of rents. This implies that governments have to select
among the pool of available policy choices those instruments which are more powerful
in distributing rents from less organized interest groups to more organized interest
groups. As an implicit result, it turns out that environmental regulation generates high
inefficiencies.
What also matters to politicians is the delegation and separation of power. Some
democratic entities have a major interest in maximizing control over other entities (e.g.
certain industries). McCubbins and Page (1986) argue that CCPs are applied more often
than market-based approaches because political entities try to maintain and/or increase
their power. In contrast, market-based approaches allow firms more flexibility which
also reduces political influence on private decisions. This theory is closely related to the
theory of bureaucracy.
Other studies look at the preferences of the voters and their influence on decision
making. Interesting in this context is the effect of income levels on environmental
regulation. Tucker (1982) focused on welfare effects within the U.S. and came to the
conclusion that rich people benefit most from high environmental standards. This is
somehow in line with the findings of Ackerman and Hassler (1981). They found that
coalitions among environmentalists and industries are possible. This can be the case if
environmental regulation carries the threat of imposing harm on the industry in the form
of job losses. There is further empirical evidence that voters care more about short-term
economic development (income level and/or unemployment) than about the ecological
situation (Paldam, 1991; Schneider, 1994). As a consequence, political parties can win
more votes with short-term policies (Frey, 1992; Horbach, 1992).
The impact of eduction on environmental preferences has been analyzed by Kahn
and Matsusaka (1997). They used data from the U.S. and found that education affected
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environmental preferences positively. The authors interpret these results to suggest
that less skilled workers are more directly affected by environmental regulation (e.g.
over wages or possible job losses). Schneider and Volkert (1999) come to similar results
and show that education has a positive influence on the election results of strongly
environmental-oriented parties.
This short introduction into the political economy of environmental policy makes
clear that political outcomes depend highly on the influence of the groups of actors that
are engaged in environmental policy making. Next, the interests of the different actors
within the economy are introduced. The line of arguments mainly follows Kirchgässner
and Schneider (2003) (compare also Kollmann and Schneider, 2010). This description of
different interests serves as a background to facilitate an understanding of the following
chapters.
Kirchgässner and Schneider (2003) follow Frey (1992) and distinguish among four
different main actors: (i) voters, (ii) politicians, (iii) public bureaucrats, and (iv) those
who are related to the industry (including capital owners, managers and employees).
Part of the discussion are the incentives to establish market-based approaches in com-
parison to command and control policies (Frey, 1992, pp. 134).
Voters
It can be said that voters are increasingly concerned about environmental issues. Never-
theless, environmental interests ‘compete’ with other interests that are mainly ‘purely’
economic in nature. For instance, in the case of climate change, investment in CO2
reducing abatement technologies is a global public good. One important question for
voters is related to distributional effects of the costs. In most cases the costs are delegated
to the consumers.20 This makes many environmental policies unpopular with voters.
Only in cases of high price elasticity are the costs delegated to industry related interests.
If a region where the industry is located is negatively (positively) affected by environ-
mental policy, resistance (support) is supposed to be high.21 Whether overall regulation
is at a level that is too low or too high is not clear. Climate change policy can again be
used as an example. If the industry that is negatively affected by climate change policies
dominates within a region (e.g. a country or county) climate change policy can be at
a level that is too low (Kirchgässner and Schneider, 2003, p. 374). If structural change
towards more climate friendly technologies takes place (e.g. the GT sector), partial
industry related interests might also support strict climate change policies. Whether
20Of major importance is the price elasticity of demand. For low price elasticities of demand and/or very
elastic supply consumers have to pay the major costs related to environmental protection.
21Horbach (1992) found for Germany that the Green Party receives less votes in regions with high unem-
ployment and/or a high concentration of industries which could be negatively affected by environmental
regulation.
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environmental regulation is at a level that is too high or too low depends on the industry
specific pattern.
A decrease in the resistance of voters to environmental friendly policy measures can
emerge from the double dividend. The revenues from environmental taxes can be used
to reduce other (distorting) tax burdens. While this alternative seems to be promising,
empirical evidence shows that the expected losers in such a tax reform would lobby
strongly against it (Kollmann and Schneider, 2010). Support for strict environmental
policy can emerge if there is underemployment in a certain region and environmental
standards can be combined with the production of consumer goods (better environ-
mental quality and higher real incomes). Under these specific circumstances efficient
environmental standards can gain political support.
However, there is still the problem of the majority of voters being short-term rather
than long-term oriented (Paldam, 1991; Schneider, 1994). One major problem is that cli-
mate change policies are mainly beneficial for future generations but the abatement costs
reduce current consumption levels. As a consequence, this can result in an undersupply
of climate change policies (Frey, 1992; Horbach, 1992).
From the perspective of voters it is difficult to find reasons why CCPs are more
often applied than market-based instruments. Voters preferences point more in the
direction of them being in favor of CCPs. One reason might be that they prefer not to be
confronted with the costs that are more apparent in the case of market-based instruments
(Kirchgässner and Schneider, 2003, pp. 373-375).
The evaluation of recent empirical studies generally confirms the arguments men-
tioned above (Kollmann and Schneider, 2010, pp. 14). The following three conclusions
can be drawn: (1) contributions to the public good “environment” is confronted with
free-rider problems; (2) there is a time gap between the investment and resulting bene-
fits, and this explains why environmental issues are rather unpopular; (3) voters give
other problems, such as unemployment, a higher priority than environmental issues
(Kollmann and Schneider, 2010, p. 17).
Politicians
It is assumed that politicians will pursue a certain policy if it serves the interests of
the median voter provided there is no considerable resistance from influential interest
groups or the bureaucracy. Thus, if voters accept (or even demand) suboptimal levels of
environmental protection, and if politicians maximize the chance to be re-elected, there
are few incentives to push for strict environmental policies.
The assumption that the main aim of governments is to get re-elected is too strict
for particular cases. There are cases where re-election prospects act as a constraint
but are not the overriding factor determining a government’s actions. This can theo-
retically be explained by combining the partisan hypothesis (Hibbs, 1977, 1992) with
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politico-economic models (Frey and Schneider, 1978b,a, 1979). Where there is a coalition
government, including a ‘green’ party and a dominant party that has strong relations to
interest groups supporting environmental policies like emission reduction, a stronger
climate change policy can emerge relative to the median voters’ preferences. Re-election
prospects are the limiting factor. There is still the question of whether this policy is
efficiently applied or not. If there is no real pressure from voters, then bureaucratic
instruments seem to be attractive because they allow control of industries directly.
Market-based approaches are also attractive, as they can generate revenues. On the
one hand these revenues can be invested to increase re-election chances. On the other
hand, market-based approaches generating revenues for the government might also
strengthen the opposition (Kirchgässner and Schneider, 2003, p. 376).
In comparing tradable certificates to environmental taxes, it can be seen that envi-
ronmental taxes have advantages over tradable permits as the latter instrument is often
perceived as a “licence[] to pollute the environment” (Kirchgässner and Schneider, 2003,
p. 376). Thus, promoting or endorsing tradable permits would seem to be politically
unsound for politicians who are known to be concerned with in efforts to save the world
climate (cf. Ott and Sachs, 2000). Additionally, if tradable permits are grandfathered to
the industry the government does not receive revenues, suggesting that environmental
taxes are preferred to tradable permits.
In general, one can expect that governments’ preferences for climate protection poli-
cies are too low. Further, there is the argument that politicians have no direct preference
for market-based instruments over command and control policies. Market-based instru-
ments have the major advantage in generating revenue. However, in many cases this
incentive is not strong enough to overcome the “bias” toward command and control.
Politicians make use of the different policy options to react to other agents’ interests.
Hence, the design of a specific policy is mainly influenced by the affected interest groups
(Kollmann and Schneider, 2010, p. 20).
Bureaucracy
The bureaucracy is strongly opposed to market-based instruments. Bureaucrats prefer
command and control as this policy option “strengthens their personal position in the
environmental policy game” (Kirchgässner and Schneider, 2003, p. 380). Empirical
evidence is provided by Holzinger (1987) and it turns out that bureaucracies favor
environmental regulation that is labor and resource intensive. Typically, this is the case
with command and control policies (cf. Kollmann and Schneider, 2010, pp. 23). This
finding is in line with the theory of bureaucracy (Niskanen, 1968, 1971). Bureaucracies
have an interest in maintaining high administrative control. Further, they like to have
the greatest possible leeway and a budget they can distribute without the control of
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politicians. Discretionary budgets are also important in meeting the demands of the
particular lobbying groups for which the bureaucracy is responsible.
Market-based instruments, with a major focus on environmental taxes, are less at-
tractive to the bureaucracy, compared to command and control. Command and control
policies are relatively labor and cost intensive. Substituting CCPs with market-based in-
struments would require a high degree of flexibility from bureaucrats, and market-based
approaches could increase the efficiency of bureaucratic processes. This can conflict with
the interests of the bureaucracy, as it becomes more difficult to justify large staff numbers
and large budgets. Taken together, the different arguments suggest that bureaucracies
have a high preference for CCPs. Nevertheless, regulating bureaucracies also have an
interest in high environmental quality (Kirchgässner and Schneider, 2003, pp. 380-381).
Industry
It is often said by officials of regulated industries that they support market-based policy
instruments. What turns out to be difficult is their implementation. In many cases,
when the discussion is about implementation of environmental taxes, industries favor
voluntary agreements. If the discussion is about the implementation of an emission
trading scheme grandfathering is of major interest. From the point of view of an industry,
CCPs are preferred over tradable certificates, with grandfathering. Environmental taxes
gain only low support. The major reason industries oppose market-based instruments
can be found in the high efficiency. What also matters for industries are distributional
effects.
Political pressure can be brought to bear through lobbying. According to Coen (2007),
lobbyists can be seen as an “organization or individual that seeks to influence policy, but
does not seek to be elected”. If an industry prefers CCPs over market-based instruments,
it tries to make use of lobbying to influence policy into this direction.
Firms have strong arguments based on international competition, employment issues
or the threat to displace the industry. If command and control policies are applied, firms
can make use of these arguments in negotiations. In the case of environmental taxes,
it is more difficult to negotiate on the price as the tax rate will be the same for each
firm. On average, one can expect CCPs to be less effective, compared to market-based
instruments, making CCPs more attractive to industry.
Distributional consequences are related to the possibility of increasing market power
by application of command and control policies (Buchanan and Tullock, 1975). This can
have a positive effect on wages and/or profits within an industry. The same argument
holds if tradable certificates are grandfathered to an industry.
This shows why industries generally oppose market-based instruments. In the case
that industries have to accept the implementation of a market-based instruments, they
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prefer grandfathered tradable certificates over environmental taxes. The European Emis-
sion Trading System (EU-ETS) is an example. Industries were able to influence policy in
the direction of grandfather certificates despite the fact that auctioning is theoretically
superior and would increase governments revenues (cf. Goeree et al., 2010; Convery,
2009; Goers et al., 2010). It can further be expected that traditional industries have
good opportunities to maintain their interests over those of most environmental interest
groups. Five major arguments support this view. (1) Industry-related interest groups
have sufficient financial resources for efficient lobbying (cf. Kollmann and Schneider,
2010). (2) Producers are close to the environmental problems making them experts
regarding questions of environmental regulation in the form of CCPs. This generates
asymmetrical information problems. Environmental interest groups, in contrast, have
difficulties gaining the necessary information. Gullberg (2008) has been able to show for
Europe that traditional industries are better connected and have more power to influ-
ence policy than is the case for green interest groups. (3) The asymmetrical information
problem helps industries to influence public opinion. They have an advantage over
interest groups supporting environmental causes. (4) Industry interest groups have
‘market power’ because they can always argue on the basis of employment within the
industry, as well as the possibility of transferring production abroad. (5) Representatives
of these industries also have personal representatives in legislative institutions. This
helps them to maintain their interests (Kirchgässner and Schneider, 2003, pp. 379).
At this stage, it is important to mention that the arguments presented are also valid
for those industries that are positively linked to the climate change problem (e.g. the
GT sector). This reasoning is not elaborated enough in Kirchgässner and Schneider
(2003) or Kollmann and Schneider (2010). From this perspective the primary arguments
get more complicated as there is competition between old (polluting industries) and new
(environmental friendly) industries to influence political decisions (e.g. Jacobsson and
Lauber, 2008). Structural change towards climate friendly technologies implies that the
GT sector carries more political weight (cf. Svendsen, 2003; Brandt and Svendsen, 2006).
The argument that green interest groups are weak in influencing political outcomes,
compared to traditional industries, is only convincing for those countries where the GT
sector operates on low scale.
In comparing bureaucratic interests with industry-related interests, it turns out that
industries favor soft and inefficient policy instruments, whereas bureaucracies prefer the
effective use of command and control policies. Whether a policy can be strictly applied
or not is dependent on the preferences of the voters. From an intertemporal perspective,
it seems that voters support strict environmental policies if an environmental problem
is already apparent. If the consequences are somewhere in the future they prefer low
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regulatory standards.22 From an international perspective, climate change policy is
expected to be at a level that is too low (Kirchgässner and Schneider, 2003, pp. 381).
Some of the studies presented in the next chapters have a related perspective to
the line of arguments presented above. However, there is one important difference.
At the industry level the major focus is on industries benefiting from the problem of
climate change. These industries are also well organized and successful in influencing
policy making in favor of their own interests. From a national perspective (e.g. in
the case of Germany), the industrial specialization pattern is, therefore, important in
evaluating the “optimality” of climate change policy. There is, further, the argument
that structural change in the energy system might evolve over time from countries with
high environmental standards to the current free-riding countries. IEAs are important
in this context. This more dynamic perspective has not been a major focus of the current
literature on the political economy of climate policy, so far.
The following thesis builds on the theory of political economy and climate change
policy. Command and control policies compared to market-based instruments is one
focus of the research. Structural change in the energy sector is another focus. It is further
the aim to test institutional factors that are endogenously implemented by policy-makers
in order to improve political outcomes. This thesis makes a modest attempt to address
the different questions related to the political economy of climate policy.
1.4.3 Aim and Approach of this Thesis
The thesis at hand contributes to the literature about the political economy of climate
policy. This is done from a national and international perspective. Chapters 2 and 3
analyze structural change in the energy sector, mainly from a national perspective.
Chapter 2 looks at the policy instruments implemented in order to foster diffusion of
green technologies with a focus on effectiveness and efficiency. The discussion on the
efficiency of command and control is of particular interest. In chapter 3 there is an
assessment of structural change with a focus on innovative activity. In this context,
innovations serve as an indicator for structural change. Chapter 4 deals with national
as well as international differences with respect to diffusion of GTs. It seems that
some countries have difficulties in fostering diffusion of GTs. The focus is on the
national interests of the German government supporting strict environmental standards
internationally. The structure of national interest groups has an impact on decision
making in the context of international policy coordination. In chapter 5, the focus is on
policy coordination (e.g. in the form of IEAs) from a long-term perspective. The major
22Kirchgässner and Schneider (2003) make the example that there is a considerable improvement in water
quality of rivers and lakes but almost no effective policy reaction to the problem of climate change.
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question is whether medium-term targets are helpful, unimportant or detrimental in
approaching long-term targets. Chapter 6 examines the impact minimum participation
rules have on the stability of IEAs. This institution requires that a minimum number of
countries participate in an agreement in order to make the agreement binding. Chapter 7
discusses the particular case of European environmental policy for regulating the GHG
emissions of private transport. The focus is, again, on the choice of policy instruments
in combination with different voting procedures. Chapter 8 brings the main results
together and draws some final conclusions.
As all of the chapters look at the climate change problem from different perspectives,
they can be read independently (abbreviations are newly introduced at the beginning of
each chapter). To facilitate selective reading, an overview of the individual chapters is
given.
1.4.4 Structure
Chapter 2 discusses aspects related to the GT sector in Germany. As a first step, institu-
tional reforms enabling diffusion of green technologies are analyzed. Cost arguments
are also taken into account. As a second step, a theoretical model developed by Tanguay
et al. (2004) is modified in order to evaluate the efficiency of the institutional setting in a
political economy framework. The model is able to show that command and control
policies are accompanied by cost inefficiencies, depending on the political weight of
technology related interest groups. There is, further, the result that relatively high
marginal production costs may generate suboptimal high diffusion of a certain GT j. For
relatively low marginal production costs policy induced demand may also be too low.
Chapter 3 is about structural change in the energy system. By focusing on different
green technology industries in Germany, it is of particular interest how policy induced
demand stimulates innovation. Taking the change in market size as a proxy for increas-
ing demand, and patent counts as a proxy for innovation, there is evidence that the
presence of institutions enabling diffusion of GTs is correlated with innovative activity.
In addition, a structural break is controlled for by comparing the two institutional set-
tings incorporated into the legal system in Germany, namely the Electricity Feed Law
and the Renewable Energy Sources Act.
Chapter 4 discusses the political economy of climate protection by combining na-
tional and international interests. The objective is to come to a better understanding of
why climate change has become one of the main topics in the domestic agenda of some
countries (e.g. Germany), despite the fact that there are obvious free-riding problems
resulting in increasing difficulties for international policy coordination. Using a strategic
trade policy framework, the paper discusses, theoretically, the incentives for domestic
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policy-makers to advocate an ambitious climate policy and assesses these incentives
empirically with econometric methods.23
Chapter 5 is about viewing individual contributions as investments in emission re-
duction. We rely on the familiar linear public goods game to set global reduction targets
which, if missed, imply that all payoffs are lost with a certain probability. Regulation by
milestones imposes not only a final reduction target but also intermediate targets. In our
leading example, the regulating agency is Mother Nature, but our analysis can, of course,
also be applied to other regulating agencies. We are mainly testing for milestone effects
by varying the size of milestones in addition to changing the marginal productivity of
individual contributions and the probability of a loss.24
Chapter 6 looks at minimum participation rules. They are implemented in almost
all international environmental agreements. Under such a rule, an agreement becomes
legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution
is reached. The model is a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous
countries in order to study the endogenous choice of a minimum participation rule and
its role in the success of international environmental agreements.25
Chapter 7 deals with a global public bad and evaluates environmental policy options
in order to internalize externalities. With a focus on the Commission’s proposal on
reducing CO2 emissions from passenger cars, regulation will distort competition and
constrain consumer sovereignty. Political economy considerations are taken into account
to identify additional problems. The study comes to the conclusion that a demand side
approach is to be highly recommended. Two important lessons can be derived from
the discussion. First, market-based instruments applied on the demand side (taxes or
certificates) seem to be optimal to tackle the problem of CO2 emissions generated by
private transportation. Second, different voting rules applied to different environmental
instruments may distort political decisions towards the direction of non-market-based
instruments.26
Chapter 8 is dedicated to final conclusions, the central results of the different chapters
and development trends of climate change policy with respect to policy implications.
23Leo Wangler came up with the initial idea and was responsible for the theoretical and the empirical
part of this chapter. All other parts were in equal responsibility of the two authors.
24Leo Wangler and Hannes Koppel have developed together the basic idea and were responsible for the
instructions, controll questions, data collection by running the experiment and the empirical part of this
chapter. Werner Güth was mainly responsible for the mathematical formulation of the model. All other
parts were in equal responsibility of the four authors.
25Leo Wangler has written the main part of the introduction, the literature overview and the political
economy analysis. Hans-Peter Weikard and Leo Wangler have developed together the idea for the model.
Hans-Peter Weikard was mainly responsible for the mathematical formulation of the model. All other parts
were in equal responsibility of the three authors.
26Leo Wangler came up with the initial idea for this chapter and was responsible for the theoretical
and political economy considerations. Bianka Dettmer has mainly contributed to the supply and demand
patterns in the automotive industry. All other parts were in equal responsibility of the two authors.
Chapter 2
Political Economy of the Green
Technology Sector∗
2.1 Introduction
Diffusion of green technologies (GTs) is highly dependent on the institutional setting.
The targets policy-makers are trying to achieve by increasing the share of electricity
produced with GTs are well defined under the “Renewable Energy Sources Act” (EEG).
As stated in Article (1), the EEG is an act aimed to
“facilitate a sustainable development of energy supply, particularly for the sake of protecting our
climate and the environment, to reduce the costs of energy supply to the national economy, also
by incorporating external long-term effects, to conserve fossil fuels and to promote the further
development of technologies for the generation of electricity from renewable energy sources”.
(EEG, 2009)
Diffusion of GTs is fostered by the definition of political targets. Up to 2010 it was the
target to increase the share of renewable energy production in the internal electricity
market to a level of 12.5 percent (EU, 2001) on average in all European countries. The
European proposal for 2020 is to achieve a share of 20 percent (COM, 2008). Germany
aims to achieve a share of 30 percent of electricity production with GTs by 2020 (EEG,
2008). The future role given to electricity produced with GTs underlines the importance
of studying the legal system responsible for structural change in the energy system.
∗This chapter is mainly based on Wangler (2010a). I am indebted to Andreas Freytag, Sebastian v.
Engelhardt, Hannes Koppel, Oliver Kirchkamp, Georges Tanguay and Tina Wolf for helpful comments on
an earlier version of this work.
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The current system responsible for diffusion of GTs is best described as a command
and control policy instrument (CCP instrument).1 The aim of this chapter is to make a
contribution to the assessment of the EEG and the related diffusion of GTs with a focus
on efficiency. As the EEG indirectly connects supply of green electricity with demand for
GTs, it was an effective tool to promote the settlement of certain GT industries. Because
there is a lot of uncertainty related to the success of GTs and their future development,
it is difficult to make a statement about the overall success of the EEG as a tool for
industrial policy. However, we will be able to show, theoretically, that even though
there might be positive effects related to the diffusion of GTs, the level of diffusion
very likely turns out to be non-optimal (even though we abstract from incomplete
information and transaction costs).2 This does not necessarily mean that too much
energy is produced with a certain GT j. The result of our model suggests that GTs
with relatively high marginal production costs (production costs relative to the positive
externality) very likely diffuse at too high levels whereas technologies with relatively
low marginal production costs very likely diffuse at a level that is too low. This result is
counterintuitive and new to the literature. It is in line with the empirical observation
that politicians try to adjust feed-in tariffs to decreasing marginal production costs.
The outline is structured as follows: In a first step in section 2.2 we connect envi-
ronmental policy to the literature of Law and Economics. We proceed in section 2.2
by giving a short overview of different studies with the focus on the political economy
of environmental policy. Then, research contributions about structural change in the
energy sector are reviewed. Section 2.3 describes the underlying institutions of the EEG
and its antecedent, the “Electricity Feed Law” (SEG) in more detail. Section 2.4 takes a
closer look at the diffusion of GTs and the related costs. What follows in section 2.5 is a
theoretical model based on Tanguay et al. (2004) and the Economic Theory of Regulation
developed by Stigler (1971). The model assesses the EEG from a political economy
perspective. In section 2.7, the different results of the previous chapters are put together
to draw a conclusion.
1One definition for CCPs is given as follows: “Under a command-and-control approach, government
regulators specify the control technology or the maximum levels of pollution [. . . ]. Other approaches, such
as market-based incentives or contractual arrangements, allow sources much more flexibility to take into
account variances in costs, production processes, and individual circumstances relevant to environmental
protection goals.” (Stewart, 1993, p. 2057, fn. 79). For further discussion of CCPs compare Ackerman and
Stewart (1987).
2In the context of this chapter the term “inefficiency” or “non-optimality” means that diffusion is either
too low or too high.
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2.2 Environmental Policy and Renewable Energies
2.2.1 Environmental Law and Economics
From an economic policy point of view, it is an important question to find appropriate
policy-instruments to cope with environmental problems (Pearce, 1991). Many theo-
retical arguments go in the direction that market-based instruments, such as taxes and
tradable certificates, are superior to other approaches which do not make use of the
price mechanism to deal with environmental problems (Baumol and Oates, 1988). A
combination of standards and prices may also allow desirable outcomes to be achieved
(Baumol and Oates, 1971). The major advantage of market-based approaches is related
to flexibility and cost-effectiveness.
That environmental taxation can be used to enhance economic efficiency is based
on the work of Pigou (1920). Under the existence of externalities, there is a divergence
among social and private costs. Optimality would require that marginal taxes on a
particular negative externality are set equal to marginal social damages. Social damages
can be interpreted to be the difference between private and social costs. An ecological
tax confronts polluters with the “true” social costs of the production activity, with the
possible result that emissions will be reduced.
Coase (1960) challenged the common view that government activism is a first best
solution to cope with the externality problem. In his seminal article “The Problem of
Social Costs”, Coase pointed out that under well defined property rights and negligible
transaction costs voluntary negotiations are able to generate a Pareto optimal outcome.
The novelty of this new paradigm lies, on the one hand, in the emphasis on making
use of the legal system to overcome the externality problem and, on the other hand, the
problem of transaction costs being seen as the main reason why private negotiations
may not generate the social optimum. It is, therefore, of particular interest to study
the legal system with a major focus on the role of transaction costs. Theoretically, an
institutional setting that is in line with low transaction costs and private exchange of
property rights is markets set up to allow trade in externalities. Market prices for the
certificates indicate the external costs related to the externality and producers have
incentives to integrate the externality into their optimization calculations (Norregaard
and Reppeling-Hill, 2000).
Even though ecological taxes also have to be treated as market-based instruments,
there are severe difficulties in using them efficiently, in practice. One of the problems
is that a taxing authority needs complete knowledge of all relevant external costs in
order to generate an optimal outcome. Taxation can only be efficient if there is complete
knowledge about the externalities and the activities by which they are caused, and the
related utilities, damages and marginal costs also have to be taken into consideration
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(Paulus and Limburg, 1995, p. 27). In order to make taxes applicable, authorities
also need to know the relative share the pollution generating source has on the total
externality. The need for complete information about the related external costs makes it
difficult to apply ecological taxes efficiently. The difficulty of their practical application
is one of the major reasons why economists often treat ecological taxes more as a
theoretical benchmark than as an efficient policy device (Paulus and Limburg, 1995,
p. 28). The knowledge required in the case of tradable certificates is the total quantity of
the externality that is socially acceptable. A system with tradable certificates does not
require any knowledge about marginal damage or costs. This is one reason why tradable
certificates seem to be a good instrument for coping with environmental problems like
air pollution (Crocker, 1966). Tradable certificates also turned out to be superior to taxes
by taking cost arguments into account (Dales, 1968; Montgomery, 1972). If the focus
is on specific transaction costs the same conclusion can be drawn (Crals and Vereeck,
2005). Straightforward theoretical arguments for the rare use of tradable certificates are
missing. Why CCPs, in general, are more often applied than market-based instruments
can be explained by the political economy of environmental policy (Yandle, 1999).
2.2.2 Political Economy of Environmental Policy
Early work worth mentioning in this context has been done by Buchanan and Tullock
(1975). The authors compare command and control policies with market-based instru-
ments in competitive markets. The question is why market-based instruments in most
cases are not the first choice of policy-makers. The main reason why governments more
often support direct control policies is due to the lobbying activities of the regulated
industries. The incentive to lobby against environmental taxes is linked to the efficiency
of a penalty tax (Buchanan and Tullock, 1975, p. 140). Redistribution of property rights
might be significant and firms will lobby in favor of abatement subsidies. If firms
compare the penalty tax with results expected from regulation, regulation might be
beneficial to a particular industry as it implements barriers to market entrance. This
result also demonstrates the power of certain interest groups, as command and control
policies do not increase the political budget and are therefore relatively unattractive to
policy-makers.
Kirchgässner and Schneider (2003) have studied the acceptance of CCP measures
by looking at the different actors who shape and influence the political outcome. The
interests of four groups of actors are described in detail: voters, politicians, public bu-
reaucrats and the owners or decision makers of those industries to be regulated. It turns
out that, beside the industries which are regulated, bureaucrats have a high interest in
CCP measures. This finding is mainly based on the fact that CCP “strengthens [the]
[..] personal position [of bureaucrats] in the environmental policy game” (Kirchgässner
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and Schneider, 2003, p. 380). The constitutional setting of the political process seems
to be important for the success of market-based instruments (e.g. taxes or certificates).
Decentralized systems tend to be closer to individual preferences and seem to be more
successful in implementing environmental reforms that favor the public interest. Ele-
ments of direct democracy are instruments that are equally important. Compensating
citizens with general tax reductions might also help in implementing ecological taxes or
tradable permits. That environmental taxes do not always increase the budget of policy-
makers is the result of a study by Fredriksson (2001). Taxes may have the surprising
effect of decreasing the revenue of the government. This is mainly due to the fact that
industries are likely to lobby for abatement subsidies.
How citizens have been successful in a political contest against a monopolistic
energy supplier in Germany is described by Graichen et al. (2001). The authors use
a case study to demonstrate that self-organization of citizens with respect to energy
production can be successful. A theoretical model shows the determinants necessary to
get the results reported in the study. Thalmann (2004) uses an empirical approach to
find the determinants behind the failure to implement ecological tax reform measures
in Switzerland. One result shows that awareness of the expected social benefits of
ecological tax reforms is important. The failure of the referendum is mainly explained
by a misunderstanding the expected benefits. The influence of different political systems
on environmental regulation has been analyzed by Fredriksson and Wollscheid (2007).
Contrary to suggestions in the literature, they did not find support for the hypothesis
that democratic systems have a significant positive effect on environmental stringency.
Their findings are based on an empirical cross country analysis involving 163 countries.
Fredriksson et al. (2007) use an empirical approach to determine whether corruption
hinders or facilitates environmental lobbying. The panel they use includes 170 countries.
They found that an increase in environmental lobbying had a significant impact on
the probability of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. The positive impact they found
was additionally positively correlated with the degree of corruption within countries.
Tanguay et al. (2004) use an extended theoretical approach to Stigler’s theory about
public interest in the context of environmental regulation.3 The empirical study supports
the view that with respect to environmental regulation interest groups have an influence
on the political outcomes and distort optimal results.
2.2.3 Change in the Energy System
The history of renewable energies is quite old. As stated by Sørensen (1991), during a
long period of human history, renewable energy was the only energy option available.
3The approach proposed by Stigler was criticized by Posner (1974) because of the need for formalization
of the model. A first formalization was made by Peltzman (1976). Therefore, in the literature the Stigler
model is often called Stigler-Peltzman-Model.
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The emergence of conventional energy production came about mainly due to the cost
argument. Nowadays, the increase in prices for fossil energy sources, as well as envi-
ronmental damages, are the main reason why policy-makers are again focusing on GTs
(Sørensen, 1991, p. 10). In the context of environmental damages, global warming plays
an important role. The argument for sustainability is used as an additional argument to
justify diffusion of GTs (EEG, 2004). However, once the interest rate related to extraction
of non-renewable energy is affected by investment into so-called “backstop technologies”
(Nordhaus, 1973),4 the speed of extraction can be assumed to increase rather than to de-
crease. This counterintuitive result mainly builds on well known theoretical arguments
coming from environmental and resource economics (compare among others Hotelling,
1931; Dasgupta and Heal, 1974). Theoretically, diffusion of backstop technologies could
evolve endogenously once a change in relative prices for conventional energy makes
investment into GTs profitable (Nordhaus, 1973). It can be seen that there is a lack of
straightforward theoretical arguments that justify a managed transition towards an
energy system that mainly builds on GTs (compare also Sinn, 2008).
Dröge and Schröder (2005) evaluate whether subsidizing the green sector or taxing
the polluting sectors are more efficient instruments to turn an industry green. They
use simulation analysis and come to the result that a tax would be the optimal political
instrument. If the sector polluting the environment is economically important, a subsidy
of the green sector (e.g.t̃he GT sector) is also acceptable. The pioneering work of
Nordhaus (1973) has been developed further by Chakravorty et al. (1997). The authors
distinguish between the extractions of different resources. The simulation results show
that if a shift towards a primary use of solar energy was to become profitable, the
increase in world temperatures turns out to be less than predicted by the United Nations
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Even though they have focused on the
technology of solar energy in their study, other “backstop technologies” may also play a
role.
A review of the demand for green power is presented by Bird et al. (2002). The study
gives an overview of the demand for contracts for electricity produced with GTs in
countries like Australia, Canada, Japan, the US and several countries in Europe. In some
countries the market share of contracts for green electricity is about 10 percent. At the
global level, the average market share for such contracts was relatively low and did
not exceed 1 percent. Factors that can be considered as driving forces for an increasing
market share of green electricity contracts are customer education, aggressive marketing,
price and transparency (e.g. product labeling) (Bird et al., 2002, p. 530).
More common than studies about the demand for green electricity are studies fo-
cusing on the supply of green technologies. Studies using a supply-side approach in
4Technologies able to produce energy without the use of non-renewable energy sources.
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most cases give an overview of the policy-induced structural change related to GTs
and the driving forces behind it. Jacobsson and Lauber (2008) describe in detail the
development of the GT sector and the factors which have been important in its evolution.
Their main argument is that the evolution of the GT sector in Germany was a “battle
over institutions” between conventional energy producers and the renewable energy
supporters.
The apparent success of feed-in tariffs (FITs) is summarized by Wüstenhagen and
Bilharz (2006).5 In section 2.3 and 2.5 we will describe in more detail the interesting
fact that feed-in tariffs are able to connect supply/demand for a certain GT j with the
supply/demand of green electricity. Langniß et al. (2008) study the institutional setting
in Germany and develop policy conclusions by detecting parameters influencing the
likelihood of political support for GTs. Agnolucci (2003) analyzes factors that can be
considered as the main drivers for institutional change within the energy sector. With
respect to the results, financial sustainability is a decisive factor. Furthermore, it has
been found that different political factors, such as size and variety of coalitions, play a
major role. Initiatives on the implementation of green technologies coming from the
European Union (EU) play a similar important role (Agnolucci, 2003, pp. 148).
So far, the main findings can be summarized as follows. First, if we were to build
an institutional arrangement for internalization of negative externalities related to
conventional energy production, tradable certificates turn out to be a kind of first best
solution. This result can be simply derived by application of the Coase theorem. The
review of recent public choice literature has shown that beside the “‘desirability” of
environmental policy, the political process has some shortcomings leading to different
results from those initially intended. Third, several studies assess the determinants of
structural change towards a more environmental oriented policy and support for the GT
sector. Structural change in the energy system is something that can be observed from
different perspectives. The following section introduces the institutional framework
enabling energy production by GTs in Germany.
2.3 Institutional Framework
The diffusion of GTs and production of green electricity in Germany, as well as in other
countries, depends on the institutional setting implemented by the government. Even
though development of GTs had already begun in the 1970s, expansion of the technology
was restricted. This was mainly due to the political energy strategy. The main focus was
on conventional technologies and monopolistic markets (Toke and Lauber, 2007, p. 683).
5A feed-in tariff is a “minimum price standard that obliges distribution network operators to connect
[green electricity power plants], to purchase [green electricity] and to pay a fixed remuneration (cents per
kWh) to the plant operator” (Langniß et al., 2008, p. 3).
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In this section, two important institutional changes enabling innovation and diffusion
of renewable energies and the production of green electricity are analyzed. The first
important institutional change was the Electricity Feed Law, and the second the Renewable
Energy Sources Act.
2.3.1 Electricity Feed Law
The SEG entered into law in January 1991 (Toke and Lauber, 2007, p. 683).6 It was
a simple feed-in mechanism with a guaranteed price for electricity that was fed into
the electricity network based on a certain percentage of the average “market price”
for conventional energy. The feed-in tariff was between 75 percent (for WATER and
BIO) and 90 percent (for SOLAR and WIND) of the market price. As the market for
electricity was monopolistic, the SEG can be considered as a first small step allowing
for decentralized energy production and some kind of subtle competition.7 Due to the
still outstanding liberalization of the market, electricity prices were relatively high and
stable (Mitchell et al., 2006, p. 298). Therefore, the SEG already allowed especially the
wind energy sector to enter into the market and to produce a certain percentage of total
electricity supply. The share of renewable energies increased at a relatively constant
rate from year to year (this will further be evaluated in section 2.4). With respect to
decentralization of the energy market as well as an increase in competition, the SEG
can be considered a success. With respect to the monetary transfer, it seems clear that
the diffusion of GTs was very limited. Cost intensive technologies, especially, such as
photovoltaics, were not able to diffuse with high growth rates. In the progression from
the SEG to the EEG, the liberalization of the electricity market in 1998 plays a notable
role. Based on the liberalization (at least in the short run), the prices for electricity
decreased and so did the monetary support transferred to GTs.8 It can be argued that
this was one of the reasons why the implementation of the EEG –introduced in the next
section– became necessary (Mitchell et al., 2006, p. 298).
2.3.2 Renewable Energy Sources Act
The argument that the motivation behind the EEG was the liberalization of the energy
market cannot be considered a satisfactory explanation. Political factors also play an
important role. When, for the first time, the Green Party became part of the federal
6This was done by the coalition government of the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party.
7Competition has a lot of desirable elements. For a more fundamental discussion about competition and
economic policy see Eucken (1955, 1965).
8In the following the word subsidy is avoided to describe the monetary transfer to the GT sector. Instead
of subsidy the term policy induced demand is used as a subsidy directly reduces the political budget. As in the
case of GTs, the monetary transfer does not have direct impact on the federal budget, the welfare effects
can only be simulated by using a general equilibrium approach. Therefore, the notation support (shifting
rents to the GT sector) seems to fit better in the case of this model.
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government in 1998, a fundamental reform with regard to energy production was
decided.9 There was political interest in supporting the expansion of the GT sector.10
FITs were used as a tool for industrial policy in certain GT industries. The EEG has
many elements often described as CCPs,11 and was installed on April 1, 2000. There are
notable studies which compare the EEG with the British Renewable Obligation (RO).
The RO is more market oriented. It was the political aim in Great Britain to allow for
“maximum competition” in order to make the system as efficient as possible (Toke and
Lauber, 2007, p. 681). It is quite surprising, in this context, that many studies find that
the EEG allowed for diffusion of GTs at lower costs than the British RO system (Mitchell
et al., 2006; Toke and Lauber, 2007; Butler and Neuhoff, 2007). Certainty about expected
payoffs under the EEG may play an important role.12 The experience with the British
RO system somehow weakens the theoretical prediction that market-based instruments,
in general, are superior to CCPs. What seems to be important in the case of supply of
green electricity is to take the supply of GTs adequately into account. As mentioned
before, the EEG connects green electricity production with diffusion of a certain GTs j.
However, a supposition would be that a market-based approach for supply of GTs
combined with tradable certificates for green electricity could generate a comparable
result with a higher degree of efficiency.
The EEG is constructed in a way that requires electricity network operators to:
• connect GTs to the network;
• accept the entire electrical output produced by GTs;
• remunerate the producers of “green” electricity at a pre-determined rate for each
KWh electricity produced.13 The remuneration is foreseen to decrease slightly
over time and is guaranteed for 20 years.
With respect to growth in the GT sector, it has to be mentioned that the EEG does not
put any upper capacity limits on the diffusion of the technology. The following formula
9The decision was to substitute nuclear energy with other sources of energy supply.
10This is mainly due to the fact that the Green Party has its roots in the opposition to conventional energy
supply (Wüstenhagen and Bilharz, 2006, p. 1682).
11This means that under the EEG certain technologies are selected ex-ante. In order to allow diffusion of
different technologies, feed-in tariffs have to be set at different levels and therefore imply discrimination
between different technologies.
12One of the main advantages of the British RO system is related to the fact that it is non-technology
specific, meaning that it is not attempting to pick winners (Mitchell et al., 2006, p. 299). Energy suppliers
are forced to buy a certain percentage of renewable obligation certificates (ROCs, 1 ROC=1MWh). ROCs
are tradable and can be bought directly from the GT supplier or other suppliers. One of the main criticisms
of the RO system is the uncertainty about future prices for ROCs and electricity. Therefore, a high risk
premium increases the price for energy produced by GTs (Toke and Lauber, 2007, p. 682).
13The remuneration is also given to those plants which do not feed into the general network of electricity.
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summarizes how FITs are used by the German government as a tool for industrial
policy:
FITtvj = FITTj(1− dj)
v−T + k j. (2.1)
Specific remuneration per kilowatt-hour is denoted by FIT j, t represents the actual year
of remuneration and T is the base year when the EEG was established. The starting
year of operation is characterized by v, technology specific industry (SOLAR, WIND,
. . . ) is indicated with j, d is the degression rate and the parameter k indicates additional
premiums for innovative technologies (Langniß et al., 2008, p. 4). With respect to k j, the
future potential of certain technologies is taken into consideration. The different feed-in
tariffs established are summarized in table 2.1.14 15
TABLE 2.1: Remuneration (FIT) for different GTs
Technology j Remuneration (2000-2003) Annual
(cents/KWh) Reduction (d)
Wind (WIND) 9.1 1.4%
Solar (SOLAR)
Capacity< 100KW 51.62 5.0%
Plants on building capacity < 5 MW 48, 1 5.0%
Biomass (BIO)
Capacity< 500KW 10.0 1.0%
Capacity> 500KW< 5MW 9.0 1.0%
Capacity> 5MW< 20MW 8.5 1.0%
Hydro (WATER)
Capacity< 500KW 7.67 0%
Capacity> 500KW< 5MW 6.5 0%
Landfill and sewage gas (BIOGAS)
Capacity< 500KW 7.67 1.5%
Capacity> 500KW< 5MW 6.5 1.5%
Geothermal plants (GEO)
Capacity< 20MW 8.5 0%
Capacity> 20MW 7.0 0%
Table 2.1 shows that the EEG sets remuneration rates differently for different GTs j.
The range in 2003 was from 6.5 cents/KWh for electricity produced by usingWATER and
BIOGAS up to 51.62 cents/KWh for electricity produced using SOLAR. The comparison
of the different technologies with respect to the feed-in tariffs is not as simple as it seems
14For a detailed overview of different feed-in tariffs related to the SEG and EEG compare App. A.1, p. 195,
table A.2
15Note that the EEG has been renewed in 2004 and 2009. The numbers with respect to the feed-in tariffs
for GTj as well as the depreciation rate d have changed. Overall, it can be said that the feed-in tariffs have
decreased whereas d has increased slightly by about 1 percent on average.
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to be at first glance. As each technology also has different features, it can be argued that
different feed-in tariffs are justified.16
2.3.3 Arguments for Different Feed-in Tariffs
Because GTs were not so much elaborated on due to reduced commercial use in the
past, learning curves seem to be important, especially regarding the development
of technologies like SOLAR or WIND (Isoard and Soria, 2001; Wene, 2008, pp. 21).
Technologies like SOLAR might be promising regarding future energy generation,
so that higher feed-in tariffs might be justified (compare figure 2.1).17 The general
argument goes as follows: Governments can generate positive welfare effects if they
set artificial markets for new energy technologies. The learning process can lead to
the result that technologies which would otherwise be too costly become cost efficient.
As the manufacturing firms that produce a certain technology compete in the market,
production costs will decrease and technical performance will increase. Uncertainty
and market dynamics allow that the whole process will be accompanied with positive
spillovers (e.g. innovations). Thus, a successful deployment program can provide what
markets might not provide by themselves, namely the diffusion of certain GTs at high
levels combined with certain political targets such as the reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions (GHG emissions) (Wene, 2008, p. 16).
Figure 2.1 illustrates how learning has an effect on production processes with a
focus on input and output (e.g. at the company level). The E in figure 2.1 represents
an experience parameter. Therefore, as diffusion leads to a higher level of experience,
output can increase for a given level of input, or less input is necessary in order to
produce the same level of output. All in all, the technology gets cheaper and more cost
efficient (Isoard and Soria, 2001; McDonald and Schrattenholzer, 2001).
Dynamic effects are a strong argument to explain discrimination between different
technologies. Nevertheless, two arguments have to be looked at separately from each
other – reduction of GHG emissions (IEA/OECD, 2000, 2003) and industrial policy in
order to foster development of “backstop technologies”. If the main reason to support
a certain GT j is to reduce GHG emissions, the argument is that the investment should
go to the cheapest technology available in order to achieve a certain target of emission
reduction.18 This would be an argument against discrimination between different tech-
nologies. Apart from this, one can also argue that certain technologies have a high future
potential so that it might be desirable to allow diffusion of these technologies because
16As the sun shines only in daytime, SOLAR cannot produce electricity during the night. WIND can
produce electricity during the night, but the amount of energy produced is not very constant.
17Especially in the case of SOLAR learning curves are very important (Zwaan and Rabl, 2003; Tributsch,
2004; Zwaan and Rabl, 2004).
18Investors would be able to take cost reductions due to learning curve effects or economies of scale into
account, and the investment would go into the cheapest technology able to achieve the political target.
Chapter 2. The Political Economy of the Green Technology Sector 47







Own illustration following Wene (2008); IEA/OECD (2000).
they might become important for energy production on large scales in the near future.19
Even though the second argument can be criticized because of the pretension of knowl-
edge (Hayek, 1945), it seems to be the main reason why policy-makers discriminate
between different feed-in tariffs. If one accepts the second argument, there is still the
question of the optimal level of diffusion.
2.4 Diffusion and Costs of Green Technologies
This section gives a short overview of the diffusion of green technologies and the related
costs.
2.4.1 Diffusion of Green Technologies
The diffusion of GTs is well documented by the Federal Ministry for the Environment,
(Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety) (BMU) (compare table A.2, page 194). The
total share of renewable energies of the gross electricity supply in 2005 was 10.4 percent
(BMU, 2008, p. 13). In figure 2.2, it can be seen that the installed capacity for WIND
increased strongly. The installed capacity for WATER remained at a relatively constant
level. SOLAR increased after the implementation of the EEG (after the year 2000)
whereas for GEOBIO there was a relatively constant but smooth increase of the total
capacity installed .
19There remains the question why private investors would not be able to detect this future potential.
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Data source BMU (2008).
Figure 2.3 contains information about the growth of the stock of installed renewable
energies (measured by INCAPMWh20). By looking at the stock of installed capacity in
1990, 2000 and 2005, the SEG (1990-2000) and the EEG (2000-2005) can be compared. If
the connecting lines between the two blocks remain parallel, the installed capacity did
not increase over time. It can be seen that under the SEG the stock of WIND increased
and WATER remained more or less constant. GEOBIO increased at a lower rate. In the
year 2000, SOLAR represented only a small share of total INCAPMWh. Under the EEG,
in 2005 the overall share of installed capacity of GTs had more than doubled compared
to the year 2000. Within five years there was a doubling of the installed capacity for
GEOBIO. WATER still remained at a relatively constant level. In contrast to this, the
stock of SOLAR increased notably. The share of WIND also grew by a large scale. The
stock soared by about 200 percent.
The German government set a target that the share of gross energy consumption
produced by renewable energies be 12.5 percent by 2010. This target was reached in
2007 (BMU, 2008, p. 8). The long-term political target is to reach a share of 30 percent of
electricity produced from GTs in 2020. On the EU level ambitious targets have also been
installed. Until 2020 a share of 20 percent of total energy consumption shall be provided
by GTs.21
20Installed capacity of electricity measured in megawatt-hours.
21Note, that with respect to this political target, the debate is not only about electricity but also about
technologies that allow to substitute conventional energy consumption like gasoline or heating with bio
fuels or geothermal energy.
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Data source BMU (2008).
2.4.2 Costs Related to the Renewable Energy Sources Act
As the German network for electricity is separated into four regions and is run by a
different operator in each region, a clearing mechanism is needed to make sure that the
costs for the network operators related to the feed-in tariffs are fairly allocated (Langniß
et al., 2008, pp. 5). The average costs of remuneration are about 10.87 cents/KWh. This
is approximately twice as much as the market price for conventional energy. In 2006,
the total costs for remuneration were about e5.6 billion (four times the costs in 2001).22
The costs related to the EEG can be translated into a price per KWh. The EEG (in 2006)
accounted for an additional 0.7 cents/KWh, which is about 3.7 percent of the average
price for electricity (calculated with a price for private consumers of 19.4 cents/KWh) or
11.6 percent, respectively, if the market price for electricity is 6.0 cents/KWh (Langniß
et al., 2008, p. 2). At first glance the numbers are not really astonishing and seem to be
surprisingly low. Therefore, one could argue that the EEG was able to reach its political
targets at relatively low costs. Such a conclusion would be far to easy because of the
long-lasting cost-effects related to the EEG. It has to be mentioned that according to the
forecasts for 2013, annual remuneration will increase to e12.6 billion (Langniß et al.,
2008, p. 2).
In the reference year 2006 about half of the money collected under the EEG went
into WIND. Twenty per cent of the money went into SOLAR. Even though the monetary
22Of course from this total number the market value of the output has to be subtracted. The total costs
related to remuneration are therefore smaller and are about e3.7 billion.
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support for photovoltaics is relatively high, SOLAR produces a rather small share of
about 4.3 percent of all remunerated renewable electricity (Langniß et al., 2008, pp. 2).
The main findings can be summarized as follows: From a static perspective, costs
seem to be rather low. As it turned out in section 2.3, many studies state that the
German feed-in system performs better than the British RO. The strength related to
FITs can obviously be found in the connection between supply of green electricity and
demand for GTs within one policy instrument. This argument seems to be important,
as the market for GTs had first of all to be developed. A market-based approach might
underestimate the important connection between demand for the technology and its
supply. This might be a factor generating relatively high costs for supply of green
electricity under the British RO. Nevertheless, it is predicted that the costs for the EEG
will also increase during the next years. On the one hand, guaranteed FITs give necessary
stability for investors and the increase in electricity prices under the EEG in 2006 seem
to be considerably low. On the other hand, it might be that some of the investments will
turn out to deallocated resources over several decades so that problems related to the
future development of electricity prices should not be underestimated.
This short description of the concept of environmental regulation, as well as the
overview of diffusion and costs related to the SEG and EEG, shall be used as background
information for the following theoretical section. The basic assumption of the model
is that the GT sector is assumed to generate positive externalities. What seems to be
interesting, in taking arguments of political economy into account, is to look at whether
the feed-in tariffs can be considered to be optimal from a short-term perspective in order to
evaluate the efficiency/inefficiency related to the EEG from a long-term perspective. This
question shall be further elaborated by using a political economy approach.
2.5 Political Economy Approach
The model presented in this section builds on a model developed by Tanguay et al.
(2004). A distinction has to be made between the theory of public interest (TPI) and the
economic theory of regulation (ETR).
2.5.1 Theory of Public Interest
TPI is based on the microeconomic theory to detect market failure, which is used
as an argument to justify political intervention. Market failure, like the problem of
externalities, can be corrected with the authority of the state. The aim of political
intervention is to reinstall optimal resource allocation. The equilibrium derived under
TPI can be considered as the optimal solution for the problem of failed markets (the
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optimal solution of course is unrealistic in a sense that it builds on the assumption of
zero transaction costs as well as complete information).
Even though there are many doubts regarding the positive impact of the GT sector,
the argument of positive externalities shall be used as a justification for why it is rational
for politicians to support the GT sector. The market created by politicians, by installing
a law enabling the diffusion of GTs, might generate positive welfare (because of job
creation, positive environmental effects or the export of the technology in the near future)
so that this can be interpreted as a positive externality (if benefits are higher than the
related costs).
As discussed in section 2.3, the institutional setting of the EEG is constructed in
order to allow diffusion of different GTs j. The FIT can be interpreted to have generated
a policy induced demand for GTs. From an economic perspective, diffusion of GT j can
be considered to be “desirable” as long as it is accompanied by positive externalities.
Under the assumptions of complete information and non-existing “state failure” one
can calculate the optimal policy induced demand for a certain GT. This optimal demand
will determine the optimal size of the GT sector and will ensure that marginal increase
in demand is equal to marginal welfare gains.23
2.5.2 Economic Theory of Regulation
Even though economists sometimes seem to ignore the fact that beside market failure
there can also be the problem of state failure, it is common knowledge that democratic
systems fall far short of generating optimal resource allocation. Even if they tried to
maximize a social welfare function, there is no way to aggregate preferences in a way
that the outcome is efficient (Arrow, 1951). Additionally, governments often try to make
decisions favoring special interests. In this case, the established policy simply reflects
the relative electoral weight of different interest groups.24
The political weight depends on votes or other factors able to generate political
power, such as monetary and non-monetary contributions. This model seems to fit
very well with the evolution of the green technology sector in Germany under the
“red-green coalition” (1998-2005). The ETR model is closely linked to the theory of the
“demand” for industrial regulation developed by Stigler (1971). In his “economic theory
of regulation” he developed a model in which demand for regulation (in our case policy
induced demand) comes from interest groups that can be considered able to benefit from
legislation. The supply for the enhanced well-being of interest groups is distributed by
23The welfare gains will be related to future exports of the technologies. There might also be positive
externalities due to job creation in the GT sector or positive environmental effects.
24This fact was mainly highlighted by Olson (1965). He states that in the political process small interest
groups often exert more influence than larger groups. One of the reasons is that for larger groups it is more
difficult to organize themselves because of higher costs.
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the incumbent government which aims to maximize current political support. Therefore,
politicians can be considered to be political entrepreneurs (Schumpeter, 1987a) in our
model. Politicians try to maximize votes in order to be re-elected.
According to this model, regulation is not only the result of market imperfections.
What is declared to be market failure in many cases is also linked to state failure (this
might also explain the problems related to the British RO system). As a result, the
welfare effects might be rather low or in some cases even negative. The success of special
interest groups depends on their ability to organize their interests and their importance
to the incumbent government. The incumbent government uses its coercive power in
favor of special interest groups with the aim of being re-elected. The model developed
by Stigler (1971) is also useful to explain the success of the GT sector in tapping resources.
Nevertheless, there is one important difference between the model used in this paper
and the approach by Stigler (1971). The Stigler model explains why producer protection
might prevail over consumers’ interest. In our model green electricity producers (GEPs)
can be both, consumers and producers of electricity. As figure 2.4 shows, the institutional
design for the GT sector is constructed in a way that some “privileged” producers of
green technology (owner of the GTs) and the GT industry j both profit from the policy
induced demand.
FIGURE 2.4: Mechanism related to the EEG














The EEG and diffusion of GT j










“Excess“ costs which allow for the diffusion of the technology are transfered to the general voting public
At first glance, it also seems that the big energy companies have to pay the bill. But
this is obviously not the case as long as demand for electricity is inelastic. The higher
costs related to the policy induced demand for GTs will finally be transferred to citizens
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in form of higher energy prices. From this perspective, the EEG fits very well with what
Peltzman (1976) calls the “law of diminishing returns to group size”. One can argue that
the interests of the GT sector and those citizens who gain from the EEG simply outweigh
the interests of society as a whole because they are better organized, better informed or
simply because they influence the political outcome more actively.25 It also turned out
in section 2.4 that the price per KWh of electricity which the EEG can be blamed for, is
relatively low. Consumers may face cost illusion with respect to the EEG.
2.6 Theoretical Model
The EEG is constructed in such a way that the money enabling the expansion of GTs
is paid by the electricity producing companies which then are assumed to transfer the
costs to the consumers (general voting public). This is shown in figure 2.4. The users of
GTs produce green electricity and the output (electricity) can be fed-in into the electricity
network. GEPs can be households, communities, small companies, farmers and others.
The remuneration per KWh electricity depends on the GT j (for the different feed-in
tariffs compare table A.2, p. 195). This mechanism generates an “artificial” demand
for electricity produced with GTs. Therefore, the possibility to feed-in electricity for a
guaranteed remuneration has an indirect impact on the production and diffusion of
GTs. Figure 2.4 also shows that GEPs, as well as companies producing GTs, have an
interest to at least keep the feed-in tariffs at a constant level. It also seems to be clear
that both interest groups would not be against political decisions in favor of an increase
in remuneration. In contrast to this, it can be expected that political decisions towards
a reduction in feed-in tariffs would be accompanied by counter-lobbying of GEPs as
well as GT producers. The “excess costs” for electricity production are transferred to the
general voting public. Therefore, two markets are assumed to have the same interests.
Namely GEP and GT producing companies. That FITs combine demand for GTs with
supply of green electricity can be demonstrated as follows: In a first step we look at the
GEP market and in a second step at the GT industry j.
25This does not mean that there are no limits for an optimal group size. Two opposite effects can be
distinguished. On the one hand, one can argue that the larger the group the higher the influence on the
government. On the other hand, the organization costs also increase with the group size. As the share of the
rents will decrease, the increasing organization costs put limits on the growth of the group size. Compare
also Peltzman (1989).
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2.6.1 Green Electricity Production Level
In the case that the government does not regulate demand for green technologies, the
market share is set to zero. ENPVGEPj is the expected net present value for the investment
into GT j. Therefore,
ENPVGEPj < 0
with










The length of the periods is given by n, pj stands for the price of GT j, r is the opportunity
cost of investment and ES is the expected surplus a GEP can make in period t. In each








xtgi is the quantity of electricity produced by the particular producer i in period tg
(g ∈ [1, n]),26 ctgj are marginal costs and FIT
tg
j is the feed-in-tariff for technology j in
period tg. Note that it is rational for GEP i to invest into GT j if ENPVGEPj ≥ 0. Figure 2.5
shows the construction of the inverse demand curve (GEP market). It is assumed that
there is a linear relationship between feed-in tariffs and ENPV.
2.6.2 Green Technology Production Level
Consider Nj to be identical firms operating in different sectors (SOLAR, WIND, WATER,
GEO and BIO). Firms are assumed to compete in their particular sector. The GTmarket is
described by imperfect competition à la Cournot.27 Marginal costs (cj) are assumed to be
constant for a given period t (cj > 0).28 If the different GT industries j are compared, it is
plausible to assume different production costs cj for the technologies. The sector-specific
demand is assumed to be linear and will be zero without policy induced demand for
26Note that xtgi has to be different between different GEPs as the input factor to produce electricity (e.g.
sun, wind or water) is exogenous and differs between regions.
27It is plausible not to assume complete competition in this case, because the GT sector is dependent on
monetary transfers (in the following simply called policy induced demand). If productivity gains lead
to lower production costs, firms make higher profits because the feed-in tariffs are relatively constant. It
also seems to be clear that high research and development R&D expenditures can only be financed by the
companies if enough rents remain within the firm. Among others, Dröge and Schröder (2005) state that
with respect to the GT sector imperfect markets can be assumed.
28Note, that this assumption only holds for a given point in time t. This assumption does not contradict
the assumption of learning curves discussed in subsection 2.3.3, meaning that over time decreasingmarginal
costs are assumed to be ct+1 < ct. Nevertheless, for every period marginal costs can be taken from the
“learning curve” and can be assumed to be constant at the given point in time.
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FIGURE 2.5: Deviation of the inverse demand curve
ENPVj






















GTs (there is no intersection between MR and cj). Inverse demand without induced
demand is given with
pj = 1−Qj, (2.4)
where pj stands for the price of the technology produced by the GT industry j and Qj
is the total output produced by the Nj firms in the industry j. As the feed-in tariffs
generate induced demand for GTs we integrate the effect as an indirect marginal subsidy
labeled as pidj (policy induced demand) into the model. Therefore
pj − pidj = 1−Qj, (2.5)
= 1+ pidj −Qj. (2.6)
Because of the symmetry assumption at the firm level, the output is assumed to be the
same for each firm so that Qj = Njqj. The residual demand on the firm level can be
written as
pj = 1+ pidj − (Nj − 1)qj − qj. (2.7)
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Note that (Nj − 1)qj is the demand of all other firms. The marginal revenue at the firm
level is given by
MRj = [1+ pidj − (Nj − 1)qj]− 2qj. (2.8)
The EEG allows the GT sector to diffuse. Firms maximize their profits at MR = cj.
Taking (2.8) into account the quantity of output produced by one single firm is given by
q∗j =
1− cj + pidj
(Nj + 1)
. (2.9)
Multiplying qj with Nj leads to the total output Q∗j which is
Q∗j =
Nj(1− cj + pidj)
(Nj + 1)
. (2.10)
Using (2.10) for the market demand gives p∗ which is
p∗j = 1+ pidj −
Nj(1− cj + pidj)
(Nj + 1)
. (2.11)
The results from (2.9) and (2.11) can be used to describe the profit of one single firm.






(1− cj + pidj)2
(Nj + 1)2
. (2.12)





TPI policy induced demand leads to the optimal outcome without any state failure.
It is assumed that welfareW (compare equation 2.13) generated by the GT industry j
derives from three different sources. The first positive effect is given by the GEP surplus
(GEP = 1/2 ∗ Q∗j ∗ (1+ pidj − p
∗
j )) generated by those who buy GTs. They receive a
state guaranteed positive remuneration for the electricity fed-in. Additionally firms
earn a profit which is denoted by πjT. The third term enters with a negative sign into
the equation and is given by the policy induced demand minus the positive effect (bj)
expected from GTs times Q∗j . The optimal solution can be found by choosing the policy
induced demand pidj able to maximize welfare(compare figure 2.6).
Optimal pid∗j generates an optimal welfare levelW
∗
j . It follows
max
pidj
Wj(pidj) = GEPj + π
∗
jT − (pidj − bj)Q
∗
j . (2.13)
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[bj(Nj + 1) + 1− cj − pidjNj]. (2.14)
Therefore the optimal policy induced demand pidTPIj is given by the solution for the
first order condition which is
pidTPIj =
bj(Nj + 1) + 1− cj
Nj
. (2.15)
Equation 2.15 gives an interesting insight. Note that for bj = 0 and cj < 1 there
would still be an optimal policy induced demand. This is related to the fact that in the
model it is assumed that governments are able to correct for market imperfections in the
case of oligopolistic markets.
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By substituting pidTPIj into the equations for price, total output and total profit, the
corresponding welfare level can be calculated. This leads to
pTPIj =
bj + 1+ cj(jNj − 1)
Nj
(2.16)
QTPIj = bj + 1− cj (2.17)
πTPIjT =








ETR policy induced demand leads to an outcome which takes the political process
into account. In democratic societies it is very likely that policies are not in line with
the interests of the general voting public (our TPI regime) because of vested interests.
The policies established to fulfill the interests of specific interest groups reflect the
relative electoral weight of those interest groups in terms of monetary and non-monetary
contributions.
The underlying assumption of the model is that the incumbent government takes
the political support expected by the interest groups into account when choosing an
FIT generating a policy induced demand pidj. This can be done following the approach
proposed by Tanguay et al. (2004) (compare also Grossman and Helpman (1994), p. 838).
Welfare (W) and political support can be modeled as a linear function (V).29 Political
support for the GT industry j (Vj) is derived from four different sources: First, industries
operating in the GT sector make profits.30 Second, political support is related to job
creation in a certain GT industry j. We assume that there is a positive correlation
between diffusion of GTs (Q∗) and labor demand in the GT industry j. Third, political
support is highly sensitive to electricity prices. In our model we assume that regulation
implemented via FITs effects electricity prices positively. There is the assumption
that electricity producing companies are able to pass the costs related to the pidj to
the consumers of electricity (demand for electricity is relatively inelastic). The fourth
argument that enters into the political support function are the feed-in tariffs. We assume
that producers of green electricity are somehow organized and therefore look at the
(pidj) which is positively dependent on FITj. An increase in FITj increases pidj and
therefore would be perceived positively by GEP j. Hence, a decrease would be perceived
29V represents monetary as well as non-monetary political support.
30This might lead to an increase in monetary contributions for the political parties supporting the
expansion of GTs.
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G(pidj) = αWj(pidj) + (1− α)Vj




∗ + pidj(FITj)]. (2.20)
Maximizing equation 2.20 relative to pidj leads to
pidETRj =
(α− 1)((1+ Nj)2 + Nj(Njcj + 1))− αNjbj(1+ Nj)− Nj
N2j (α− 2)
. (2.21)
An interesting question that occurs is whether policy induced demand under the ETR
regime is bigger or smaller compared to the TPI regime. By calculating the difference
between pidTPIj and pid
ETR





(1− α)((Nj + 1)2 + Njcj(Nj + 1)− 2bjNj(Nj + 1))
N2j (α− 1)
(2.22)
Whether the result from equation 2.22 is positive (support under ETR is too low) or
negative (support under ETR is too high) depends on the value of the parameters. It can
be observed that the size of the marginal costs cj relative to the positive externality bj
plays an important role for the result. All in all the result has to be interpreted in the
direction that the diffusion of GTs under ETR is very likely to be inefficient.
As shown in figure 2.7, for any α < 1 the question whether pidj is too big or too
low depends on marginal costs cj relative to the positive externality bj. As we assume
learning curves, the value for cj has to change over time. The value related to the positive
externality may also change over time depending on the actual knowledge about the
negative externality related to conventional energy technologies.
2.6.4 Comparative Static
For the TPI, as well as for the ETR, the policy induced demand “should” increase, the
more positive externalities (bj) are linked to the GT industry j by keeping marginal
production costs cj constant. Therefore, in the model, a government seeking to maximize
a linear combination of the social welfare function will increase demand for a certain
GT j if the positive externality increases (e.g. with new knowledge about the impact of
the GT industry j for social welfare).
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FIGURE 2.7: Inefficiencies under the ETR regime
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This result is in line with the argument that under certain circumstances policy
induced demand for certain GTs j is welfare enhancing.
It can also be observed that the optimal transfers shifted to a certain GT industry j
may either increase or decrease with N under TPI and ETR. For TPI the result depends
on the value of bj compared to cj. For cj < (1+ bj) we have a negative relationship.
Theoretically the increase in N stands for an increase in competition leading to the
result that the dead-weight-loss becomes less important. Governments can more and
more focus on the positive externality bj and do not have to take market imperfections
into account by setting the FIT. Under ETR the political reaction of the incumbent
government depends on the question of whether pidj is too high or too low compared
to the TPI regime. If the number of firms producing green technologies increases,
the outcome of positive externalities also increases. As everything else has been kept
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constant, it is rational to adapt policy induced demand to the price reduction caused by
the increase in competition.
What is somehow puzzling is the negative sign for the TPI system for an increase
of cj. However, an increase in cj leads to an increase in pj, meaning that the ENPVj
for some agents becomes negative. As the absolute value for bj remains constant, the
relative price to produce the positive externality will also increase. The implication of
this result is the following: if marginal production costs decrease, pidj should increase.
For the ETR cj can enter positively and negatively into the equation. The result depends
on the marginal production costs cj in comparison to the positive externality bj. If cj in
comparison to bj is high, pidj is supposed to increase. If production costs decrease, it
might also be that pidj becomes too low. Because the share of electricity produced with
GT jmight affect general electricity prices positively, political leaders might not adjust
pidj in an optimal manner. Therefore, if cj relative to bj is high, pidj will be too high and
if cj relative to bj is low, there is an additional possibility that pidj is too low.
The sign for α again depends on the relationship between cj and bj. If pidj under the
ETR regime is too low, an increase in α is positively related to an increase in pidj. In
the case that pidj under the ETR regime is too high, there will be a negative correlation
between an increase in α and pidj.
Of course the results of our model for the ETR regime are highly dependent on the
model specification. One can easily implement other assumptions leading to the result
that pidj in the ETR regime is always too high or too low. Nevertheless, we tried to base
the assumptions for the political support function on the positive analysis of the previous
sections. What the model is able to show is that governments might have difficulties
calculating the welfare optimal pidj. Additionally, we are able to show that diffusion
of a certain GT j under TPI is highly sensitive to the positive externality bj. A further
implication of the model is that governments have to be aware of the market structure.
As shown in App. A.2, under complete competition optimal pidj is simply bj. In contrast
to this, under oligopolistic markets the incumbent government has also to correct for
market imperfections leading to the counterintuitive result that a decrease in marginal
costs has to be accompanied by an increase in pidj. However, in reality, we see for the
technology with the highest FIT (namely SOLAR), that its FIT is negatively correlated
with cj (compare table A.2 p. 195). This is in line with the theoretical prediction of our
model under the ETR regime. Even though this second result seems to be interesting,
we do not want to highlight it too much as the real world might be more complicated
and the political support function might look different to what we have proposed. This
does not change the general result of the theoretical model that CCPs, as such, very
likely turn out to be inefficient, and the only economic argument for diffusion of GTs is
related to a certain positive externality bj.
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2.7 Conclusion
The aim of this study was to assess the institutional setting enabling the diffusion of
GTs (under the SEG and EEG) in Germany from a political economy perspective. The
first part of the study was intended to set the necessary background to understanding
the following theoretical model. As a result of the model, it turned out that the EEG as
an institution generates inefficiencies. The level of diffusion of different GTs is highly
dependent on political lobbying and other aspects that distort economic efficiency. The
institutional analysis that compared the SEG with the EEG found that the SEG can
be considered successful because for the first time it allowed for competition in the
energy sector. Only by looking at positive effects like competition and the structural
change in the energy market, can the EEG also be considered a success. Its related costs
(in 2006) seem still to be at a manageable level. Therefore, one could argue that the
inefficiency-costs related to the EEG have to be accepted in order to foster structural
change in the energy sector. From a dynamic perspective this conclusion seems to be
too trivial. Wrong political decisions today may implement long-lasting cost effects on
future generations (because feed-in tariffs are guaranteed over a time horizon of twenty
years). On the one hand, this may result in the aim to “reduce the costs of energy supply
to the national economy”, formulated in the EEG, not being achieved. If the guarantees
for the feed-in tariffs have too long a time horizon, this problem will become even
worse. On the other hand, a long-term time horizon is needed by investors and therefore
should not fall below a critical threshold. This highlights the importance of adjusting the
induced demand for different GTs based on actual knowledge of the positive externality
and changes in the market structure, as well as changes in marginal production costs.
The strength related to the EEG can be found in the connection between demand for
GTs and supply of green electricity within one policy instrument. In the early stages of
structural change in the energy system this seems to have been important. Theoretically,
FITs could be adjusted to achieve pre-defined environmental standards (Baumol and
Oates, 1971). This optimistic interpretation is highly sensitive to the parameter α and
therefore the weight given to the TPI regime. If the industry is well established (supply
of GTs is well established) it does not seem to be overconfident to believe that tradable
certificates become a serious alternative to FITs in order to enhance efficiency related to




Structural change of the energy system is part of the political agenda. The German
Federal Ministry for the Environment considers renewable energy technologies to be
“key technologies” for future energy supply. In Germany, the share of renewable energies
of total energy production has increased steadily in the past two decades. Diffusion
increased markedly from the late 1990s on. From 1998 to 2008, the share of renewable
energies of total electricity production increased from 4.8 percent to 15.1 percent. In
2008, the share of green technologies (GTs) of total energy production was 9.5 percent.
Diffusion rates also differ between the different GTs available. Electricity produced with
water (in 2008) accounted for 23.0 percent of all electricity produced by GTs, wind’s
share was 43.5 percent, solar 4.3 percent, and biomass accounted for about 22.1 percent
(BMU, 2008, p. 15).
Even though there has been a significant growth in the GT sector in the past ten
years, GTs in Germany are still operating at a low scale (energy produced with WIND
turns out to be an exception). With the decision to phase out the use of nuclear power (in
the year 2000), electricity producing companies are still heavily dependent on other non-
renewable energy sources, such as COAL and GAS (IEA/OECD, 2007, p. 120). This is
not surprising as transition from non-renewable energy technologies to a system mainly
based on renewable energy technologies needs time. So far, there is still uncertainty
about the point in time for this achievement. Innovations play a highly relevant role in
the possibility of transition, its speed and the related costs.
Diffusion of GTs, at a certain level, depends crucially on the institutional setting. The
relatively high production costs for energy produced with GTs, as well as monopolistic
market structures, have made the diffusion of GTs difficult without governmental sup-
port. Market entry became possible in Germany for the first time under the “Electricity
∗This chapter is mainly based on Wangler (2010b). I am indebted to Andreas Freytag, Guido Buenstorf,
Marco Guerzoni, Frenken Koen and Jan Nill for helpful comments on an earlier version of this work.
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Feed Law” (SEG) (implemented in January 1991). Investment into GTs became economi-
cally highly attractive under the “Renewable Energy Sources Act” (EEG) (implemented
in April 2000). However, demand is policy induced as other technologies exist that can
produce the same outcome (namely electricity) for lower prices. The institutional setting
has been designed in a way that electricity produced with GTs can be sold on the market
(under the EEG for a guaranteed remuneration specific to a certain GT j as shown at
table A.2, page 195).
The policy induced demand for GTs in Germany provides an opportunity to test a
theory that has become known in the literature as the so-called “Schmookler hypothesis”
(Schmookler, 1962, 1963): Higher demand (here proxied with the change of installed
capacity in GTs) has a positive impact on firms engaged in innovative activities (here
proxied with patent counts). The econometric analysis of this chapter contributes to
the recent literature by looking at four important questions. First, we try to answer the
question of whether the policy induced demand for GTs was accompanied by innovative
activity. This is interesting as innovations also indicate the future economic values
market actors relate to GTs. The next question we try to answer concerns the impact of
public R&D expenditures on innovations. Our third question is related to the impact of
electricity prices on innovative activity in the different GT industries. We also take the
institutional change under the SEG and the EEG into account and test for a structural
break.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 is a critical assessment of the struc-
tural change in the energy system in Germany under current policies. In section 3.3 we
analyze studies of the relationship between demand and innovation, as well as techno-
logical lock-in. We further review institutional change in the German energy sector by
studying differences between the SEG and EEG. We use the results as background to
formulate a hypothesis for our econometric model. Description of the data, variables,
econometric model and estimation results follows in section 3.4. In section 3.5 we draw
a conclusion.
3.2 Structural Change in the Energy System
Energy production in Germany is still highly dependent on conventional energy tech-
nologies. They have the major characteristic that non-renewable/ exhaustible energy
sources1 are used as an input. Non-renewable energy sources have the shortcoming
that they are either responsible for externalities in the form of CO2 emissions2 (as in
1A definition for exhaustibility is given by Dasgupta and Heal (1979), p. 153:“an exhaustible resource is
[...] used up when used as an input in production and at the same time its undisturbed rate of growth is
nil”.
2CO2 emissions represent one big part of total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions which are seen to be
highly responsible for global warming (IPCC, 2007, p. 5).
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the cases of COAL or GAS), or that there are unsolved externality problems (as in the
case of NUCLEAR energy). In comparison to this, renewable energy systems are able
to produce energy without causing marked harm to the environment, at least in form
of producing CO2 emissions. However, energy production from non-renewable energy
sources is more cost intensive and substitution for conventional energy production is
still far from a reality.
Two distinct problems are often combined when the discussion is about structural
change of the energy system and diffusion of GTs. The first problem is related to
externalities and the second to transition from a non-renewable energy system to a system
mainly based on renewable energies in order to implement long-term sustainability.
If the discussion is about the externality problem one can argue that a substitution of
conventional energy technologies by GTs has to reduce externalities and, consequently,
their diffusion has positive environmental impacts. Another option would be to apply
instruments enforcing the internalization of the externality directly by the non-renewable
energy technologies.
Apart from the externality problem, there is an additional argument why diffu-
sion of GTs may have positive impacts. This argument is related to the problem of
non-sustainability in the energy system. Sustainability requires transition from non-
renewable energy sources to a system that mainly builds on GTs (“backstop technolo-
gies”). The point in time of transition can be influenced by policy-makers (“transition
management”). The European Union, for instance, has implemented a directive that
in 2020 the percentage of total energy produced from renewable sources has to be at
least 20 percent (COM, 2008). The aim of sustainable energy supply is also used as an
argument for diffusion of GTs under the EEG.3
Even though the argument for sustainability seems to be convincing at first glance,
there are concerns regarding the use of sustainability as an adequate normative argu-
ment for transition management in the energy sector. One important aspect involves
environmental and resource economics. Extraction of a non-renewable energy source is
a decision between expected profits to be earned in the future by leaving the resource in
the ground and profits that can be earned by extraction of the resource. If it is envisaged
that development of GTs will reduce expected profits for the owners of non-renewable
energy sources, diffusion of GTs may be accompanied by an increase in the speed of
extraction of non-renewable energy sources. Thus, from an international perspective,
investment in GTs may not lead to an increase in sustainability (Sinn, 2008).4
3Article 1(1) EEG: “facilitate a sustainable development of energy supply, particularly for the sake
of protecting our climate and the environment, to reduce the costs of energy supply to the national
economy, also by incorporating external long-term effects, to conserve fossil fuels and to promote the
further development of technologies for the generation of electricity from renewable energy sources” (EEG,
2009).
4However, there is also no empirical evidence that diffusion of GTs translates 1:1 into world market
energy prices. The total impact of this “rebound effect” is an empirical question.
Chapter 3. Renewables and Innovations 66
Two problems become obvious. On the one hand, there is the problem that it
is difficult to justify diffusion of GTs aiming to substitute for conventional energy
technologies. On the other hand, a first best solution would require that all externalities
from non-renewable energy sources are internalized. Obviously, this is not the case.
Not subsidizing GTs would generate distortions in competition between conventional
energy technologies and green technologies. Both problems have to be evaluated with
care when thinking about the optimal level of diffusion of GTs.
3.3 Theoretical Background and Hypothesis
3.3.1 Innovations and the role of demand
One reason for studying innovations is related to the importance of the impact they
have on endogenous growth and economic development (Schumpeter, 1934). Firms
(and entrepreneurs) may seek profit and be motivated to innovate or imitate with the
aim of continuously increasing profits. Economic actors, therefore, search for better
techniques and the selection of successful innovations takes place through the market.
The dynamics behind this process are best describedwith the notion of creative destruction
(Schumpeter, 1942).
From an economic perspective, it is in the core interest to detect the driving forces
behind innovations. For many years there has been an ongoing debate on the question
of whether demand drives innovation, or if it is the other way around. The importance
of demand to innovation is closely connected to the research done by Schmookler (1962)
and Griliches (1957). However, the argument as such can be traced back to Hicks. He
made the observation that “a change in the relative prices of factors of production is itself
a spur to innovations and to inventions of a particular kind – directed at economizing
the use of a factor which has become relatively expensive” (Hicks, 1932, p. 124). The
relationship between demand, and the timing and the location of an invention, has been
studied by Griliches (1957). Schmookler focused on the causality between demand and
innovation. He stated that “new goods and new techniques are unlikely to appear, and
to enter the life of society without pre-existing – albeit possibly only latent – demand”
(Schmookler, 1962, p. 1). According to this reasoning, demand is the main driver in
stimulating inventive activities. Schmookler used patent statistics to study four different
industries (railroads, agricultural equipment, paper and petroleum). He found a linear
relationship between demand and investment in capital goods in the particular sectors.
His line of argument can be summarized as follows: market actors have incentives to
innovate as long as improvements in production technique or product quality have a
chance of achieving a higher mark-up per unit. The more units that are sold on the
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market, the higher the profits that can be earned. There are more incentives for economic
activities, measured as inventions, the bigger the size of the market (Schmookler, 1962).5
The theoretical argument put forward by Schmookler has also been criticized (for
an early critique see Salter, 1960; Rosenberg, 1974; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979).6
Scherer (1982), re-ran Schmookler’s analysis and found much weaker evidence for the
underlying demand hypothesis. He used a broader dataset and included several types
of industries. Firms with market power are able to use their strategic advantage to
increase market share. In contestable markets, market power can encourage firms to
innovate and to create demand endogenously. This makes the simple demand story
more complicated. The significance of the results is further dependent on technological
opportunities of the underlying industries. Kleinknecht and Verspagen (1990) have
shown that Schmookler’s dataset contains reverse causality problems. There is the
important implicit result that even though it is true that at a given point in time t the
size of the market S has an impact on the probability to innovate C (Pt : St → Pt(St)),
there is the endogenous effect that innovation is able to increase the size of the market
by itself (St : Pt → St(Pt)). Both, demand and supply have to be relevant (Pavitt, 1984).7
However, beside the fact that the underlying relationship is more difficult than
initially perceived, the intuition of Schmookler’s reasoning, that demand positively
affects innovations, is not falsified (cf. Fontana and Guerzoni, 2008, p. 930). Testing the
Schmookler hypothesis with data containing information about diffusion of GTs has one
major advantage. Theoretically, demand can be treated as exogenous as diffusion of GTs
is policy induced. The previous arguments build a background for formulating the first
hypothesis. We refer to them as our Schmookler hypothesis. We distinguish between the
size of the market (hypothesis 1a) and the change in size of the market (hypothesis 1b).
Hypothesis 1a: The size of the market (S) positively affects firms in a GT industry j to
engage in innovative activities.
Hypothesis 1b: Increase in market size (∆S) positively affects firms in a GT industry j
to engage in innovative activities.
3.3.2 Technological lock-in and the energy system
As stated at the beginning of this section, in markets characterized by self-selection
and creative destruction, a direct link between innovations and growth can be drawn
5For a simple formal description compare Fontana and Guerzoni (2008).
6Rosenberg (1974), p. 105, states that: “[..] technical problems and their relative complexity stand
independently of demand considerations as an explanation of the timing and direction of inventive activity.
Therefore any analytical or empirical study which does not explicitly focus upon both demand and supply
side variables is seriously deficient”.
7For a survey about the discussion on demand-pull and supply-push see Freeman (1994) among others.
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(Schumpeter, 1934, 1942). This mechanism, however, does not guarantee optimality of
the result. Even in competitive markets self-selection processes can be accompanied by
suboptimal results (market failure). In markets characterized through learning curves
and/or economies of scale, especially,8 there is the possibility that the economic system
locks-in to a technology that can be considered to be suboptimal ex-ante. This problem
has been highlighted by David (1985) and further developed analytically by Arthur
(1989, 1994).9
Arthur (1989) distinguishes, in his first example, between two technologies (A and
B) competing on the market for adoption. The early market entrance of a certain tech-
nology (A) can make it difficult or even impossible for a competing technology (B) to
“get started”, as there is technological lock-in (Arthur, 1989, p. 119).10 In the case of GTs
the problem is different to the described relationship, as technology selection does not
take place over the self-selection process of the market. In the specific case of the energy
sector one can argue that demand depends on political decisions. If there is a lock-in
to suboptimal equilibria the major reason is wrong political decisions (state failure, not
market failure). We nevertheless stick to the previous example and propose to treat A
as a vector of conventional non-renewable energy technologies (e.g. NUCLEAR power
plants or COAL power plants regime) and B as a vector of GTs (e.g. SOLAR, WIND,
WATER, GEO and BIO).11 Following the logic of technological lock-in, it seems plausible
that if A is the dominant technological regime, B is very limited with respect to inno-
vations and diffusion (Unruh, 2000) without policy induced demand. Hypothesis 2 is
formulated to test the theory of technological lock-in. If technological lock-in is present,
we expect that electricity prices have no impact on innovative activity in the GT sector.
Hypothesis 2: Increasing electricity prices have no impact on innovative activity in
GT industry j.
8Adaptive expectations and network externalities are additional reasons behind a technological lock-in
(Arthur, 1994).
9The example of QWERTY is well-known. QWERTY is the current standard used in type-writing.
Because a superior system has been developed that is able to substitute for QWERTY, from a pure technical
perspective, the lock-in to the QWERTY system has to be explained by high switching costs and cannot be
considered as optimal from an ex post perspective.
10Examples for the suboptimal selection process of markets are given by the US television system, the
example of the US programming language FORTAN, or the example of QWERTY (Arthur, 1984; David,
1985; Hartwick, 1985).
11This distinction would be misleading in the case that those technologies incorporated in B are not able
to substitute conventional energy in the long run. In this case, A and B cannot be treated as substitutes
ex-post. This would make it difficult to find rational arguments in support of GTs.
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In contrast to hypothesis 2, one could also argue that due to the creation of a niche
for GTs under the SEG and EEG, electricity prices could have an impact, as some partial
lock-out from A has already taken place.12
3.3.3 Eco-innovations and the double externality problem
As this study deals with innovations in GTs (so-called “eco-innovations”13), we have
to take into account the “double externality problem” (Rennings, 2000). Like other
innovations, eco-innovations are able to create positive externalities (Arrow, 1962) and,
additionally, their diffusion is connected to environmental specific positive externalities
(Rennings, 2000, p. 325).
This double externality problem (problems related to cost-internalization) reduces
incentives for firms to invest in environmental friendly R&D. Suboptimal market alloca-
tions can occur, as under certain conditions “technology push and market pull alone
[...] [are not] strong enough [for self-enforcement of eco-innovations]” (Rennings, 2000,
p. 326). Public R&D expenditures may help to push for eco-innovations. In order to test
the technology push factor we formulate our next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: Public R&D plays a significant role in innovations within GTs.
3.3.4 Transition policy in the GT sector (from the SEG to the EEG)
Pull factors for GTs have been implemented through the SEG and EEG. The switch in
the energy regime from conventional energy production A to an energy regime that
mainly builds on energy produced with green technologies B is therefore dependent on
the institutional setting. We distinguish three different institutional stages that roughly
describe institutional change in the German energy system.
The first stage is characterized by a monopolistic electricity market with almost no
competition. A is considered to be the main source of electricity supply. Due to the
cost argument, as well as the problem that no institutional setting exists to facilitate
feed-in of electricity produced with B into the electricity network, diffusion of B is very
limited.14 The first stage characterizes the German energy market until 1991 (Toke and
Lauber, 2007, p. 683).
12An increase in electricity prices for GT producers can indicate a higher market potential for GTs.
However, regulation in the energy sector towards an increase of GTs may also drive electricity prices
affecting the electricity price endogenously.
13“Eco-innovations are all measures of relevant actors (firms, politicians, unions, associations, churches,
private households) which; (i) develop new ideas, behavior, products and processes, apply or introduce
them and (ii) which contribute to a reduction of environmental burdens or to ecologically specified
sustainability targets.”(Rennings, 2000, p. 322)
14Note that in some geographical areas WATER (which is considered to belong to B) is very cost-efficient
and therefore was traditionally one main source of electricity supply.
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The first change in the energy system was brought about by the “Electricity Feed
Law” (SEG). The SEG entered into law in January 1991 (Toke and Lauber, 2007, p. 683).
The SEG was important insofar as it allowed small and medium electricity producing
companies to feed-in their electricity to the grid. The remuneration was based on
75 percent (for WATER and BIO), and 90 percent (for SOLAR and WIND) of the average
market price for electricity. The SEG allowed for some initial competition in the energy
market and the first decentralization. Nevertheless, diffusion of B was limited because
remuneration was lower than the average market price for electricity produced with
A (compare BGBl, 1990). The institutional arrangement under the SEG held from 1991-
1999. The SEG can be seen as a necessary requirement for bringing contestability to the
electricity market.
The end of the 1990s brought the liberalization of the energy market and, addition-
ally, the so-called “Renewable Energy Sources Act” (EEG) entered into law in April
2000. It consists of elements best described as “command and control”, because only
some selected technologies get a defined remuneration for electricity feed-in. The EEG
is designed in a way that discrimination between different technologies takes place
through different remuneration rates. Degression rates for the feed-in tariffs also dif-
fer. Discrimination was a necessary condition in order to implement diversity. Under
the EEG, until 2003, the range of remuneration was from 6.5 Cent/KWh for electricity
produced using WATER and BIOGAS, increasing to 51.62 Cent/KWh for SOLAR. The
highest feed-in tariff, except for SOLAR, was for BIO (biomass) at 10 Cent/KWh. The
German government has since modified the EEG two times (for details on the differences
compare BGBl, 2000; EEG, 2004, 2009).
The institutional arrangements described above created a policy-induced demand for
GTs (compare also figure 3.1). Figure 3.1 connects the institutional change with diffusion
of GTs. The expected structural break between the SEG and the EEG is characterized
through different slope parameters related to the dotted arrows representing diffusion
of GTs under the SEG and diffusion of GTs under the EEG. The following hypothesis
is intended to test whether a structural break can be observed by comparing the SEG
(1990-1999) with the EEG (from 2000 on).
Hypothesis 4: Demand driven innovation under the EEG is significantly higher com-
pared to the SEG.
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3.4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We constructed a panel covering the period from 1990 to 2005. The sectors of interest are
wind (WIND), solar (SOLAR), water & ocean (WATER), geothermal (GEO) and biomass
(BIO).15 Our panel therefore contains 16 observations over time and five sector-specific
observations.
Inventions as a proxy for innovations are measured by patent counts PAT, APAT.16
The variable PAT describes the sector-specific patent counts of granted patents and
APAT are all patents applied for in Germany in all IPC classes (the database for PAT is
DEPATIS net). We build on work done by Johnstone et al. (2010), as we use a modified
version of the patent classification proposed in their paper to identify innovations in
different GT industries (see table B.1, App. B, p. 200). We use the application date for all
patents that have been granted (inventions). The data contains only those patent counts
with priority in Germany (double counting excluded).
We also have information about sector-specific public expenditures on research and
development RuD and the installed capacity of the different technologies (measured
in MWh) INCAP. Prices are measured by CPIE (consumer price index for electricity).
Electricity consumption is measured by the consumption of KWh per capita ELC. The
15The five sources of the data are the German Patent Office (GPO), the International Energy Agency (IEA),
Eurostat (ES), The German Statistical Office (GSO) and the German Federal Ministry for the Environment
(BMU). For a detailed description of the data compare appendix B.1, p. 198.
16There is the critique that “not all inventions are patentable, not all inventions are patented, and the
inventions that are patented differ greatly in ‘quality’, in the magnitude of inventive output associated with
them” (Griliches, 1990, p. 1669). However, using patents as a proxy for innovation is common and seems
appropriate as there are only a few economically significant inventions which have not been patented
(Dernis et al., 2000; Dernis and Khan, 2004).
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variables PAT, RuD and INCAP contain sector-specific information. The variables
CPIE and ELC are aggregated observations with country specific information. The
variables are summarized by table 3.1.
TABLE 3.1: Summary of the data
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Measure
PAT 80 76.5125 85.67025 3 297 Counts
APAT 80 50281.13 7286.154 37252 59685 Counts
RuD 80 17.47135 22.97052 0 91.178 Mio. Euro
INCAP 80 2213.532 3695.865 0.01 18428 MWh
CPIE 80 109.3919 15.03489 85.18 134.04 2004 indexed to 100
ELC 80 6601.992 257.3511 6246.21 7111.05 KWh per capita
Patent counts (PAT) as a proxy for innovations
Figure 3.2 shows a time trend of granted patents (patent counts at application date). It
is interesting to see that granted patents for SOLAR started to decrease under the EEG
before they increased again after 2002. For WIND, a decline of the patenting intensity
can also be observed after 2001. Part of the decline could be explained by a time lag
between the application date and the date of patent granting. In order to avoid this
problem, we restricted our panel to the year 2005, even though our database on patent
counts goes to 2007. We make the implicit assumption that applied patents will be
granted within a time frame of two/three years.
If one takes into account that patenting activity can also be interpreted as a stock of
knowledge, even though the patent counts decrease, the stock of knowledge does still
increase. It is also notable that SOLAR has the highest patenting activity, followed by
WIND. In contrast to this, GEO and BIO generate relatively low knowledge stocks.
Public R&D expenditures (RuD)
Figure 3.3 shows the industry specific R&D funding by the federal government. It
can be seen that there was a decrease in public R&D funding for SOLAR after 1993.
Compared to this, there was a relatively low level of reported public R&D expenditures
for technologies like WIND, WATER, BIO or GEO. The figure shows that most R&D
expenditures went into SOLAR, followed by WIND. BIO and GEO received relatively
low public R&D transfers. There is no reported R&D support for WATER.17
Installed capacity of GTs (INCAP) and change of installed capacity (∆INCAP), mea-
sured in MWh to proxy the change in size of the market (S)
Figure 3.4 shows the installed capacity of renewable energies under the SEG and EEG. It
17It might be that RuD does not display all direct payments going to GTs. One first hint is that ex-
penditures of the local government are not measured by RuD. Nevertheless, RuD incorporates all R&D
expenditures of the federal government reported to the IEA.
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can be seen that until 1999, WATER was the most important renewable energy source.
After 1999, the share of WIND increased, with high growth rates, and its installed capac-
ity exceeded that of WATER. Until 2005, the installed capacity of SOLAR was still at a
lower level than that of BIO. The installed capacity of GEO was almost zero. Figure 3.5
represents corresponding growth of the installed capacity.
Consumer price index electricity (CPIE), a marked based indicator for the incentives
to innovate
Figure 3.6 gives insights into electricity prices which decreased until the year 2000 and
increased again after the year 2000.18
3.4.2 Econometric Model




+ , CPIE0 , RuD+
)
.
For our dataset we assume that T → ∞ and our independent variable consists of a
vector with count data. Therefore, two major problems are related to our data. On the
18Having the liberalization of the market for electricity in mind, the decrease in electricity prices may
indicate the welfare gains due to liberalization. It might be the case that regulation related to the EEG had
some impact on this development.
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one hand, observations over time may not be independent from each other and, on the
other hand, (as we are dealing with count data) standard errors are not assumed to be
normally distributed.
The estimation model can be formalized as follows (Wooldridge, 2002a, pp. 247):
yit = β
Txit + ci + uit, (3.1)
where i = 1, . . . , n indexes the technologies listed within the different patent classes
(compare table B.1, p. 200) and t = 1, . . . , T indicates time. The error term uit is idiosyn-
cratic and ci allows to control for group specific heterogeneity (fixed effects model).
The count data characteristic of patents19 suggests estimation coefficients, with mod-
els for event counts like the negative binomial model or the Poisson model (Maddala,
1983; Cameron and Trivedi, 1998; Wooldridge, 2002a). The negative binomial model is
based on a Poisson distribution with an unobserved error parameter ν, implementing
heterogeneity in the variance. The intensity parameter ϕ is explained by a vector of all
explanatory variables X.
Formally:
PATi,t → NegBin(ϕ; σ),
equals
PATi,t → Poisson(ϕ) i f
{








The standard deviation for the expected value E(PATi,t) = ϕ is given by V(PATi,t) =
ϕ(1+ σ2ϕ). Thus, with σ → 0 the intensity is ϕ and the model converges towards a
Poisson distribution (Johnstone et al., 2010, p. 146). We follow this argument and use
the negative binomial model as our baseline model.
In contrast to the negative binomial model, there is the striking feature of the linear
model (or some standard non-linear estimation methods like AR(1)) that one can easily
correct for serial correlation. Calculating first differences for the observations over time
can already help to get reduce the problem of first order serial correlation (Wooldridge,
2002b, p. 365). Non-linear AR(1) estimation methods offer additional opportunities
to handle first order serial correlation (Wooldridge, 2002b, p. 350). However, these
estimation methods may cause a bias in our estimates because of the wrong assumption
about the functional form. Therefore, we propose the following estimation strategy:
The basic model is estimated with the negative binomial model. In addition to this,
we show estimation results for the first differences fixed effects OLS model and AR(1).
19An event count “is the realization of a non-negative integer-valued random variable” (Cameron and
Trivedi, 1998, p. 1).
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If the estimated coefficients show comparable results (same sign and significance) to
the negative binomial model, we can conclude that first order serial correlation is not
inflating the significance of our estimates.
We try to test hypothesis 1a with the variable INCAP, hypothesis 1b with ∆INCAP,
hypothesis 2 with CPIE and hypothesis 3 with RuD. The structural break (hypothesis 4)
is taken into account with the use of period dummies (compare table 3.3, page 80).
Model specifications for the standard model are given for
PATi(t−1) = β0 + β1zi(t−2) + β2(INCAPit/∆INCAPit)
+β3(RuDi(t−1)) + β4(CPIEi(t−2)) + ci + ui(t−1), (3.2)
and for hypothesis 4 we have
PATi(t−1) = β0 + β1zi(t−2) + β
SEG
2 (INCAPit/∆INCAPit) + β
EEG
3 (∆INCAPit)
+β4(RuDi(t−1)) + β5(CPIEi(t−2)) + ci + ui(t−1). (3.3)
In the model, t indexes time and i indexes different industries operating within the
GT sector,20 SEG stands for the period from 1990-1999 and EEG represents the period
from 2000-2005. If the variables are indicated with (t− 1), a one year time lag is used
in order to incorporate dynamic effects into the model, (t− 2) and (t− 3) are two year
and three year time lags. ∆ is used as a symbol for first differences. zi(t−2) describes
two observable characteristics integrated as control variables, namely ∆ELCt−2 and
APATt−2. ∆ELCt−2 is implemented into the model because electricity prices may also
react to electricity consumption. APATt−2 allows to control for endogenous institutional
changes in the German patent system.21 The variable β0 denotes the intercept. The error
component ci is group specific (individual heterogeneity) whereas ui(t−1) represents the
idiosyncratic error term (dependent on i and t).
Note, that in the model foresightness is integrated as there is a one year time lag be-
tween our dependent variable PATi(t−1) and the dependent variable (INCAPit/∆INCAPit).
With respect to the other lag structures, strong assumptions are made. They are theoreti-
cally motivated by previous contributions in the literature (Brunnermeier and Cohen,
2003; Griliches, 1990, 1998; Hall et al., 1986, cf.). A criticism might be that private R&D
expenditures are not integrated as an explanatory variable into the econometric model.
As we do not have information on private R&D, we have to stick to the model presented
20Table B.4, p. 203 shows the correlation matrix for the variables integrated into the model (Correlation
matrix 3).
21It might be possible that overall patents have increased (e. g. due to institutional changes) and therefore
most of the variance in patenting activity would follow a trend which is observable in overall patent counts.
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above. From a theoretical point of view it has to be taken into account that firms op-
erating within an industry compete with each other. There is the implicit assumption
that firms have to innovate (with process or product innovations) to be able to increase
market shares. Hence, INCAP should indirectly capture at least parts of successful
private R&D.22
With respect to the construction of the panel, we took some guidance from Johnstone
et al. (2010). They run a panel on the international level, combining patent counts
with data from the IEA.23 Johnstone et al. (2010) run the regression with a negative
binomial model. We use the negative binomial model as our benchmark but make
serious attempts to take the problem of first order serial correlation into account.
Robustness of our estimates is further demonstrated with test statistics like the
Baltagi-Wu LBI test and the use of time dummies (compare table B.2, page 201). We
also calculate the variable RELPAT which is the ratio between PAT and APAT. For
RELPAT we are not limited to the negative binomial regression (RELPAT is not count
data) which makes the use of standard estimation models like OLS appropriate.
3.4.3 Estimation Results
Starting with the Hausman test the results indicate that random effects is the appropriate
estimationmethod. In some of the cases we also calculate fixed effects to show robustness
of the results (compare in particular table B.2, page 201). The basic model to test
hypothesis 1-3 is shown in table 3.2 (page 79). We start the estimation with only a few
variables and proceed by integrating additional variables in further steps. In column 6
(model to test hypothesis 1a, hypothesis2 and hypothesis 2) and column 7 (model to test
hypothesis 1b, hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3) the core model is presented. Estimations
are done with the negative binomial model. Based on this model we find support for
hypothesis 1a, hypotheis 1b, hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3. These results are further
tested by the regressions presented in table B.2 (page 201), table B.3 (page 202) and
table 3.4 (page 81). Our findings are now discussed by taking the results from the
additional regressions into account.
Hypothesis 1a and hypothesis 1b: We find support that the size of the market
and/or an increase in the size of the market positively affects the probability that
firms, operating within different GT industries, are engaged in innovative activities.
A positive correlation is supported by the results reported for INCAP/∆INCAP in
22However, as can be seen from the estimation results of our OLS regression, less than fifty percent of
the variance is captured by our model. Having information on private R&D may further increase the
explanatory power of our model.
23There are additional important differences. ∆INCAP was not part of the sample and WATER was not
integrated. We run the regression excluding WASTE due to the fact that this variable does not contribute











TABLE 3.2: Estimation result 1a negative Binomial regression (neg. Bin) and first differences model (FD)
estimation neg.Bin. neg.Bin. neg.Bin. neg.Bin. neg.Bin. neg.Bin. OLS OLS
method FD FD
(random effects) (random effects) (random effects) (random effects) (random effects) (random effects) (random effects) (random effects)
Independent Variable PATt−1 PATt−1 PATt−1 PATt−1 PATt−1 PATt−1 PATt−1 PATt−1
INCAP 0.0000556∗∗ −− −− −− 0.0000317∗∗ −− 0.0049697+ −−
(8.33e− 06) (7.72e− 06) (0.0029219)
∆INCAP −− 0.0003788∗∗ −− −− −− 0.0002097∗∗ −− 0.0330318∗∗
(0.0000462) (0.000052) (0.0085457)
RuDt−1 −− −− −0.0021942 −− 0.0079735∗∗ 0.0068344∗ 0.9292521∗∗ 0.9201498∗∗
(0.0062704) (0.002883) (0.0030065) (0.3506719) (0.3179317)
CPIEt−2 −− −− −− −0.0136821∗∗ 0.0023306 0.0023844 −0.5225558 −0.2824146
(0.0018688) (0.0055219) (0.0054758) (0.4224488) (0.3899379)
∆ELCt−2 −− −− −− −− 0.0002035 0.0001285 −0.0120087 −0.0101671
(0.0002673) (0.0002719) (0.0161369) (0.0146693)
APATt−2 −− −− −− −− 0.00003∗ 0.0000283∗ −0.0004177 −0.0003805
(0.0000129) (0.0000126) (0.0013016) (0.0011739)
β0 2.64868∗∗ 2.866002∗∗ 2.397688∗∗ 4.802875∗∗ 1.937776 2.009899 1.537938 2.222963
(0.2703001) (0.2861197) (0.2321561) (0.3544461) (1.281859) (1.257838) (3.172943) (2.665193)
time dummies No No No No No No No No
R-sq – – – – – – 0.1807 0.32390
Wald chi2(5) 44.46 67.18 0.12 53.60 83.72 84.52 – –
Nr. of observations: 75 75 70 70 65 65 60 60
Nr. of groups: 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Significance: ∗∗ ≤ 1%,∗ ≤ 5%,+ ≤ 10%
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TABLE 3.3: Estimation result 2 (model with period dummies)
estimation neg.Bin. neg.Bin. AR(1) AR(1)
method −− −− FD FD
(fixed effects) (fixed effects) (fixed effects) (fixed effects)
Independent PATt−1 PATt−1 −− −−
Variable −− −− RELPATt−1 RELPATt−1
INCAP
SEG




0.0000298∗∗ −− 3.42e− 07∗ −−
(7.76e− 06) (1.43e− 07)
∆INCAP
SEG




−− 0.0002046∗∗ −− 6.08e− 07∗∗
(0.0000523) (2.21e− 07)
RuDt−1 0.0068447∗ 0.0060129∗ 0.0000403∗∗ 0.0000272∗
(0.002893) (0.0030548) (0.0000127) (0.0000117)
CPIEt−2 0.0028118 0.0016896 −3.55e− 07 2.14e− 06
(0.0054942) (0.0056752) (8.77e− 06) (8.71e− 06)
∆ELCt−2 0.0002251 0.0001219 −1.67e− 07 −1.64e− 07
(0.0002658) (0.0002714) (2.98e− 07) (2.96e− 07)
APATt−2 0.0000287∗ 0.0000263∗ −− −−
(0.0000126) (0.0000131)
β0 2.049183 2.224346+ −0.0004298∗ −0.0002484+
(1.253973) (1.291999) (0.0001677) (0.0001377)
time dummies No No No No
R-sq – – 0.0120 0.0206
Wald chi2 85.93 83.91 – –
p-value Chow-test 0.3621 0.8283 0.7198 0.5628
Nr. of observations: 65 65 55 55
Nr. of groups: 5 5 5 5
Significance: ∗∗ ≤ 1%,∗ ≤ 5%,+ ≤ 10%
table 3.3 (column 2-5), table B.2 (page 201, column 2-7) and table B.3 (page 202, column
2-8).
Hypothesis 2: Our hypothesis is that electricity prices do not significantly affect
the probability for innovate activity when looking at the different GT industries. This
view is supported by assuming a one-year time lag between PAT and CPIE as shown
in table 3.2 (page 79, column 6-9). The estimation results reported in table 3.3 (page 80,
column 2-5), table B.2 (page 201, column 2-7) and table B.3 (page 202, column 4 and 5)
support this view. However, in table B.3 (page 202, column 2-3 and column 6-8) we
also report the estimation results for a two-year time lag between PAT and CPIE. These
additional estimations show a different outcome. Electricity prices positively affect the
probability of patenting if the time lag is bigger than one year. Based on this result, we
Chapter 3. Renewables and Innovations 81
TABLE 3.4: Reverse causality
estimation OLS AR(1) OLS AR(1)
method FD FD
(fixed effects) (fixed effects) (fixed effects) (fixed effects)
Independent ∆INCAP ∆INCAP −− −−
Variable −− −− INCAP INCAP
PATt−1 12.33627∗∗ 5.630782∗∗ 73.12402∗∗ 3.182065∗
(1.914261) (1.655493) (12.16215) (1.461352)
CPIEt−2 −10.47017 −3.946515 −62.13559 −6.396556
(8.701615) (5.576607) (55.28523) (6.017495)
RuDt−1 −0.9970726 −6.817154 −23.99885 −2.590538
(5.800703) (4.577341) (36.85445) (3.9163)
∆ELCt−2 −0.1973399 −0.0006138 −2.09386 0.0563747
(0.4556235) (0.1771254) (2.894779) (0.1570209)
APATt−2 −0.0123203 −0.0009091 −0.082883 0.0067159
(0.019199) (0.0154699) (0.1219799) (0.0152988)
β0 1142.529 28.68449 8061.845 822.1719∗∗
(1891.871) (32.09113) (12019.9) (31.16902)
time dummies No No No No
R-sq 0.1832 0.2408 0.0657 0.0236
Number of observations: 65 55 65 55
Number of groups: 5 5 5 5
Significance: ∗∗ ≤ 1%,∗ ≤ 5%,+ ≤ 10%
have to reject hypothesis 2. An increase in electricity prices can increase the probability
to be engaged in innovative activities with a two-year time lag.
Hypothesis 3: The positive significant result for RuD is relatively stable. It is sup-
ported by the estimation results presented in table 3.2 (page 79, column 6-9), table 3.3
(page 80, column 2-5), table B.2 (page 201, column 2-7) and table B.3 (page 202, column 2-
8). Public R&D has a positive impact on the probability for innovative activity.
The structural break between the SEG and the EEG (hypothesis 4) is tested by the
use of period dummies for INCAP/∆INCAP (compare table 3.3, page 80, column 2-5).
Interestingly, in column 2 the coefficient under INCAPSEG is insignificant and becomes
significant under INCAPEEG. This points in the direction of there being some difference
for diffusion under the SEG and the EEG. When looking at the differences in coefficients,
however, the Chow-test does not report any structural break (the Chow-test is reported
on the lower end of table 3.3).24 The test statistic did not show any significant difference
24As reported in column one, the p-value for the Chow-test was reported to be 85.39 percent. In
85.39 percent of the cases we cannot reject HO, indicating that there is no significant difference between the
coefficients.
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between the coefficients for INCAPSEG/∆INCAPSEG and INCAPEEG/∆INCAPEEG in
all four cases. As we get significant results for INCAP/∆INCAP under the SEG and
EEG in three of the cases (column 3-5), we have to reject hypothesis 4. One possible
explanation might be as follows: Due to the fact that most GT industries (exceptWIND)
are still operating on rather low scales (compare figure 3.4), the time span might be too
small to capture the dynamics related to structural change within the energy system.
Finally, we have to comment on the estimation results presented in table 3.4 (page 81).
It can be seen that innovations increase the size of the market, endogenously. This has to
be taken into account by interpreting the result of hypothesis 1. This is in line with the
literature and the critique of the Schmookler hypothesis. Finally, the simple demand
story is more complicated, as providers of certain products can increase the size of the
market endogenously if they innovate.
3.4.4 Robustness of the results
Table 3.2 (page 79) shows in column 8 and 9 the estimation results for the first differences
OLS model. It can be seen that the estimation results are similar to those reported for
the negative binomial regression in column 6 and 7. This already indicates that first
order serial correlation is not driving our estimation results. Further estimations are
also reported in table B.2 (page 201), where we explicitly control for first order serial
correlation.25 The Baltagi-Wu test statistic for the AR(1) random effects model presented
in column 3 (model with INCAP) is reported to be 2.177. For the model in column 5
(model with ∆INCAP) it is reported to be 2.101. As the test statistic is higher than 2
in both of the cases we can conclude that there is no significant autocorrelation for the
AR(1) model.
A look at correlation matrix 5 and correlation matrix 6 (page 203) shows, in addition,
that multicollinearity is also not a major problem of our model. It has further to be kept
in mind that multicollinearity does not cause a bias in the estimated slope coefficients
(Berry, 1993).
The robustness of our estimates supports the main findings that can be summarized
as follows: With respect to the Schmookler hypothesis (hypothesis 1a, hypothesis 1b), we
find that firms operating in different GT industries are engaged in innovative activities.
We further find good evidence for hypothesis 3. Whether hypothesis 2 has to be rejected
depends on the model assumptions. As one can also expect that price increase positively
affects incentives to innovate, it seems plausible to reject hypothesis 2. We also have to
reject hypothesis 4.
25See the test statistics of the Baltagi-Wu LBI-test reported for the AR(1) model in column 3 and column 5.
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3.5 Conclusion
The aim of this study has been to test if policy induced structural change in the energy
sector in Germany is accompanied by innovative activity. The empirical findings support
the hypothesis that a market size as well as an increase in the size of the market has
an impact on firms to be innovative. The empirical findings also show that public
R&D expenditures are important. We test for reverse causality and find that innovative
activities have a significant impact on the increase in market shares by themselves.
Innovations in GTs are a necessary condition if conventional energy technologies are to
be substituted for in the future.
That supply is able to react in a very short time period to changes in relative prices
(the same is true for innovations), is one of the results demonstrated by the econometric
model. Nevertheless, as diffusion of GTs is policy induced, the partial analysis cannot
be related to aggregated economic growth. There is a further concern that positive
environmental impacts disappear due to the inefficiencies related to the institutional
setting. Efficient diffusion of GTs requires a mechanism that allows for more self-
selection by the market with respect to the future potential of different GTs j.
Chapter 4
Strategic Trade Policy as Response
to Climate Change?∗
4.1 Introduction
The problem of climate change is of a global nature. As long as economic growth is
not disentangled from an increase in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the problem of
climate change is likely to increase. One common argument is that the global problem
encourages free-riding and reduces national incentives to contribute to climate change
mitigation policies. Thus, international policy coordination seems adequate.
One example of international cooperation aiming to reduce coordination problems
is the Kyoto-Protocol (KP). Even though the KP was an attempt to make countries act
cooperatively, strategic behavior could be observed at the ratification stage (decision
to ratify or to free-ride on the agreement) as well as the implementation stage (over
or underinvestment to fulfill the requirements agreed by ratification). Differences in
national cost structures combined with strategic interaction between countries makes
international policy coordination difficult. A recent example was the negotiations for
a follow-up agreement to the KP which took place in December 2009 in Copenhagen
(cf. Macintosh, 2010; Nicoll et al., 2010). Despite the global nature of the problem, some
governments did start to restructure their energy policies. It seems that they take the
climate change problem seriously (e. g. the German government by supporting diffusion
of green technologies (GTs)1). Interestingly, it turns out that the same countries argue
forcefully in favor of more strict environmental standards on the international platform.
The fact that some countries invest relatively more than other countries in the
abatement of climate change is somehow counterintuitive if we apply the general
∗This chapter is mainly based on Freytag and Wangler (2008). We are indebted to Peter Burgold,
Sebastian v. Engelhardt, Hannes Koppel, Simon Renaud, Gert Tinggard Svendsen and Hans-Peter Weikard
for helpful comments on an earlier version of this work.
1In this paper we define GTs as technologies able to produce electricity using renewable energy sources
(e.g. photovoltaics, . . ., wind mills) and therefore have the potential to substitute for GHG emitting
conventional energy sources.
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wisdom that free-riding of particular countries negatively affects the international
competitiveness of non-free-riding-countries. Investment costs related to GTs seem
to be a burden that increases the costs of energy consumption within a country. It is
therefore an interesting question why some countries are more motivated than others in
implementing policy measures that have a seemingly positive impact on the problem of
global warming and promote actively high environmental standards at the international
level instead of free-riding themselves.
We argue that the initiative for structural change at the national level can be an
outcome of international environmental agreements (IEAs) aimed at reducing problems
related to climate change. In contrast to the common view, the main argument of our
paper is that free-riding by some countries may encourage other countries to increase
investment in abatement measures instead of reducing it. Our arguments are based on a
political economy framework in combination with international trade policy.2
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly discuss the costs of global
climate change, the global attempt to solve the problem and the specific German policy
response. Section 3 is dedicated to the development of our theoretical framework to
explain a country’s solo run to provide a global public good in climate policy. Our
political economy reasoning is empirically assessed using a negbin model in section 4,
where we use the patent applications of German green technology firms as a proxy for
their expectations about future export sales. Conclusions round off the paper.
4.2 Climate Change and International Policy Coordination
4.2.1 Costs and Benefits Related to Climate Change
Detecting the costs of climate change is a difficult task. Without policy response, costs
of changes in temperature are expected to increase at a level of from 5− 20 percent of
global annual gross domestic product (GDP). The cost of reducing GHG emissions can
be lowered to a decrease in world GDP of one percent if countries are able to coordinate
their policies (Stern, 2007). Costs and benefits related to climate change also differ
substantially between different regions, and simulation models have to take spacial
differences into account (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996; Mendelsohn et al., 2000). It might
well be argued that it is “cheaper” to react today than in the near future, because doing
nothing will increase costs (Kemfert, 2005). However, as stated by Sinn (2008), it may
also be the case that the abatement of industrialized countries does not affect the speed
of global warming as initially intended because the reduced demand for energy by some
2Brandt and Svendsen (2006) argue similarly. They focus on the first mover advantage of the Danish
wind and turbine industry to explain the national interest of high environmental standards. Compare also
Svendsen (2003). Our approach is different as we focus on the German green technology sector and we use
a Stackelberg game with five different possible outcome scenarios.
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industrialized countries simply lowers world market prices and increases the demand
for energy by those countries which do not intervene to reduce energy consumption (the
so-called “rebound effect”). This leads Lomborg (2006) to suggestions of alternatives to
the option of cutting GHG emissions.
It can be seen that the estimated costs related to climate change depend strongly
on the policy measures implemented (compare among others Klepper and Peterson,
2004, 2005), as well as the scenarios and the underlying assumptions on which the
calculation is based. Welfare effects published by the IPCC (IPCC, 2007) and the Stern
review (Stern, 2007) are thus critically assessed (Nordhaus, 2007; Weitzman, 2007).
Due to the uncertainty, estimates for a particular scenario lie within a certain range
and precise accounts of the costs are difficult. Notwithstanding, it becomes clear that
there are costs related to investment into mitigation policies, generating problems for
national governments to free resources for investments into environmental conservation.
The free-riding of some countries may increase the slope of the national cost function.
Country specific solo-runs do not make sense, as the climate change problem creates
international spillovers.
4.2.2 International Policy Coordination and the Kyoto-Protocol
Based on the former arguments, global environmental problems constitute an inter-
national prisoners’ dilemma. Once the problem of climate change is acknowledged
as a global environmental problem, it has to be treated as a global public “bad”. This
implies, in turn, that climate protection has the characteristics described as “tragedy of
the commons” (Hardin, 1968). Thus, countries have to cooperate to find solutions for
the common pool problem (cf. Ostrom, 1990).
The Kyoto Protocol is an attempt to coordinate international policies. By signing the
KP countries agreed to a reduction in the emission of GHGs to a specified level measured
in percentages of the base year 1990. Between 2008 and 2012 countries are supposed
to reduce the average emission of GHG by about 5.2 percent of the 1990 reference-
level. Europe agreed to reduce the emissions of GHG by 8 percent in comparison
to the emissions of 1990. Germany agreed on an emission reduction of 21 percent
(Sachverständigenrat, 2004, p. 121). The KP was coupled with the condition that at
least 55 member states, which altogether produce more than 55 percent of the global
emissions of CO2, have to ratify the protocol before it can enter into force (UNFCC, 1998,
p. 19).3
The 55 percent rule was fulfilled when Russia ratified the KP in November 2004.
Therefore, the KP came into force in February 2005. Today, 188 countries and other
3The so-called 55 percent rule has important implications: It gives countries the opportunity to free-ride
without nullifying the whole agreement. The free-rider problem is thus mitigated and it is more liekely that
the agreement will be implemented.
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governmental entities have ratified the KP. The United States, the largest single emitter
of GHG signed, but did not ratify the KP at the national level.
Altamirano-Cabrera et al. (2007) discuss the KP from a political economy perspective
and analyse the influence of political pressure groups on the stability of the agreement. It
turns out that strategic interaction between countries is highly influenced by the relative
political strength of two different interest groups, the GT industry and conventional
industries, respectively. Pressure groups determine the abatement inside a country
and influence the stability of international agreements. The probability of cooperating
less or acting non-cooperatively increases with the political influence of conventional
industries. Considering this and the fact that some countries did act non-cooperatively
at the ratification stage or the implementation stage, it is surprising that countries like
Germany were willing and able to install high national environmental standards.
4.2.3 Germany’s Policy Reaction to Global Environmental Problems
Germany has chosen a mixed strategy to reduce the emission of GHG. On the one hand,
there is the market solution (implemented in Europe) of trade with certificates related
to GHG emissions.4 Germany has a target that emissions in 2012 be reduced by about
21 percent, compared to 1990. On the other hand, the government is using incentives to
encourage the application of particular (allegedly) climate friendly technologies. For
instance, the former “red-green” government coalition5 passed a law, the so-called
“Renewable Energy Sources Act” (EEG), to support renewable energies by the use of
technology specific feed-in tariffs. The EEG can be considered as the successor of the
“Electricity Feed Law” (SEG) of 1991. The SEG allowed, for the first time, the feed-in of
electricity produced with GTs into the electricity network for a remuneration which was
lower than the average market price for electricity.
Policy induced demand for GTs can theoretically be justified by the argument of
backstop technologies (Nordhaus, 1973). The political argument for investment into GTs is
to foster the development of GTs and to reduce global warming (EEG, 2009, section 1,
purpose). There is an obvious connection between the problem of climate change and
industrial policy, as the EEG uses feed-in tariffs to foster diffusion of some particular
GT industries. The range in 2003 was from 6.5 Cent/KWh for electricity produced
by using WATER and BIOGAS up to 51.62 Cent/KWh for electricity produced with
SOLAR.6
4The importance of defined property rights as an efficient solution for the externality problem has been
highlighted by Coase’s (1960) seminal paper. For theoretical considerations compare (Baumol and Oates,
1988).
5The coalition between the Social Democrats and the Green party from 1998 to 2005.
6The market price for electricity in 2003 was reported by the German statistical office to be 8.78 Cen-
t/KWh on average.
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By examining the effects of the EEG relative to a reduction of GHG emissions, the
positive environmental impact is strongly debated.7 Nevertheless, the EEG had the
effect that the percentage of renewable energies of the total production of electricity
increased from 6.3 percent in 2001 to 11.8 percent in 2006 (BMU, 2007a, p. 8).
4.3 Political Economy Consideration
In comparing conventional energy technologies with GTs, there is a major argument
that the outcome (e.g. electricity) can be produced cheaper with conventional energy
technologies. If the externality problem is taken into account, this calculation might be
wrong. However, as most GTs, so far, are not able to substitute for conventional energy
technologies, diffusion of GTs is, first of all, a costly investment into backstop technolo-
gies, with uncertainty about its relevance for substituting conventional technologies in
the near future.
4.3.1 Two Alternative Explanations for One Country’s Solo Run
In our study we look at investment into GTs from a political economy perspective. We
argue that welfare effects are not the major concern of politicians. Politicians try to be
re-elected and therefore are concerned about vested interests (Schumpeter, 1987a). A
decline in the current level of GDP (e.g. because of the decline of traditional industries)
might have a negative impact on the probability of being re-elected.
If we base our arguments on a short-run perspective, the free-riding of some countries
makes investments into climate protection costly. We, therefore, should not expect that
politicians (e.g. in Germany) will invest in the diffusion of GTs to such a great extent, as
described previously. The support for most GTs (e.g. photovoltaics) is still not profitable
under current relative prices. It is also implausible that politicians in a democracy
with limited electoral terms will seriously support a policy which has a long-term time
horizon (as is the case with climate change issues). This argument may change once
exports of GTs are taken into account. We still have to answer the question about the
rationality of the political calculations.8
7This is because the providers of energy are integrated into the trade with emission certificates. The EEG
obliges them to buy the electricity produced with GTs. If the quantity of certificates remains constant, the
EEG frees shares of certificates for other sectors and reduces incentives for GHG reduction (Sachverständi-
genrat, 2004, pp. 122-123). Compare also Traber and Kemfert (2009). However, as most of the industries
affected by the emission trading scheme are energy producing companies, this hybrid system may reduce
their resistance to diffusion of GTs.
8Sometimes, there is not a clear strategy, rather a kind of “window of opportunity” opens for the support
of GTs. The fact that the German Green Party was in the government between 1998-2005 supports this
explanation. Using the close relationship between the interests of the GT sector and the Green Party as an
explanation, “standard” “lobbying” and short-term orientation of politicians can still be used to explain the
outcome of the political process.
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A standard political economy explanation refers to the median voter model (Black,
1948; Downs, 1957). The government follows the median voters’ preferences, which are
increasingly directed to protect the climate. Therefore, the government invests relatively
more than other countries into climate protection as this is in line with median voter
preferences within the country. In addition, the domestic government can lobby for a
more ambitious international policy response. This strategy only pays off politically, if
the median voter thinks the benefits of the domestic efforts provide a global public good
higher than the marginal costs of higher energy prices or costs related to substitution
effects in the economy. The likelihood of such a potitical preference for early investment
into abatement policies is doubtful, at least when it is about the adoption of a certain
GT industry j.
Thus, there has to be a second rationale, namely short-term employment in the
GT industries (generating directly observable growth in the GT industry) linked to the
argument of future export sales of these technologies. The job creation in a particular
GT industry (Hillebrand et al., 2005; Lehr et al., 2008; Blanco and Rodrigues, 2009;
Lund, 2009) very likely creates stable (or increasing) transfer flows to the particular
GT industries (lock-in effect). Politicians maximize their political support function (in
the short run) with this job increase and at the same time justify these transfers by
expected future payoffs (e.g. future exports) related to the investment. However, such a
strategy requires that, over time, other countries adapt to the higher national standard.
From this perspective it becomes clear that the incumbent government has to make
use of the instrument of “international lobbying” to prepare future export markets
in order to make the (over)investment into GTs profitable. Thus, for investment into
GTs it mainly holds in a one-shot game that free-riding behavior of other countries is
problematic for the domestic government and its climate abatement targets. From a
dynamic perspective, this free-riding behavior in the short run may be a major reason
for ambitious unilateral political action, as long as it can be expected that other countries
over time have to increase their environmental standards, as well. Obviously such an
increase seems to be likely in the context of climate change with its long-term time
horizon.
To strengthen this argument we first discuss short-term GDP reaction related to a
policy induced demand for GTs. The impact is assumed to be negative. This result
builds on the assumption that without a policy induced demand, the domestic market
for GTs would fail as there is not an intersection between demand and supply for given
prices without subsidies. However, once national institutions are installed and GTs start
to diffuse, marginal costs are supposed to decline because of learning effects or some
economies of scale. The resulting effect is a comparative advantage for the national
GT industry (first mover advantage) as it moves rightwards on the learning curve (see
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figure 4.1) and institutions like patent laws allow for the commercial exploitation of this
advantage.
We, therefore, proceed and combine this argument with a Stackelberg game which
shall explore the political economy of climate policy in more detail.9
Heterogeneity among countries with respect to the national strength of GT industries
may encourage particular countries to progressively support the interests of their GT in-
dustries at the international level. Such a policy would be politically promising, as the
demand for both climate protection and future jobs seems to be satisfied. The negative
impact the GT sector has on the national GDP is expected to decline and growth in the
GT industry shifts climate policy towards the preferences of the median voter.10
4.3.2 Economy Without Trade in Green Technologies
Without any policy induced demand for a certain GT j there is no intersection between
supply and demand and marginal production costs are assumed to be constant. Once
there is an intersection between supply and demand (due to a subsidy or regulation
in favor of a certain GT j), we assume learning curve effects, thus the cost curve has a
negative slope.11 This is depicted in figure 4.1, where t stands for time, cpr represents
the marginal production costs, DN stands for demand for a certain GT j without policy
induced demand (pidj) and DS stands for demand for a certain GT jwith policy induced
demand. We refer to pidj as diffusion of GTs that results from domestic political inter-
vention. What we have in mind can be interpreted as command and control policies
with characteristics similar to those of the EEG. Theoretically pidj could also represent
diffusion of GTs as a result of market-based instruments such as tradable certificates or
subsidies. In any case, the parameter is exogenous and can be directly influenced by
national legislation.
We start in a world were only one country – in our framework the home country (H)
– implements measures that allow for diffusion of GTs. The measure taken is a policy
induced demand for renewable energy at a level that allows the GT industry to establish.
There is no international trade in GTs as the foreign country (F) free-rides on climate
change mitigation policies.
Concentrating on the domestic consequences of supporting renewable energy beyond
themarket demand for GTs (under the assumption that F does not support the GT sector),
9A Stackelberg game seems to be the most appropriate in this case, because producers of GTs start to
compete once one country starts to invest into GTs. Within the country firms compete on the industry level
such that they cannot make use of their cost advantage in the form of price competition. We expect that
competition will be about exported quantities.
10The empirical evidence shows that governmental changes in Germany did not lead to real changes
within the German system that is used to support diffusion of GTs, even though the Green Party has been a
member of the opposition since the year 2005.
11There are studies which support this assumption. For photovoltaics and wind mills see Nemet (2006)
and Madsen et al. (2005).
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the balance is negative. Because conventional substitutes for producing energy exist,
the creation of the GT sector generates costs in H that can be translated into a reduction
in the level of national GDP. In addition to the environmental regulation, these costs
reduce the initial comparative advantages of other industries (that use energy as input
and compete in international markets) and additional pressure comes from the short run






H stands for “new GDP1”
with policy induced demand for GTs and without exports, the latter for the GDP without
policy induced demand for GTs). This line of arguments is well known and can directly
be applied as an explanation for the free-riding problem, resulting in an international
prisoners’ dilemma.
4.3.3 Open Economy Considerations
Because we assume that H enters the market of GTs before F, it moves rightward on
the cost curve.12 Hence, considering exports does lead to a change in the results. If F
decides later to enter the GT market and starts its own production, it has to start at a
higher point on the cost curve. Figure 4.2 shows that cprF are expected to be higher than
cprH . The support for a certain GT industry in F could be the result of H’s government
successfully “lobbying” for a global environmental standard or due to a change in the
national government in F. It also might be that median voters’ preferences in F change.
12For a general discussion of learning curve effects and competitive markets see Rasmusen et al. (1997).
Chapter 4. Strategic Trade Policy as Response to Climate Change? 92













It is highly sensible to use a framework of strategic trade policy to explain why
H′s government has strong incentives to support high environmental standards on an
international platform. The idea of strategic trade policy can be traced back to Brander
and Spencer (1985). The underlying argument is quite simple and can be summarized
in the following way: in incomplete markets, market entrance can be characterized by a
first mover advantage. The first mover advantage stems from the chance the firm which
first enters the market with incomplete competition has to increase market power. In an
extreme case, the industry will become monopolistic.
Thus, political support (or more generally a policy induced demand) can help the
industry to exploit the rents related to the early market entrance. Even though the terms
of trade may deteriorate, as long as price changes exceed the marginal costs related to
the political support, the welfare of the country as a whole can increase.13
Other theoretical papers also use game theory to evaluate strategic interaction be-
tween countries in the case of environmental policy (Barrett, 1994b; Ulph, 1996; Ulph
and Ulph, 1997, 2007; Rege, 2000). In our paper, we use the theoretical arguments to
explain political rationality, which distinguishes it from former related publications.
The political rationality is explained by five different scenarios. In the first case we
assume that F decides in a later phase than H to implement a transfer scheme per unit
13Only if both countries subsidize their industries in order to be the first to enter into the market, a
prisoners’ dilemma is present and both countries would be better off without the subsidy (Brander and
Spencer, 1985, p. 95).
Chapter 4. Strategic Trade Policy as Response to Climate Change? 93
of energy produced by a particular GT (FITs) (what is captured by pidj). We assume
that producers located in F are also able to produce GTs, but they operate on a higher
marginal cost curve. This allows the GT sector in H to enter the market in F as a
Stackelberg leader (scenario 1).14 Alternatively, high environmental standards might be
the result of supranational negotiations (scenario 2). The high environmental standards
increase the demand for GTs indirectly.15.
There may also be a different outcome, depending on F’s reaction. For example,
what if F decides to support GT firms located in F directly with a subsidy on marginal
production costs (scenario 3).16 Two cases are possible under this scenario. In case (3a),
H is not able to export its technology, because the subsidy to the foreign GT sector is too
high and industries located in H are not able to compete with F (however, the subsidy in
F may encourage foreign direct investments (FDIs) or the GT industry in H also lobbies
for direct subsidies in order to become competitive). In case (3b), if the GT industry
in H is so competitive that it was exporting GTs before F started to subsidize national
industries, H can continue to export, if it is still able to compete with the GT industry
located in F. It is also possible that H competes with the GT industry in F in a “third”
market (e. g. country I) (scenario 4).17 There is, further, the possibility that a firm located
in H is making a direct contract with politicians in F (scenario 5), and, again, two cases
have to be distinguished: In case (5a), F simply buys H’s technology. In this case, the
GT industry would sell a package of GTs to F. This scenario can also be used to integrate
the clean development mechanism into the model. In case (5b), the contract is combined
with a local content clause.18
We restrict the analysis to these five scenarios, because they cover relevant cases and
seem to be sufficient to show the incentives which politicians in H have (1) to use indus-
trial policy to support the national GT industry even though other countries free-ride,
14As stated by Frondel et al. (2008a), there was a huge increase in the demand for photovoltaics when
Germany started to support GTs by subsidizing each unit of energy produced by GTs directly over the
EEG. The increase in demand was so strong that most of the modules were imported from Japan (Frondel
et al., 2008a, p. 6). It seems plausible to interpret this in the sense that Japan had a first mover advantage to
enter the German market, as we model it with the Stackelberg game. However, the empirical evidence also
shows that the German solar industry was quite fast in catching up.
15Many papers use an endogenous growth setting to model the costs of technological abatement related
to high environmental standards ((an overview is given by Löschel, 2002; Jaffe et al., 2002b). High environ-
mental standards set the incentive to invest in abatement, such that it leads to endogenous technological
change (Xepapdeas, 1995; Rosendahl, 2004; Golombek and Hoel, 2008)
16We assume that this scenario is the most likely one. The government in F would probably have political
difficulties increasing the costs for its industries with a higher environmental standard without using the
argument of new jobs in its own GT-sector.
17In this case, I is not able to produce GTs but has an incentive to buy them (e. g. because of high
international environmental standards or as a result of cost reductions and innovations). Among others,
the competition related to a “third” market has been studied by Maggi (1996).
18One example of local content clauses related to the implementation of GTs is the Canadian province of
Québec. A precondition for obtaining support for the installation of windmills in Québec is that 30% of the
wind mills have to be produced locally (FAZ, 2007, p. 16).
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(2) to support high environmental standards at a supranational level and (3) to coop-
erate with the GT industry on international interests.19 Initially, we discuss scenario 1
and scenario 2. The results for the other scenarios are summarized in table C.1 (App. C.1).
Expectations Related to Exports of GTs (scenarios 1 and 2)
Without any support being given to the GT sector the initial GDP of both countries is the






F stands for the GDP without any support for the GT
industries in F). H is faster in implementing GTs than the other country.20 If we compare
the GDP levels of both countries after H has decided to implement a GT sector, in the
short run we have the case that Yn1H < Y
i
F.
We do not assume a monopolistic market in the GT sector in H but all GT industries
in H are supposed to be symmetric and able to supply GTs at the same marginal costs.
Finally, expected exports of GTs j (j = Photovoltaics, . . . ,WindMills) from H to F are
looked at from an aggregated level. Politicians and representatives of the different GT in-
dustry’s in H are aware of their advantage in international competitiveness. Therefore,
both groups expect to benefit from an increase in environmental standards in F. This
means that there is an expected gain related to the export of GTs.




represents the expected size of the GT market with exports, qeHj stands for the expected
quantity sold by the GT industry j located in H and qeFj stands for the expected quantity
sold by the GT industriesj located in F). Expected profits of the GT industryj located in









+ pideFj)− clj . (4.1)
If industries in H and F are operating on different cost curves, as depicted in figure 4.2,
then equation 4.1 can be solved as a Stackelberg game (compare App. C.2, p. 205). We
argue that H enters the export market as Stackelberg leader.
We then get as an expected outcome that qe∗H > q
e∗
F and exports (in contrast to
the short-term considerations) contribute positively to Hs level of GDP. The result
qe∗H > q
e∗
F > 0 can be interpreted as potential extra gains for the GT industry in H
– if F was free-riding in the short run and decides later to support diffusion of GTs
without discriminating against Hs industry. This is one reason why there might be a
strong interest in H investing heavily in the diffusion of GTs and “lobbying” for high
environmental standards internationally. Thus, once the GT industry has been successful
in establishing itself at the national level, the GT industry (in both H and F) and the
government (in H) have common interests at the international level.
19For an example look at http://www.exportinitiative.de.
20We argue that this is due to the political process. Beside this, both countries can be assumed to be
symmetric.
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How does this result translate into H’s changes in GDP (Y)21? We can substitute the
calculated values for qe∗Fj and q
e∗
Hj
into equation 4.1 and obtain the expected profit πeHj > 0.
This profit can be directly translated into national welfare gain (πeHj = y
e
H > 0). This
leads to the result that yeH > 0 reduces the loss in GDP related to the pidHj without any









is bigger than Y
n1







H . The model implies that exports of GTs can generate welfare




22 Therefore, the national government and the particular industry have
another strong incentive to promote the technology.
Finally, just how realistic the expectation is that there is a long-run net benefit for
country H from subsidizing its GTs has to be discussed. As Table C.1 (App. C.1, p. 204)
shows, “only” in scenario 3, case (a), does the first mover advantage not lead to higher
exports because of direct support in F for the GTs there. However, as qe∗F is also bigger
than zero, one can expect that the industry in F also gains. This implies less resistance in
F.23 All other scenarios are characterized by increasing exports, but not necessarily by
increasing the GDP compared to the situation without policy induced demand for GTs.
However, this problem can be politically mitigated, as the complexity of the economy
may allow the government to attribute the export gains directly to its climate policy,
whereas the job losses in downstream industries can be traced back to many factors.
Governments may find a lot of explanations for the latter. Thus, there are at least three
political economy arguments that politicians in H use in support of the GTs, strategically.
All three have an interest in a market that allows for diffusion of GTs in F, because
• GT industry j expects higher profits,
• national governments can reduce the political costs caused by the policy induced
demand for GTs,
• the GT industry in F can also generate profits which is important to reduce resis-
tance against international standards.
The intuition behind the framework presented is to analyze political incentives which
we now try to incorporate into an econometric model.
21Note that the welfare analysis is limited to the GDP and therefore ignores welfare gains due to the
reduction of GHGs. In our study benefits of climate change protection are not taken into account. A
cost-benefit analysis therefore would come to very different results.








23In addition, legal contracts for Fmight render scenario 3, if F is a WTOmember and cannot just increase
restrictions on GTs. That reduces incentives for opposition in F.
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4.4 Empirical Approach
To strengthen our theoretical argument we propose an econometric model. With this
model we try to assess empirically whether the alleged strategy of the government
and the GT interest groups is indeed observable in reality. The question is whether or
not the link between climate policy and industrial policy has an influence on export
expectations related to GTs (eventually leading to an increase of GDP beyond the free-
riding status quo). This is, of course, difficult to estimate, as expectations cannot be
modeled easily. We argue that expectations about future export sales and thus profits
(πeHj) are best expressed in patent applications and grants in foreign target countries
(PATENTHF). The econometric model is therefore constructed in a way that it tries to
proxy equation 4.1 (πeHj = q
e
Hj
(Ae − qeHj − q
e
Fj





shown by the further calculations (equation C.4) exports of GTs can have a positive
impact on the countries level of GDP.
We build the model on the assumption that diffusion of GTs (as a result of pid)
reduces marginal production costs. This relationship pidHj : c
pr
Hj
→ cprHj(pidHj) is proxied
with installed capacity (measured in MWh) of industry specific technologies (pidHj)
in H. We further assume that in the equilibrium without trade in GTs pidFj is lower
than pidHj (such that c
pr
Hj
< cprFj ) and politicians located in H make use of international
“lobbying” to create or to further increase pidFj in order to be able to exploit their
comparative advantage in future trade sales (in the model described as intra-industry
trade). Formally: πeHj proxied by PATENT
HF and cprHj(pidHj) proxied by (INCAP
H)
gives the functional form that we are interested in. This then leads to the relationship
(INCAPH : PATENTHF → PATENTHF(INCAPH)). Thus, if there is a positive correla-
tion between PATENTHF and INCAPH), we see a rationale for politicians located in
H to actively support the interests of the different GT industry’s at the international
level. As controls we add public expenditures on research and development in the home
country (RuDH), energy prices in the foreign country (CPIEF), as well as electricity
consumption in the foreign country (ELCF). We also control for structural change in the
patent system with the variable (APATENTF) which measures all patent applications in
the specific country (this variable can also be interpreted as a proxy for Ae). Due to a
lack of information we have to ignore the costs of lobbying (clj). As our model makes
use of future expectations, we don’t have information on qeHj , q
e
Fj
, and pideFj which is
expected to be significantly higher than the observed variable pidFj).
The positive relationship between the patent system and trade has been highlighted
by different authors (Markusen, 1995; Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; Rafiquzzaman, 2002).
Coe and Helpman (1995) analyze empirically the impact of international R&D spillovers
on economic growth. They come to the result that the relationship is positive. Beneficial
24Only those variables without e (“expectations”) are observable.
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effects turn out to be the stronger, the better the economy is internationally integrated.
Overall, the rates of international R&D turn out to be very high. Thus, we see a certain
confirmation of our political economy logic, if GT patents German firms file abroad are
partially correlated with German climate policy.
4.4.1 Related Previous Studies
An increasing number of studies analyze the impact of environmental regulation on
GTs. Rose and Joskow (1990) investigate the impact of fuel prices on the adoption of
fuel-saving technologies on the electric utility industry (database comes from industries
located within the US). In their study they also control for firm size and find that large
firms are likely to adopt new technologies earlier than small firms and publicly-owned
enterprises. Jaffe and Stavins (2005) study the impact of high energy prices on insulation
for new home construction. They find a positive correlation between the two variables.
With respect to the interpretation of the results, they underline that individual decisions
to invest in insulation are strongly affected by the costs of insulation material. Other
studies examine the relationship between environmental regulation and the probability
for adaptation of environmental friendly technologies (Jaffe and Palmer, 1996; Gray
and Shadbegian, 1998; Kemp, 1998; Kerr and Nevell, 2003). One of the main results is
that the response to environmental regulation is different. This outcome can mainly be
explained by firm specific heterogeneity.
Further studies look at a causal relationship between environmental regulation and
industry specific competitiveness. Mainly, these papers are based on a contribution
which became known as the “Porter hypothesis”. The main idea is that countries with
stricter environmental regulation force their industry to invest in abatement. One of the
results may be that the industry located in the country becomes more competitive com-
pared to its competitors located in other countries with lower environmental regulations
(Porter, 1990; Porter and Linde, 1995).25 Some rare studies are able to find support for
the positive relationship (Porter and Linde, 1995; Berman and Bui, 2001b,a). However,
besides theoretical concerns against the “Porter hypothesis”, many empirical papers
come to the conclusion that there is significant negative impact from environmental
regulation on firms operating in the specific industry (Bartik, 1985; Jaffe et al., 1995;
Becker and Henderson, 2000; Greenstone, 2002).
Only a few studies connect environmental policy to the diffusion of environmental
friendly technologies. One important study, based on patent counts, addressing ques-
tions related to international diffusion of environmental technologies is Lanjouw and
Mody (1996). The authors use patent data from the United States, Japan, Germany and
other countries to analyze the impact of pollution abatement costs on environmentally
25For a review of some literature related to the “Porter hypothesis” compare Jaffe et al. (1995).
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friendly innovations. They come to the conclusion that in countries with comparative
advantages in industrial production – such as the United States, Japan and Germany
– the majority of the patents for environmentally friendly technologies are owned by
domestic inventors. By contrast, in the case of developing countries most innovations are
“imported” from industrialized countries. Another major result of their study is related
to regulation in one country and inventive activity in other countries with high innova-
tive capacities. It turns out that environmental regulation in one particular country has
an impact on innovative activity in other countries.26
In his study based on patent counts, Popp (2006) assesses differences at the interna-
tional level. The study analyses the impact of stringent sulfur dioxide (SO2) standards
and nitrogen dioxide (NOX) standards on the environment. The result is that the num-
ber of domestic patents increases with environmental regulation at the national level.
Nevertheless, at the international level there is no significant impact. Popp (2006) in-
terprets the results in a way that indicates domestic inventors tend only to react to
national environmental regulation, whereas regulation in other countries does not have
an influence. Additionally, the author is able to show that innovations may be made
in one country, even though they have already been made in another country. There-
fore, inefficiencies occur due to transaction costs and probable protection (scenario 3).
Nevertheless, innovations developed in other countries are, to some extent, used as a
building block for emission reduction in other countries. The following econometric
model is related to this literature, but the underlying motivation is a political economy
perspective.
4.4.2 Using Patent Counts as Indicator
Patents can be defined as “a document, issued by an authorized governmental agency,
granting the right to exclude anyone else from the production or use of a specific new
device, apparatus, or process for a stated number of years” (Griliches, 1990, p. 1662).
From an international perspective, this implies that inventors with patents in a foreign
country have the advantage of also protecting their knowledge in foreign market places.
The rationality behind patenting abroad should be positively correlated with export
expectations or the aim to sell licenses of a certain technology to the foreign country.27
The idea to use patent data as a proxy related to environmental innovation and
competition at a national or international level is not new. A good overview of the
26They show this using the example of regulation on vehicle air conditioners in the United States. Even
though the United States was one of the first countries with standards on vehicle air, many innovations
came from foreign inventors.
27This is somehow clear, because if H is the leader in a certain technology, the follower F cannot export to
H as long as inventors in H have applied for a patent. Because patent applications are costly, it is plausible
to assume that patent applications abroad go in hand with the commercial value of the invention related to
the foreign marketplace.
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advantages and possible shortcomings of using patent counts as an indicator for en-
vironmental innovation is given by Popp (2005a). Patents have the main advantage
of being a good proxy for international relations because “since inventors can apply
for patents in multiple countries, patents can also be used to track the diffusion of
technologies across-countries” (Popp, 2005a, p. 210).
The empirical approach we use to test the theoretical framework looks at the patents,
with a priority on the German Patent Office (GPO) applied by German inventors and
which are also protected at the European Patent Office (EPO), Japanese Patent Office
(JPO) and the American Patent Office (APO), respectively. Therefore, we are able to
consider the protection of knowledge in different markets. The patent counts we use
also contain information about the dynamics of patent application over time. The
number of patents issued can therefore also be interpreted as diffusion of innovation
and expectation for future export receipts.
Beside these advantages, there are also shortcomings.28 It is important to mention
that by using patent counts as an indicator only a small area of innovations will be
covered. There are many inventions/innovations that are not patentable at all. It might
also be better for strategic or cost reasons to keep the innovation secret, instead of
applying for a patent. Especially with respect to incremental innovations, this seems to
be very likely. Therefore, regarding our study, patents can only measure a proportion
of innovations related to green technologies. Because our analysis is constructed on
aggregated data, we lose all the important information also captured by patents, such as
the location of inventors, the firms operating in the GT industry or information about
the value of the patent.29 We also use the predefined list of patent classes from chapter 3
(table B.1, App. B) to extract the patents of the overall sample. Even though key words
have been used to find out whether these groups are exactly the international patent
classification (IPC) classes where the technologies of interest will be patented, it might
be that patents are applied in other groups which are not captured by our list.30 With
respect to patent applications and patents granted, there might be a large difference. By
evaluating long-time series, structural breaks due to institutional reforms of the patent
system can also not be excluded. Time trends may exist in overall patenting behavior
that may already explain some of the changes. Being aware of this problem we will
include in our regression the count of all patents issued in countries abroad to cover
some of these endogenous effects.
28A good overview of advantages and disadvantages related to the use of patent data is given by Griliches
(1990).
29The count of patent citations could be used as an indicator measuring the value of a certain patent e. g.
compare Jaffe et al. (2002a).
30Note that the extraction of the data has been done by a algorithm able to get rid of the problem of
double counting of a certain patent. Therefore double counting cannot be considered to be a problem in
our study.
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4.4.3 Data Sources
The time frame of the dataset is from 1992 to 2002.31 The institutional settings analyzed
are the SEG (1990-1999) and the EEG (2000-2002+). The four sources of the data are the
German Patent Office, the International Energy Agency (IEA), Eurostat and the Federal
Ministry for the Environment (BMU). The industries of interest are Wind, Solar, Water &
Ocean, Geothermal and Biomass.
In the regression proposed in subsection 4.5 patent applications (PATENTHF) are
used as a dependent variable. PATENTHF measures patents filed to German inventors
at the EPO, the JPO and the APO. As for the timing, we use the priority date which is the
date of the patent application at the GPO.32 If the patent is granted in the foreign country,
protection begins with the priority date. The huge time lag that may occur by regressing
patents applied in foreign countries on their priority dates is not as problematic as it
seems to be at first glance. As inventors who desire patent protection in other countries
have the possibility of using the patent cooperation treaty (PCT) they have only a time
span of one year to name the foreign countries in which protection is desired. Note that
this information is very important with respect to our assumptions about the time lags
implemented in the regression analysis (see closer specification of time lags and period
dummies). For patents granted in a foreign country, the protection will go back to the
application date in the home country. Nevertheless, between application in the home
country and the granting of the patent in the foreign country, a time lag of more than
four years is plausible. Therefore, for the regression analysis, we only use data from
1992 until 2002 (even though the dataset contains information until 2005).33
4.4.4 Descriptive Statistics on Patent Counts
Looking at the evidence shows that patents in the wind mill industry, solar industry
and biomass industry have generally increased after 1998. For the other two industries,
there is no observable trend. Figures 4.3-4.7 display the development since 1990-2005.
It can be seen that, especially in the case of WIND, patent counts have decreased con-
siderably since 2002. The explanation for this is in the huge time lag we are confronted
with in looking at patent applications in foreign countries.
31The data range is from 1990-2005. We restrict the analysis to twelve years of observation, because we
assume that patent applications abroad before 1992 were not relevant. Additionally there is a problem
of a huge time lag between patent application in Germany and the date when the patent is granted in a
foreign country. As the dataset we use contains patent counts of patents that have already been granted in
Germany and the foreign countries, after 2002 we lose a lot of information, leading to biased results. The
reason for this is that there might be patents that have been applied for in foreign countries but have not
been granted, so far. A summary of the data included in our dataset is provided in App. C.3, p. 206.
32Because nearly all patent applications are first filed in the home country of the inventor (Popp, 2006,
p. 52), we can look at patents with priority at the GPO applied for protection in other countries.
33The dotted line in figures 4.3-4.7 is intended to show the decline in patent counts due to the time lag.
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We use PATENTHF as a proxy for export expectations as described in our strategic trade
policy framework. Strategic knowledge protection in foreign countries represents the
first “mover advantage” from the theoretical part. Results not published in this paper
are strongly supportive of ∆INCAPH being significantly positively correlated with
patents filed at the German Patent Office (Wangler, 2010b). INCAPH (which we indicate
by cprHj(pidHj) in the theoretical part) is our main variable of interest. We argue that
feed-in tariffs in Germany are used strategically under the EEG to generate comparative
advantages. INCAPH is therefore used as a proxy to test whether it is true that the
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strategic use of feed-in tariffs did generate positive export expectations captured by
PATENTHF. If we connect the theoretical framework to our empirical data then we
should also expect a positive relationship between RuDH and INCAPH. This leads to
hypothesis 1a (H1a) and hypothesis 1b (H1b).
H1a: There is a positive relationship between public R&D expenditures RuDH and
international patent applications.
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Source figure 4.3-4.7: EPO, compare App. C.3, p. 206.
H1b: There is a positive relationship between installed capacity of GTs in Germany
INCAPH and international patent applications.
The third variable of the model is the installed capacity of renewable energies in the
specific region INCAPF. As an increase of INCAPF enhances export expectations to the
foreign region it should be positively correlated with patents filed in this region in order
to protect knowledge. This leads to hypothesis 2 (H2):
H2: An increase in installed capacity abroad INCAPF has a positive impact on interna-
tional patent applications.
In addition to these three hypotheses there is the general assumption that there are
significant differences with respect to region (r) and time (t). H3a and H3b capture the
spacial dimension. H3c is related to the time dimension. To test H3c we implement time
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dummies for the SEG and the EEG. We suppose a significant change in coefficients as
Germany started to connect industrial policy with the climate change issue under the
EEG.
H3a: There are differences between EPO, JPO and APO, because the markets are differ-
ent from each other.
H3b: Most dynamics take place in Europe.34
H3c: There are differences regarding the international diffusion under the SEG and EEG.
It is important to mention that hypothesis H1b and hypothesis H3c are of particular
interest. Both hypothesis are very closely related to the theoretical framework where
we argue that under the EEG feed-in, tariffs are used as a tool to indirectly support the
implementation of certain GT industries.
4.5 Econometric Model
Model Specification











APATENTF, CPIEF and ELCF are added to the core model as controls.35 The vari-
able APATENTF is integrated into the model because it contains information about the
total number of patent applications in the specific region. It may be that the industrial
structure in the region (indicated with many patent applications) is the driving force
behind patent applications in the GT industry j.36
The dataset is constructed on three dimensions: (1) Time t, (2) Technology i and (3)
Region r. A simple approach would be to estimate the regression for the EPO, JPO and
APO separately. In this case there would be the estimation of three different panels. For
each panel the estimation would be
PATENTF
r
i,t = β0 + β1RuD
H












t−1 + αi + ǫi,t. (4.2)
34Europe has the highest share of renewable energies (6.9 percent) compared to the other countries of
the analysis (Johnstone et al., 2010, p. 134).
35Compare also Popp (2001, 2002).
36Note that this variable is also important because it takes away some problems related to endogeneity.
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The cross-section with different technologies (WIND, SOLAR,WATER,GEO, BIO) is
indexed by i = 1, . . . , 5, and t = 1993, . . . , 2002 represents time.37 The dependent
variable is a vector with patent applications by German inventors in the other regions
(PATENTri,t), measured by the number of patents granted in r (at priority date). The
independent variables include a vector with German technology specific public R&D
expenditures (RuDHi,t), diffusion of the specific technology in Germany measured in
MWh (INCAPHi,t ), diffusion of all green technologies (not industry specific) in region




t ) is a vector with
electricity consumption per capita in region r and (CPIEFt ) is a vector with the price index
for energy. Because of collinearity of patent applications regarding r = EPO, JPO, APO,
we integrate the third dimension with the same regression. In order to do so, we build
region specific interaction terms. Fixed effects are integrated into themodel by αi in order
to capture unobservable technology specific heterogeneity. All the residual variation is
captured with the error term ǫi,t.
As proposed by Johnstone et al. (2010), we use a negative binomial regression for es-
timation of the model from equation 4.2 but extend the panel about the third dimension
(r). Poisson models as well as negative binomial models have been suggested in order
to estimate count data (Maddala, 1983; Cameron and Trivedi, 1998; Wooldridge, 2002a).
The events we “count” are the patent applications in different international levels indi-
cated by r. Formally, we can define an event as a count of a non-negative integer-valued
random variable. The assumption is that the count of the event (captured by PATENTF
r
i,t )
follows a negative binomial distribution. Due to the underlying assumptions of the
negative binomial distribution, the patent count follows a Poisson distribution with an
unobserved error parameter ν implementing heterogeneity in the variance. The intensity
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The description from above implies that expected value E(PATENTF
r
i,t ) = ϕ with
standard deviation V(PATENTF
r
i,t ) = ϕ(1 + σ
2ϕ). Therefore with σ → 0 intensity is
given by ϕ and the model converges towards a Poisson distribution (Johnstone et al.,
37Correlation matrices for the two models (one year time lag and two year time lag) are presented at
table C.4 and table C.5, appendix C, page 209 and page 210. It can be seen that high correlation exists
among ELC and APATENT (for EU,JAPAN and USA) what might cause a problem of multi collinearity
within the regression. The overall regression results, however, do not change if these variables are left out
of the regression. As the omission of variables can cause a bias in coefficients, we decided to present the
results including the variables ELC and APATENT.
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2010, p. 146). The estimation is done for 5 technologies and 11 years (1992-2002) with 3
regions. This leads to a sample with 180 observations.
4.5.1 Closer Specification of the Time Lags and Period Dummies
Because our dataset allows for dynamic model specifications, time lags have to be im-
plemented to be in line with economic theory.38 Because the priority date indicates the
application date in Germany, we expect a one year or a two year time lag for RuDH.
For INCAPH no time lag is assumed. As the diffusion of the technology in Germany
can only take place when the technology is already developed, this assumption makes
sense. For INCAPF, APATENTF, ELCF and CPIEF a one year time lag is assumed. We
justify this assumption with reference to the PCT. As stated above, according to the PCT,
most of the patents applied at the national level extent to patent applications in foreign
countries within a time frame of one year. This is a very pragmatic way of dealing
with the problem of a time lag of four or five years between the patent application at a
national patent office and the patent granting of a foreign patent office. For RuDH and
INCAPH , as well as for CPIEF, we implement period dummies from 1992-1999 (for the
SEG) in the first period, and 2000-2002 (for the EEG) in the second period.
4.5.2 Estimation Results
The results of our reference model are presented in Table 4.1 (estimation results un-
der assumption of a one year time lag for RuDH). It can be seen that an increase in
domestic public R&D expenditure does not affect the patenting behavior of German
firms abroad. We find a negative but insignificant relation between the public R&D
expenditures. We therefore have to reject hypothesis 1a. We get the opposite result for
hypothesis 1b. Under the SEG and EEG strong support for hypothesis 1b can be found.
As seen, the evidence for hypothesis 2 is mixed but rather weak. Otherwise, there are
differences in the regions (as some coefficients are different with respect to their signs),
which somehow confirms hypothesis 3a. The EU is not specifically attractive for Ger-
man firms, which contradicts hypothesis 3b. To test hypothesis 3c we use a Chow-test
and compare INCAPH1992−1999 with INCAP
H
2000−2002. We find significant differences for
EPO (p= 0.0580) and JPO (p=0.0713). For APO the difference is not significant under
conventional statistical terms (p= 0.1220). The three results together give evidence for
hypothesis 3c. However, the coefficients indicate a decrease in this relationship instead
of an increase, which can be interpreted to suggest that efficiency decreased under the
38For a more detailed discussion on time lags related to patent data compare Hall et al. (1986). Brunner-
meier and Cohen (2003) also make an econometric study and make the assumption that there is no lag at
all. The result from Griliches (1998) also suggests that with respect to R&D the time lag can be assumed to
be rather small.
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EEG. Installed capacity in Japan is relevant for patenting there, and general patenting
behavior is positively correlated with green patenting in the United States.
TABLE 4.1: Fixed effects negative binomial regression
PATENTHF EPO JPO APO
lag1RuDH1992−1999 −0.0049777 −0.0033792 −0.000487
(0.0084893) (0.0104979) (0.0082184)








lagINCAPF 0.0000161 0.0008603∗∗ −0.0000788
(0.0000279) (0.0005283) (0.000058)
lagAPATENTF −194e− 06 −0.0000594) 0.0011413∗∗
(0.0003891) (0.0002586) (0.0005508)
lagCPIEF1992−1999 0.0022767 −0.0023875 0.0011234
(0.0185545) (0.0178013) (0.020191)
lagCPIEF2000−2002 0.0092491 0.0009691 0.0070262
(0.0158542) (0.0177275) (0.0170407)





Nr. of observations: 165
Significance: ∗∗∗ ≤ 1%,∗∗ ≤ 5%,∗ ≤ 10%
4.5.3 Robustness of the Results
As a robustness check we present an additional model (table 4.2) with a two-year time lag
for public R&D expenditures. It can be observed that compared to our reference model
(table 4.1) the results for R&D change. Under the SEG, public R&D gets significant for
EPO and APO. Thus, if the model is correctly specified with a two-year time lag for
public R&D, we cannot reject hypothesis 1a under the SEG for EPO and APO for the
period from 1992− 1999. For our main variable of interest, INCAPH, under the SEG
hypothesis 1b is only confirmed for JPO. For EPO and APO it has to be rejected. Under
Chapter 4. Strategic Trade Policy as Response to Climate Change? 108
the EEG, INCAPH remains significant, confirming hypothesis 1b. It can be seen that
the right specification of the lag structure for public R&D is crucial for the econometric
model. The comparison between the different lag structures shows that slight model
specifications change the significance of some indicators. We therefore try to motivate
the assumptions implemented into the econometric model, theoretically.
Further econometric problems might be due to multicollinearity between the obser-
vations. However, leaving some variables out of the model may cause omitted variable
bias problems. Serial correlation might be an additional problem. In table C.3 (p. 208) we
therefore present a model estimated by a simple first differences ordinary least squares
(OLS) model. We still get significant results for INCAPH2000−2002 in JPO and APO. Our
main hypothesis for the paper is that feed-in tariffs are used strategically under the
EEG. This hypothesis is still partially confirmed under the specified models presented
in table 1 and table C.3 (App. C.3, p. 208). If we run a Poisson model instead of a negbin
model (table C.2, App. C.3, p. 207) some of the results change and become significant
but the overall picture remains the same.
Even though the model is sensitive to model specification, different estimations have
shown that INCAPH is a quite robust predictor for PATENTF under the EEG. As the
theoretical model from section 4.3 mainly refers to this time period, the econometric
model offers important insights related to our theoretical reasoning.
4.6 Conclusion
We analyse the climate change debate from a perspective of political opportunity and
economic rationality. We use a strategic trade policy framework to explain the political
interests behind the climate change debate. In contrast to the strategic trade policy
literature, we do not intend to justify or to nullify strategic trade policy. The result of our
welfare analysis clearly shows the expected gains related to exports of GTs. Politicians
might use the problem of climate change as an instrument to support the national
GT industry at the international level. From this perspective, high environmental
standards are in the political interest of these countries. Environmental standards can
be used by a government as an instrument to convince other countries to open their
markets for GTs. As shown theoretically, the welfare effects of one country’s industrial
policy therefore strongly depend on the policy reaction of other countries.
The theoretical framework and the empirical evidence also show incentives for
GT enterprises to lobby their case and prepare for future markets. It seems as if the
German green industry, indeed, anticipates future export sales via patenting abroad.
The main driver we identify for this behavior is the installed capacity of GTs in Germany.
This seems fairly plausible and can be interpreted as positive experience creating new
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TABLE 4.2: Fixed effects negative binomial regression












lagINCAPF 0.0000675 0.0035497 0.0002025
(0.0001194) (0.003328) (0.0003636)
lagAPATENTF 0.0028577 −0.001055 0.0038894
(0.0040687) (0.0010724) (0.0037222)
lagCPIEF1992−1999 −0.0023775 −0.009236 −0.0082064
(0.0250123) (0.0233636) (0.0258147)
lagCPIEF2000−2002 0.0649717 0.0547221 0.0583138
(0.0790413) (0.0794015) (0.079379)





Nr. of observations: 150
Significance: ∗∗∗ ≤ 1%,∗∗ ≤ 5%,∗ ≤ 10%
expectations. Although the results are encouraging, we need better evidence to confirm
our political economy reasoning.
Nevertheless, this logic and the empirical evidence suggest that one can expect the
German government to continue its efforts to lobby for an international environmental
agreement and strong climate protection standards valid world-wide. International
experience, however, also suggests that other countries will not open their markets easily.
Instead, the German policies may be replicated and other countries may subsidize their
own GT industry, which renders the German policy unsuccessful.
Chapter 5
Is Regulation by Milestones
Efficiency Enhancing?∗
5.1 Introduction
In real life, a number of long-term projects rely on intermediate targets or milestones.
For individual choice problems imposing additional constraints may be detrimental to
efficiency. External regulation does not make much sense if individuals are able to cope
with problems on their own. However, this is different for collective choice problems. In
the economic domain, we do indeed observe milestones mainly in social contexts. For
instance, governments often announce official targets for budget reductions. Another
prominent example is the GATT and its aim of continuous liberalization of international
trade – a target which cannot be easily operationalized. Nevertheless, intermediate
targets have been regularly set in trade rounds. At the end of each round, the negotiating
parties agreed on an agenda to stepwise reduce trade barriers within a certain period.
A third example is environmental protection. Here investments in climate protection
could be imposed by an international environmental agreement (cf. Barrett, 1994a, 2003).
Such an agreement often includes a final target which should be reached at a certain
date, e.g., reduction of total emissions until 2050 by about 50 percent, based on the 1990
emissions (IPCC, 2007).1 Under such circumstances, milestones can proxy intermediate
abatement targets to keep total emissions below a critical threshold (e.g., the emission
reduction targets in the context of the Kyoto Protocol). If the international community
fails to meet these intermediate targets, it will become more difficult to reach the final
threshold, making catastrophic events more likely.
∗This chapter is mainly based on Freytag, Koppel, Güth andWangler (2010). We are grateful to Christoph
Engel, Gerhard Riener, M. Vittoria Levati, Michael Huettner, Oliver Kirchkamp and Sebastian Vergara,
for valuable comments. We also would like to thank seminar audiences at the 2010 ESA world meeting
in Copenhagen and the 2010 IAREP/SABE/ICABEEP conference in Cologne for their feedback. We are
indebted to Christian Streubel for programming assistance.
1Without national commitments (“the business as usual” scenario) estimations predict a temperature
increase with possibly catastrophic consequences (Stern, 2007; Solomon et al., 2009; Latif, 2010).
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The rationale behind such milestones is to increase the intermediate credibility of
policy announcements through a commitment to testable intermediate targets. Govern-
ments may thereby overcome pressure from vested interests and measure long-term
goal achievements by short-term goal achievements. The above examples illustrate that
milestones are often seen as disciplining factors for policy makers. In global economic
policy making, the evidence seems clear – GATT has achieved considerable progress in
the field of comprehensive international liberalization. Thus, applying a similar tool to
climate policy may also be reasonable.
However, there is neither convincing empirical evidence nor a sound theoretical
basis for this in the global governance literature or, more specifically, on how to promote
efficiency by imposing additional restrictions like milestones. We do find evidence
for markets, e.g., labor markets. Falk and Kosfeld (2006), for instance, have shown
that an employer may suffer from imposing a minimum performance threshold for her
employees. Similarly, Berninghaus et al. (2008) found that downward wage flexibility,
if exploited, may encourage shirking. In a more general sense, we will add to this
literature, but not in a one-off interaction task but a recursive interaction task.
We conduct a recursive game in which all players can gain by reaching a certain
commonly known final target. The game can, however, be more strictly regulated by
imposing intermediate targets to be reached earlier. In this way, regulation imposes
additional risks of failure. Our main milestone hypothesis predicts that additional
regulation via milestones, i.e., intermediate performance targets, is efficiency enhancing.
Although our leading example is environmental protection to prevent global warm-
ing, we abstain from inventing a novel game and test the milestone hypothesis with a
familiar experimental workhorse to compare our findings to those of other experiments.
More specifically, we use the familiar linear public goods game (see Ledyard, 1995, for
an early survey of experimental studies) by interpreting contributions as investments
protecting the environment, e.g., investments in emission reduction to limit or prevent
global warming.
Thus, milestones and contribution targets set lower bounds for emission reduction in
our experiment. If one of the milestones or the final target is missed, the rather dramatic
effect will be that all players sustain a total loss with a given probability. This implies
additional (subgame perfect) equilibria, beside the usual free-riding equilibrium, where
the sums of the contributions accumulated at a certain point reach the targets exactly.
We test themilestone hypothesis as treatment effects withmilestones as one treatment
variable. Whereas for all treatments the final target is the same, we distinguish between
high milestones (H) and considerably lower ones (L), the latter rendering the milestones
rather inessential. We compare the H versus L effects in three different scenarios, leading
to 2x3 = 6 different treatments. The three scenarios vary the individual marginal
Chapter 5. Is Regulation by Milestones Efficiency Enhancing? 112
productivity of contributions and the probability of a total loss if one of the targets is not
reached.
In spite of the impressive tradition of public goods experiments (Ledyard, 1995),
there are few studies which focus on environmental protection. Milinski et al. (2008)
introduce and experimentally analyze a collective-risk social dilemma framed as a
dangerous climate change. The players were split into groups of six and endowed with
e40 each. They could repeatedly contribute e0, e2, or e4 to a “climate change account”
over ten rounds. If they failed to reach the threshold after the last round, they sustained
a total loss, with a probability of 90%, 50%, or 10%, respectively. Results show that even
with a losing probability of 90% half of the groups failed to reach the threshold.
Fischbacher et al. (2010) rely on a linear public goods game, however, with only
one trial contribution target with rather similar effects. But they do not address the
question whether milestones would be efficiency enhancing. On the other hand, they
made their final target stochastic by assuming that players would receive either private
or common stochastic signals whose sum would determine the final target. We compare
our findings with earlier related findings in the concluding section.
Section 6.2 describes our experimental design, including all treatments and the ex-
perimental protocol. In section 5.3 we present our results. Our conclusions in section 5.4
round off the paper.
5.2 Experimental Design
5.2.1 General Setting
To capture environmental protection problems, e.g., avoiding global warming, we rely
on a linear public goods game (Isaac et al., 1985) as our experimental workhorse. Thus,
monetary contributions mean investing in emission reduction for the sake of less global
warming, whereas “free riding” stands for voluntarily abstaining from any individual
attempt to protect the environment.
In all treatments, five players, respectively participants i = 1, . . . , 5, are endowed
with e = 65 tokens, which they can either keep or repeatedly contribute over six periods
t = 1, . . . , 6. Individual contributions ci,t must satisfy 0 ≤ ci,t ≤ 10, guaranteeing that
after six periods each participant has some tokens left. In all treatments, furthermore,
all players i sustain a total loss, i.e., what they have kept and what they could have
gained from accumulated contributions C6 = ∑6t=1 ∑
5
i=1 ci,t by all five players, with a
certain probability p ∈ (0, 1) if the contribution target of C6 = 150 tokens is not reached
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(C6 < C6). Assuming constant individual marginal productivity (α ≥ 0.2) of individual














ci,t + αC6) if C6 < 150.
Under the condition that α < 1 ≤ 5α, opportunism in the sense of own monetary
payoff concerns suggests to reduce own contributions in both ranges, C6 < C6 and
C6 > C6, as long as this does not mean that C6 becomes smaller than C6, whereas α > 0.2
renders efficient maximal individual contributions (in the sense of payoff maximization).
Due to the discontinuity of the payoff function Ui at C6, there exist many strict but only





















c+i,t = 60 for i = 1, . . . , 5, these serve as
our benchmarks when we discuss actual behavior.2 Since, in case of E0, no individual
player i can guarantee that the target of 150 is reached, it is obvious that E0, based on
0-contributions throughout, is a (subgame perfect) equilibrium. This also holds for E∗
since increasing ∑6t=1 ci,t above 30 is clearly suboptimal, and contributing less than 30
would yield maximally 65 but only with probability p, whereas a player’s payoff from
E∗ is Ui = 150α + 35, which is at least 65 due to α ≥ 0.2.
Note that target C6 could already be reached within three periods by all five players,
contributing maximally (ci,t = 10) in each of the three periods. Thus, viewing the first
three periods as a base game with already two strict (symmetric) equilibria reveals that
“finite-horizon Folk Theorems” (Benoit and Krishna, 1987) can be applied, showing that
there exist also nonstationary pure strategy (subgame perfect) equilibria.
In all treatments, subjects receive periodic feedback information, i.e., after each period
t = 1, . . . , 6 all five players i = 1, . . . , 5 are informed of the individual contributions cj,t
of all players j = 1, . . . , 5 and can thus react accordingly when deciding on their next
contribution ci,t+1. Obviously, this allows for reciprocity and a variety of disciplining
actions by future dealings on which the so-called Folk Theorems are based (Aumann
et al., 1981; Axelrod and Dion, 1988; Benoit and Krishna, 1985).
2It is clear that the efficiency benchmark requires α > 0.2.
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5.2.2 Milestones
Regulation is implemented by means of milestones (M), i.e., contribution targets on
the way to reaching the final target of C6 = 150, namely C2 after period 2 and C4
after period 4. Not reaching the intermediate targets has the same consequences as
not reaching C6. Although players i = 1, . . . , 5 may sustain a total loss already after
periods 2 and 4, they will, in the experiment, first decide successively for all six periods
t = 1, . . . , 6. Only then will it be decided randomly in view of C2,C4, and C6 whether
or not they will sustain a total loss already after period 2 if C2 < C2, after period 4 if
C4 < C4, or finally if C6 < 150.


















C2 < C2& ≥ for the other
two restrictions or
C4 < C4& ≥ for the other
two restrictions or
C6 < C6& ≥ for the other
two restrictions,








C2 < C2&C4 < C4&C6 ≥ C6
or
C2 < C2&C6 < C6&C4 ≥ C4
or
C4 < C4&C6 < C6&C2 ≥ C2,



















cj,t. Comparing Ui with UMi clearly reveals
that implementing milestones on a sufficiently high level means implementing “regu-
lation,” where, in view of the environmental interpretation, the regulating agency is
Mother Nature. We predict a milestone effect, i.e., a more efficient performance with
stricter milestones. In order to test this effect, we distinguish two cases:
1. strict milestones (H): C2 = 50 and C4 = 100, and
2. less strict milestones (L): C2 = 5 and C4 = 10.
For the case of “strict milestones” (H) we set the intermediate targets such that con-
tributions necessary to reach the final target of C6 increase linearly. For the less strict
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case we do not omit the milestones but lower them by a factor of 10 which should
render them inessential such that payoff UMi approximates Ui. The “philosophy” of
such a manipulation is, of course, that the two cases, H and L, rely on the same verbal
instructions and differ only in two numerical parameters, namely C2 and C4, which
should not induce any difference in (sub)conscious demand effects between H and L,
where “L” stands for –extremely– “low milestones.”
5.2.3 Scenarios
We consider three different scenarios to test the potential milestone effect by comparing
treatments with strict (H) and less strict milestones (L).
In the baseline scenario (B), we set α = 0.4 and p = 0.5 in combination with a group
size of five subjects.3 Since the probability of sustaining a total loss seriously increases




c+i,t = 60 for i = 1, . . . , 5
may be expected more often than in usual public goods experiments.
Our experimental design might be criticized since linearly increasing total payoffs,
even above the final target, may not adequately capture environmental protection. We
therefore propose an alternative scenario (S), in which reaching the final target of C6
merely preserves the status quo, i.e., a mean payoff of 65 tokens, and overshooting is
not beneficial at all, i.e., removing the efficiency of C6 > C6. This is done by lowering
the constant individual marginal productivity to α = 0.2. Compared to scenario B,
incentives to cooperate are, of course, smaller, also below C6.
This manipulation changes two aspects: it questions the efficiency benchmark and
reduces the free-riding “disincentives,” as measured by the expected payoff of a uni-
lateral deviation from the E∗-equilibrium to constant 0-contributions (free riding). The
difference in expected payoffs between the E∗ -equilibrium and the payoff of a unilateral
deviation to constant 0-contributions for scenario B is 95− 56.5 = 38.5 tokens, whereas
it is 20.5 tokens for scenario S only. Since by comparing these scenarios, the two aspects
mentioned above cannot be disentangled, we consider a third scenario (P) and preserve
the equilibrium and efficiency benchmarks of the baseline scenario by setting α = 0.4
but keeping the free-riding “disincentive” equal to that of scenario (S) by lowering the
probability of a total loss from p = 1/2 to 1/3.4 Altogether, this 2X3 factorial design
results in six treatments as listed in table 5.1.
3One might argue that setting α = 0.4 is unrealistic in a climate change setting since investments in
emission reduction are usually seen as preserving the status quo. This is because sustainability is the main
argument for policy intervention.
4The probability is calculated by comparing the individual payoff that results when all players i =
1, . . . , 5 play E∗ to the individual payoff that results when a player deviates from E∗ by free riding:
(95− 20.5) = (1− p)(65+ 0.4x120), implying p = 38.5/113 ≈ 1/3.
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TABLE 5.1: 2x3 factorial treatment design
Milestones
H L
P α = 0.4; p = 1/3 PH PL
B α = 0.4; p = 1/2 BH BL
S α = 0.2; p = 1/2 SH SL
5.2.4 Experimental Protocol
We ran 12 separate sessions for the six treatments. Three hundred sixty student partici-
pants were recruited from various disciplines of Friedrich Schiller University of Jena
using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004). The experiment was programmed and con-
ducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In each session, the 30 participants
per session were subdivided into two equally large matching groups and played the
6-period recursive game repeatedly. After each play of the 6-period recursive game the
15 participants of a matching group were randomly rematched to form three new groups
with five players each who interacted in the next round of play. Since participants were
only told that they were randomly rematched, they could expect that each of the 29 other
participants might become an interaction partner. This should discourage reputation
effects even more (participants can, of course, try to establish some reputation within
the same rounds, i.e., across the six periods of a given round).
After entering the computer laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics in
Jena, participants received written instructions (see App. A.2 for translated material),
which were read aloud to ensure common knowledge. After answering questions
privately participants had to answer a few control questions. The experiment only
started when all participants had answered all control questions correctly. One session
with altogether 12 rounds lasted, on average, 90 minutes, including reading instructions,
answering control questions, and payment. Average payoffs were e17, with a minimum
of e2.5 and a maximum of e29, including the e2.5 show-up fee.
5.3 Results
To begin with, we describe our findings on the group level, followed by a closer look at
individual behavior. We first state the “Results” and then proceed to validate them by
descriptive and statistical data analysis.
Chapter 5. Is Regulation by Milestones Efficiency Enhancing? 117
RESULT 1: Equilibrium play E∗ and E0 is negligible.
Only three out of 144 groups ended up in the E∗ outcome, investing 150 tokens in
total (two groups in treatment SH and one in treatment SL). One group in treatment
SL was able to coordinate on the fair share equilibrium of contributing five tokens in
each round. No groups totally free rode or contributed the maximum possible. How-
ever, we are not interested in testing equilibrium outcomes; rather, we want to study
treatment effects and therefore turn to our main question, namely whether regulation
by milestones is efficiency enhancing.
RESULT 2: Depending on the scenario, milestones increase the probability of reaching
the final target.
Since expected payoffs are lower when the final target is not reached compared to
when it is reached, it is more efficient in all scenarios to reach the final target. Figure 5.1
shows the probability of reaching the final target separately for scenario and treatment.
In scenario B and P, almost all groups succeeded (10 of 12), and there is no significant
treatment effect (H versus L). The picture slightly changes for scenario S with an almost
significant milestone effect for the success probability in the first run, where 8 versus 4
out of 12 groups reached the final target (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.110). However, the effect
disappears since after the restart more groups, namely six, succeeded in SL, whereas for
SH, there is no change (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.340).
FIGURE 5.1: Final target reached
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RESULT 3 On the group level, milestones increase average group contributions only in
scenario S.
Figure 5.2 depicts, separately for the three scenarios (scenario B on top, scenario
S in the middle, and scenario P at the bottom) and treatments, average contributions
over the sequence of play, i.e., the six rounds of two runs. In the first run of scenario
B, average contributions were lower in the treatment with strict milestones (5.6 tokens
versus 5.98 tokens), and it seems that imposing additional risks by intermediate targets
is detrimental to efficiency. The effect is not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney-U,
p = 0.2142), however. For scenario S a significant milestone effect shows up in the first
run. Imposing milestones increased contributions by approximately 30 percent from
3.78 to 4.93 tokens (Mann-Whitney-U, p = 0.0831) and is thus efficiency enhancing. No
significant difference between treatments shows up in scenario P, which also goes for
all three scenarios after the restart.
Thus, milestones increased the probability of success and contributions only in sce-
nario S, which features investments in emission reduction as preserving the status quo
by ruling out efficiency enhancement below and above C6.
RESULT 4: An analysis of individual contributions shows that milestones are inspiring
the former in scenario S and P.
Accordingly, on the level of individual behavior, the picture for scenario P changes
when panel regressions are used. By design, the panel is strongly balanced and consists
of 60 subjects per treatment cell (120 subjects per scenario). Taking group heterogeneity
into account, we made use of a panel regression with adjusted standard errors on
the group level (each group formed one cluster), i.e., in total, there were 24 groups
per treatment (48 groups per scenario). Moreover, there were 24 groups for each run
and 48 groups for both runs together. Contributions were explained by a dummy for
the treatment with strict milestones (PH), dummies for one session of the respective
treatments (SPH and SPL), lagged variables on own contributions, average contribution
within the group, and accumulated contributions. Regression results are shown in
table 5.2. There are no significant treatment effects in the first run (the first two columns).
However, in columns 3 and 4, showing regression results for the sequence after the
restart (second run), the treatment dummy is positive and significant. Controlling for
sessions only (column 3), the effect is significant at the 5 percent level. Additionally
controlling for various forms of information which subjects received (column 4) results
in a better fit and a significant treatment effect on the 1 percent level, although it is lower
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FIGURE 5.2: Average contribution per treatment
in magnitude. More precisely, subjects contribute, on average, 0.766 tokens more to the
public good with strict rather than less strict milestones. Taking the two runs together in
column 5 and controlling for the restart (including a dummy), the effect is weaker (on
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average 0.457 tokens more in SH) but still significant at the 5 percent level, whereas the
restart dummy has no significant effect.
The effect is stronger in scenario S (see table 5.3). Although we do not find a
significant treatment effect after the restart, there is a strong and high effect in the first
run. Subjects in treatment SH contributed, on average, 1.080 tokens more with strict
milestones, when controlling for the received information (column 2). In contrast to
scenario P, the milestone effect disappears after the restart (columns 3 and 4) but is
present when we consider both runs, controlling for information and the restart (column
5). Subjects in treatment SH contribute, on average, 0.873 tokens more than in SL,
whereas the restart dummy is insignificant. Individual level analysis offers no further
insights on scenario B (see appendix D.1).
TABLE 5.2: OLS Panel regression with clustered standard errors on the group level for
scenario P
Run 1 Run 1 Run 2 Run 2 Both runs
contribution contribution contribution contribution contribution
PH 0.872 0.160 1.261∗ 0.766∗∗ 0.457∗
(1.46) (0.65) (2.53) (2.93) (2.46)
SPH -0.294 0.308 -0.372 -0.00931 -0.0242
(-0.36) (1.07) (-1.59) (-0.06) (-0.13)
SPL 0.956 0.403 1.350∗ 0.758∗∗ 0.483
(1.18) (1.02) (2.29) (2.83) (1.68)
Lag contribution 0.479∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
(7.00) (8.04) (10.08)
Lag average contr. 0.320∗∗ 0.109 0.171∗
(3.26) (1.01) (2.17)




cons 5.533∗∗∗ 1.267∗∗ 4.606∗∗∗ 2.650∗∗ 1.824∗∗∗
(19.27) (3.09) (9.97) (2.92) (3.97)
N 720 600 720 600 1320
NIndiv. 120 120 120 120 120
R2O 0.0102 0.333 0.0193 0.301 0.227
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Although the non-parametric group level analysis suggests no milestone effect in
scenario P, we do find a significant milestone effect on the individual level, controlling
for group, session, and information effects. Compared to scenario S, the effect is lower
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in magnitude and less significant. The milestone effect is therefore not only driven by
the exclusion of efficiency above and below targets (scenario S) but is also due to higher
free-riding “disincentives” (scenario P and S).
TABLE 5.3: OLS Panel regression with clustered standard errors on the group level for
scenario S
Run 1 Run 1 Run 2 Run 2 Both runs
contribution contribution contribution contribution contribution
SH 2.156∗∗∗ 1.080∗ 1.000 0.473 0.873∗
(3.90) (2.32) (1.60) (0.86) (2.21)
SSH -0.100 -0.128 0.333 0.359 0.0898
(-0.38) (-0.93) (1.07) (1.52) (0.58)
SSL 1.917∗∗ 1.286∗ 0.844 0.538 0.850∗
(2.82) (2.56) (1.32) (1.08) (2.15)
Lag contribution 0.343∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗
(3.68) (4.74) (5.75)
Lag average contr. 0.0874 -0.0340 -0.0196
(0.51) (-0.17) (-0.16)




cons 2.822∗∗∗ 1.052∗ 3.717∗∗∗ 2.079∗∗ 1.949∗∗∗
(5.36) (2.41) (6.87) (2.78) (4.85)
N 720 600 720 600 1320
NIndiv. 120 120 120 120 120
R2O 0.100 0.232 0.0363 0.165 0.171
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
RESULT 5 The milestone effect in scenarios S and P is mainly driven by a higher share of
individual contributions between 4 and 6 tokens.
To further scrutinize contributions on the individual level as well as the general
sequence of play, we classified contributions as low (0-3 tokens), medium (4-6 tokens),
and high (7-10 tokens). Figure 5.3 shows the resulting relative number of contributions
for the respective classes in the six treatments in the first run.5 It further shows that
contributions are quite heterogeneous. However, in treatment SH most contributions
(64.44 percent) fall into the medium class. Compared to treatment SL, milestones seem
to discipline subjects to stay on track to reach the final target as the number of low
contributions is significantly lower (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.000) and medium contributions
are significantly more frequent (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.000). Though not particularly
5In the following, we show results for the first run only. Regarding the second run, the qualitative results
for the classification are the same.
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strong, a similar pattern is found for scenario P, where we observe a significantly
lower frequency of low contributions and a significantly higher frequency of medium
contributions in treatment PH (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.025 for low and p = 0.002 for
medium). No significant difference between contribution classes is found in scenario B
(see also the graphical illustration in fig. 5.3). The share of contributions classified as
high in scenario S is significantly lower than that in scenario B and P (Fischer’s exact,
p = 0.000, for BL vs. SL, BH vs. SH, PL vs. SL, and PH vs. SH), whereas we do not
find any significant difference between B and P.








































RESULT 6 Milestones stabilize individual behavior over the sequence of play in scenarios
S and P.
Is the classified behavior stable over the sequence of play? To answer this ques-
tion, we subclassified, additionally to the above classification, the relative number of
contributions into three phases of rounds: round 1-2 , round 3-4, and round 5-6.6
The results of the classification in scenario S are shown separately for the two
treatments (SL and SH) in figure 5.4. There is a relatively stable share of low contributions
in treatment SL over the three phases (Kruskall-Wallis, p = 0.3588), which is significantly
6We chose this classification to capture differences in play between rounds including a target. Moreover,
results do not change qualitatively if we take every single round into account.
Chapter 5. Is Regulation by Milestones Efficiency Enhancing? 123
higher than in SH (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.000 for round 1-2 as well as round 3-4 and
p = 0.004 for round 5-6). In contrast, a high and stable share of medium contributions
is found in treatment SH (Kruskall-Wallis, p = 0.5946), which in all three phases is
significantly higher than in SL (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.000 for round 1-2, p = 0.001 for
round 3-4, and p = 0.004 for round 5-6). Thus, the disciplining effect of the milestones
operates through medium contributions, i.e., subjects seem to coordinate on medium
contributions throughout. Subjects in treatment SL tried to make the best out of a bad job
in round 5-6, with significantly more contributions in the high class than in the previous
rounds (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.000). However, as shown in figure 5.1, they often failed to
reach the long-term target. The comparison between SL and SH over the sequence of
play shows that milestones stabilize average contributions and thereby offer a certain
intermediate planning reliability.








































In Scenario P (see fig. 5.5), milestones have a significant disciplining effect especially
in the first and second phase. The share of low contributions for PH is significantly
lower than for PL (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.047 for round 1-2 and p = 0.052 for round
3-4). However, low contributions in both treatments increase steadily, indicating that
participants anticipated that total contributions would exceed the critical thresholds. We
also observe differences for the medium contribution class. In phases 1 and 2, medium
contributions in treatment PH are significantly higher than in treatment PL (Fisher’s
exact, p = 0.024 for round 1-2 and p = 0.005 for round 3-4). This finding indicates that, as
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in scenario S, the milestone effect is driven by low and medium contributions. The overall
contribution patterns for both treatments (besides the differences mentioned above) are
rather similar.











































To investigate if regulation by milestones is efficiency enhancing, we have imposed
additional risks of failure. If, in a threshold public goods game featuring a final target
after six rounds, the final target is not reached, a total loss is sustained with a given
probability. The same consequences can be assumed if a milestone is not reached.
Our treatments vary the magnitude of the milestones from less strict (approximately
inessential) to strict (essential), the marginal productivity of contributions and thereby
efficiency and free-riding incentives as well as the probability of a total loss in case of
failure.
We find substantial differences between the three scenarios. Milestones do have a
positive impact on efficiency when there is no efficiency benchmark and free-riding
“disincentives” are low. The effect is strongest when higher contributions below and
above targets are not efficiency enhancing and free-riding “disincentives” are low so
that investments in emission reduction can only preserve the “status quo.” A moderate
effect is found when efficiency can be promoted but free-riding “disincentives” are still
low. However, the result is mainly due to second run behavior. Since in the context of
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climate change, a restart or second chance may not be possible, learning might come too
late. In the scenario where efficiency can be promoted and incentives to free ride are
low, no milestone effect is found.
Our results are similar to Milinski et al. (2008) who find that half of the groups had
difficulties reaching the final target. Note that Milinski et al. framed the game as a
climate change, which might have increased contributions. Comparing our findings to
Fischbacher et al. (2010), who do not implement any intermediate targets, we confirm
their result that more serious losses promote cooperation when the threshold is missed.
It is worth mentioning that commonly known targets (the common signal case), which
we have implemented in a deterministic way, seem to provide a best-case scenario for
environmental protection. Their and our observations imply that, depending on the
specific scenario, regulation by milestones can be efficiency enhancing.
Caution should be exercised when generalizing our conclusions. Since we do not
capture the advantages of early investments, our scenario is a kind of worst-case scenario
for testing the milestone hypothesis. In the case of environmental protection, early
investments can be considered superior to late investments. Without early investments,
the costs of climate protection may increase because emissions accumulate, making it
more difficult to reach a certain emission reduction target (cf. Kemfert, 2005). Moreover,
environmental returns might need some time to develop and accumulate. Capturing
this, was not within the scope of this paper but would be a challenging topic for future
research.
In our experiment, we have implemented and manipulated milestones exogenously.
This seems unrealistic when thinking of environmental agreements where milestones are
usually negotiated, as has been done in Kyoto. Implementing endogenous milestones in
such a setting is problematic as one cannot invoke the punishment of Mother Nature.
Before doing so, one has to think of the consequences if a milestone is missed.
In the actual debate on climate change, which discusses the investments in emission
reduction needed to protect the climate in the long term, milestones may be essential
to overcome the current coordination problem. Intermediate targets, as proposed by
international environmental agreements such as the Kyoto-Protocol, might help to solve
this problem. However, our results reveal a high risk of failure. This has to be kept in
mind when hoping for the milestone effect, especially when discussing coordination
problems with possibly catastrophic consequences. Additionally note that the results
imply a punishment mechanism, imposed by nature, which is in reality lacking so far
and whose implementation by international agreements may lead to another dilemma
situation.
Chapter 6
Minimum Participation Rules with
Heterogeneous Countries.∗
6.1 Introduction
In February 2005 the Kyoto-Protocol entered into force, more than seven years after it
had been negotiated. One reason for the delay is that a hurdle had to be overcome. It
was agreed in Kyoto that the protocol would not become binding unless ratified by a
minimum number of 55 countries that include Annex I countries (UN 1992) responsible
for at least 55 per cen of the emissions of greenhouse gases of all Annex I countries in
1990 (UNFCCC 1998, Article 25). Similar requirements, called ’minimum participation
rules’ (MPRs), are very common in international environmental agreements (IEAs).1
Rutz (2001) examined a sample of 122 IEAs and found that almost all (98 per cen)
contained some kind of participation clause.
IEAs are set up to control transnational spillovers. By their very nature IEAs have
to be self-enforcing, meaning that countries decide voluntarily to join the agreement or
not. Spillovers imply that, even though countries can reap some gains from cooperation,
there are strong incentives to free-ride on an agreement and unilateral action is inefficient.
In the case of greenhouse gases, a failure to establish a sufficiently large (and effective)
coalition may even trigger catastrophic risks (Stern, 2007; IPCC, 2007).
The design of the agreement is important to overcome the problem of free-riding at
the ratification stage. Our study focuses on MPRs as a very common and potentially
successful tool to increase IEA participation. MPRs can be designed in different ways.
They can be linked to the number of signatory countries2, to country characteristics (such
as baseline emissions), contributions (such as abatement targets) or to combinations of
∗This chapter is mainly based on Weikard, Wangler and Freytag (2009). We are indebted to Erik Ansink
and Mika Widgrén for helpful comments on an earlier version of this work. Mika has provided stimulating
comments on an earlier version this paper just a few weeks before he passed away.
1The recent literature on IEAs has been surveyed by Barrett (2003, 2007), Carraro and Marchiori (2003)
and Finus (2003, 2008).
2In this chapter, the term signatories refers to sovereign states that have ratified the agreement.
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these. In the Kyoto-Protocol, for instance, a twofold MPR rule has been implemented
(55 countries representing 55 percent of emissions).
It is widely argued that, under the MPR agreed in the Kyoto-Protocol and with the
withdrawal of the US from the agreement, Russia (which had become pivotal for the
agreement) gained bargaining power (cf. Böhringer and Vogt, 2004; Dagoumas et al.,
2006). This argument mainly addresses the distribution of welfare among the countries
that finally ratified the agreement. In our study we compare payoffs of pivotal countries
under participation and non-participation. Our analysis indicates that countries would
prefer to be non-pivotal compared to a situation in which they are pivotal as pivotal
countries have hardly any credible threat to not enter the coalition. This result offers an
interesting new interpretation for the alleged strength of Russia’s position in the Kyoto
ratification process. Our paper therefore contributes to the discussion about optimal
international policy coordination and gives important new insights on the issue of an
MPR for coalition stability with heterogeneous countries.
We analyze the formation of an IEA as a coalition formation game. It is assumed that
each country is free to decide whether or not to join a unique IEA. More technically, we
analyze a cartel formation game with open membership. We examine both, the choice of
an MPR and its effects on equilibrium coalition formation among countries in this model.
Our approach follows seminal work by Hoel (1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and
Barrett (1994a)3 who have proposed a sequential game where a cartel formation game at
the first stage is followed by a transboundary pollution game at the second stage. This
type of game has been used in a number of applied studies on climate agreements (e.g.
Finus et al., 2005; Weikard et al., 2006; Lessmann and Edenhofer, 2010).
Recently Carraro et al. (2009) have proposed an extension of this model framework
to study the endogenous choice of an MPR. In earlier work Okada (1993) has shown
how inefficiencies in prisoners’ dilemma situations can be overcome in an appropriate
institutional setting where the players can commit to accept a punishment for deviations
from the cooperative action. Okada’s model is inspired by the seminal work of Ostrom
(1986, 1990) on the role of institutional arrangements as tools for changing incentive
structures. In contrast to our model punishment is an important factor determining
coalition stability.
Although our approach is in the same spirit as Okada’s, we consider a continuous
action space and heterogeneous players in the underlying public goods game. Closest
to our study is the analysis of MPRs by Carraro et al. (2009). However, it also relies on
the assumption of identical countries. Our study relaxes this assumption. We analyze
a model with heterogeneous countries and we allow for transfers between coalition
members that can be used to set incentives for participation. Following Carraro et al.
3Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) have shown that some of Barrett’s (1994) results only hold if the
level of abatement is not restricted by emissions.
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(2009) we use a 3-stage game. First, there is a unanimous decision on the MPR. Second,
each country individually decides whether to ratify the agreement or not. If countries
agree on the MPR, the agreement enters into force whenever the MPR is satisfied. If the
MPR is not satisfied, then the coalition breaks down into singletons. Third, given the
MPR is satisfied, a transboundary pollution game between the coalition of signatories
and the non-signatories is played. Else we have a standard transboundary pollution
game.
The result of our analysis is that implementation of an MPR is always an equilibrium
which strengthens cooperation. More precisely, a stricter MPR always performs at least
as well as a less strict MPR. This does not imply that an equilibrium MPR will always
require the membership of all countries. An MPR that requires full participation of all
countries only results under particular circumstances. We find that in a subgame perfect
equilibrium the MPR either requires full participation or it will be set at a level that
allows at least one country to free-ride. The grand coalition is always an equilibrium in
the first case but not necessarily in the second case.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the next section we describe the game.
Section 3 provides the formal analysis of the game and determines key features of the
equilibrium outcomes. In Section 4 we move to the discussion of our results. This
section puts provides additional details on how our study is linked to the literature on
minimum participation rules. In section 5 conclusions round off the chapter.
6.2 A Model of a IEA Formation with Minimum Participation
We consider a 3-stage game with a set N of countries as players. As we wish to study
coalition formation we assume |N| ≥ 3. The three stages are (i) the minimum participa-
tion stage, (ii) the coalition formation stage, and (iii) the transboundary pollution game.
We describe the game in more detail starting from the third stage going backwards.
Stage 3: The transboundary pollution game. At this stage an agreement has become
binding for the group of signatories S ⊆ N. The case of failure to reach agreement
is the special case where S = ⊘. The signatories, acting as one single player, and the
non-signatories play a transboundary pollution game. Hence we have |N| − |S|+ 1
players. Each player j chooses a level of pollution abatement qj ∈ [0, ej] where ej are the
unabated (or baseline) emissions. We assume a uniformly mixing pollutant, as in the
case of greenhouse gases. Hence, individual benefits Bj depend on the aggregate level
of abatement q ≡ ∑i∈N qj. Abatement costs Cj depend on country j’s own abatement.
We assume that benefits are (weakly) concave and costs are (strictly) convex. Payoffs of
player j (where j is the coalition S or a singleton player i /∈ S) are given by
vj = Bj(q)− Cj(qj). (6.1)
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We assume that countries choose abatement levels simultaneously to maximize
payoffs, i.e. singletons maximize their individual payoff while the coalition maximizes
the aggregate payoff of coalition members. We allow for heterogeneous countries, i.e.
countries may differ with respect to their benefits and cost functions. We assume that
the game satisfies the conditions of the formal transboundary pollution game described
by Folmer and von Mouche (2000) and that the pollution is uniformly distributed as
mentioned before. Hence we assume that abatement is a global public good. Such a
transboundary pollution game has a unique Nash equilibrium (Folmer and von Mouche,
2000, Proposition 3), referred to as partial-agreement Nash equilibrium by Chander and
Tulkens (1995).
The unique Nash equilibrium of the stage-3 game defines a partition function, i.e. for
every coalition S ⊆ N we have the payoffs for the coalition and for all non-signatories.
We denote country i’s payoff under coalition S by Vi(S). The coalition payoff is Vs(S). A
sharing rule must be applied to divide Vs(S) between the members of S. This will be
discussed below.
Stage 2: Coalition formation. At this stage each country i ∈ N decides whether or not
to join a unique IEA. Formally, each country i has a binary strategy space with strategies
σi = 0, 1. If country i chooses σi = 0, it will not be member of the IEA; if i chooses σi = 1,
it will be a signatory, i ∈ S. The group of signatories forms an IEA if and only if the
MPR is satisfied. If the MPR is not satisfied, the agreement will not be binding and will
be irrelevant. Then the transboundary pollution game will be played by all countries
acting as singletons and payoffs are determined by the unique Nash equilibrium of that
game. Hence S ⊆ N is effective if the MPR is satisfied, else it is ineffective.
Stage 1: Setting the Minimum Participation Rule. We consider heterogeneous coun-
tries. In general, an MPR uses a set of measurable characteristics of countries and it
defines a minimum requirement for the aggregate across signatory countries for each
characteristic. A simple characteristic is “being a sovereign state”. This characteristic
corresponds to a minimum number of countries, for example “55” in the case of the
Kyoto-Protocol. With heterogeneous countries, however, setting a minimum number of
signatories does not seem to be adequate, as countries differ with respect to benefits and
cost of abatement. Therefore a natural characteristic is countries’ abatement level in the
non-cooperative (all singletons) Nash equilibrium of the transboundary pollution game
which reflects countries’ respective marginal benefits and costs.4
Let q⊘i denote country i’s equilibrium abatement level in the non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium of the stage-3 game. We refer to the vector q ≡ (q⊘i )i∈N as benchmark
abatement without an effective agreement. In the following we assume that an MPR
refers to the sum of signatories’ benchmark abatements. We denote the minimum
4One interpretation of our model is that the Nash-equilibrium abatements reflect the historical abate-
ment/emissions levels.
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required level of benchmark abatement by q. Hence, the MPR is satisfied and coalition S
is effective if and only if
∑
i∈S
q⊘i ≥ q. (6.2)
In our game the MPR is set as follows. A randomly chosen country suggests q which
the others accept or reject. As in Carraro et al. (2009) we require a unanimous decision,
i.e. if a single country rejects, then no MPR applies and q = 0.
6.3 Analysis
We conduct the analysis going backward.
Stage 3. As we have indicated before, the transboundary pollution game at stage
3 has a unique Nash equilibrium and determines a partition function. The partition
function provides for any given coalition S ⊆ N a coalition payoff Vs(S) and payoffs
Vj(S)for all singleton countries i /∈ S. Abatement is a public good in our transboundary
pollution game. A larger coalition provides more of the public good as it internalizes
more externalities. Overall payoffs increase with coalition enlargement. If a player joins
a coalition, the larger coalition will receive a larger payoff than the initial coalition and
the joining player acting separately. Moreover, all other singleton countries are also
better off. Using the shorthand notation S+j ≡ S ∪ {j}, these properties are formally
defined as follows.
DEFINITION 1 (superadditivity): A cartel partition function is super-
additive if and only if for all coalitions S ⊂ N and all j ∈ N\S, it
holds that VS+j(S+j) ≥ VS(S) +Vj(S).
DEFINITION 2 (positive spillovers): A cartel partition function ex-
hibits positive spillovers, if and only if for all coalitions S ⊂ N and all
j, k ∈ N\S with j 6= k, it holds that Vj(S+k) ≥ Vj(S).
Note that in superadditive cartel games with positive spillovers the grand coalition
of all players will choose an efficient abatement level and maximize overall payoffs. On
the basis of what we just argued we can state our first result without formal proof.
RESULT 1 The partition function that results from the transboundary
pollution game with a uniformly mixing pollutant described before is
superadditive and exhibits positive spillovers.
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In order to assess individual incentives to participate in a coalition, we need to
determine how the coalition payoff is shared between members. Following Weikard
(2009) we assume that a sharing rule is applied that satisfies the Claim Rights Condition.
This condition requires that every coalition member i ∈ S receives at least its outside
option payoff, i.e. what iwould receive under coalition S−i ≡ S\ {i} if this is feasible.
Feasibility is warranted if the coalition payoff is at least as large as the sum of the outside




A particular sharing rule that satisfies the Claim Rights Condition is sharing propor-
tional to outside option payoffs. In this case Vi(S) =
Vi(S−i)
∑j∈S Vj(S−j)
VS (S) for all i ∈ S.
However, the remainder of the analysis holds for any sharing rule that satisfies the
Claim Rights Condition. We refer to this class of sharing rules as “optimal sharing rules”
for reasons that will become apparent below.
Stage 2. Now we can move to the coalition formation stage. A Nash equilibrium of
the coalition formation game is a vector of ratification decisions (σi)i∈N such that no
single country would prefer to change its decision. We call a coalition S a stable coalition
if the strategy profile (σi)i∈N that corresponds to S is a Nash equilibrium. Stability can
be decomposed into internal and external stability (D’Aspremont et al., 1983).
DEFINITION 3 (internal and external stability):
(i) A coalition S is internally stable if and only if for all i ∈ S it holds
that
Vi (S) ≥ Vi (S−i) . (6.4)
(ii) A coalition S is externally stable if and only if for all i /∈ S it holds
that





(iii) Coalition S is stable if and only if it is internally and externally
stable.
To determine the equilibrium coalitions we proceed in two steps. First we discuss
internal stability, then external stability. Note that our sharing rule implies that, if the
coalition payoff exceeds the sum of outside option payoffs, then payoffs can always be
shared such that the coalition is internally stable. Hence to check internal stability it is
sufficient to check whether the Claim Rights Condition can be satisfied, i.e. to check
condition (3). Next notice that if (3) is not satisfied for S, then S cannot be internally
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stable. Hence, sharing rules that satisfy the Claim Rights Condition will internally
stabilize all coalitions that are possibly internally stable (Weikard, 2009, Theorem 1). It
is in this sense that these sharing rules are optimal. Also note that whether (3) holds is
determined by the partition function alone and therefore it is not necessary to specify
the sharing rule.
A transboundary pollution gamewith optimal sharing has been examined inMcGinty
(2007), Weikard and Dellink (2008), Nagashima et al. (2009) and Fuentes-Albero and
Rubio (2010). The setting in this study extends the analysis to include MPRs. In essence
an MPR makes every coalition inadmissible that does not meet the minimum require-
ments stated in condition (2). Suppose coalition S forms such that q⊘S ≡ ∑i∈S q
⊘
S < q
and, hence, S is ineffective. In this case a non-cooperative transboundary pollution game
is played where all countries i ∈ N choose their benchmark abatements and payoffs are










. We refer to Vi (⊘) as country i’s benchmark
payoff.
The following is straightforward.
RESULT 2 Every ineffective coalition is internally stable.
Proof. If coalition S is ineffective, then the smaller coalition Si will also be ineffective.
Hence no country can gain by leaving an ineffective coalition. 
To obtain the next result we introduce the notion of a pivotal country.
DEFINITION 4 (pivotal players): Country i ∈ S is pivotal for an effec-
tive coalition S if and only if coalition Si is ineffective.
The next result follows by construction.
RESULT 3 The outside option payoff of a pivotal member of S is its
benchmark payoff.
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To determine the impact of an MPR on coalition (internal) stability, we need to
examine how an MPR affects coalition payoffs and outside option payoffs. It holds that
RESULT 4 Consider a given coalition S and two MPRs, one less strict
qL ≥ 0, the other more strict qH > qL. Moving from qL to qH will
never increase coalition payoffs but will reduce them to benchmark
payoffs for sufficiently high qH.
Proof. If S is ineffective under qL, nothing changes if qH applies instead of qL. Further-
more, if S is effective under qH , then it will be effective under qL and nothing changes. If,
however, qL ≤ q
⊘
S < qH (S is effective under qL but ineffective under qH), then payoffs
will be reduced to benchmark payoffs if qH applies. 
The next result is the key to understanding how MPRs work in this model.
RESULT 5 Consider again a given coalition S and two MPRs, qL ≥ 0
and qH > qL. Moving from qL to qH will never increase outside option
payoffs but will reduce them to benchmark payoffs for sufficiently
high qH.
Proof. First, if S is ineffective under qL, nothing changes if qH applies instead of qL.





S − q. This implies that an increase of q may increase (but never decrease) the
number of pivotal countries. If q = q⊘S , every country in S is pivotal. As a country
becomes pivotal, its outside option payoff is the benchmark payoff (RESULT 3) which is
lower than the initial outside option payoff. The latter holds due to superadditivity and
positive spillovers. Finally, if q > q⊘S , then S is ineffective and, trivially outside option
payoffs equal benchmark payoffs. 
The next result follows as a corollary of Results 2 and 5.
RESULT 6 Consider any two MPRs, qL ≥ 0 and qH ≥ qL. Then every
coalition S that is internally stable under qL will also be internally
stable under qH. The converse does not hold.
Proof. First, from RESULT 2, if S is ineffective under qH then it will be internally
stable. If S is effective under qH (and, of course under qL), then payoffs are unaffected
if qH applies instead of qL. Outside option payoff, however may fall (see RESULT 5).
Hence, moving from qL to qH may internally stabilize S but it will never internally
destabilize S. 
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Loosely speaking, a stricter MPR will always offer more internal stability than a less
strict MPR. Of course, an increase of q can make a given coalition S ineffective. However,
under a well chosen MPR every possible coalition can be stable and effective as the
following proposition shows.
PROPOSITION 1 With a superadditive partition function, if q = q⊘S ,
then S is effective and internally stable under optimal sharing.
Proof. It is clear that S is effective. But also every smaller coalition is ineffective and,
hence, all countries in S are pivotal. By superadditivity it holds that VS(S) ≥ VS(⊘).
Because every member is pivotal, VS(⊘) is the sum of the outside option payoffs and
condition (3) is satisfied. Therefore optimal sharing guarantees internal stability. 
With these results we can move on to examine external stability. Under an optimal
sharing rule the following result holds
RESULT 7 A coalition S is externally unstable if and only if there exists
country j /∈ S such that S+j is internally stable.
Proof. See Weikard (2009) proof of Lemma 1. 
The next result puts together external and internal stability.
RESULT 8 Consider any two MPRs, qL , qH with 0 ≤ q̄L ≤ q
⊘
N and
q̄L > q̄H . A move from q̄L to q̄H will result in a larger coalition becom-
ing stable for sufficiently high q̄H. With superadditivity and positive
spillovers, this will always improve payoffs.
Proof. This follows immediately from RESULTS 6 and 7. If a move from q̄L to q̄H
internally stabilizes coalition S, then either S is externally stable or, if externally unstable,
there exist S+j with j /∈ S and S+j is internally stable. We call S+j an internally stable
enlargement of S. The argument can then be repeated. Hence, either S+j is externally
stable or there exists an internally stable enlargement of S+j , and so on. 
Stage 1. With these results in place we can now turn to the minimum participation
stage. Since each country is characterized by q⊘i , we sort countries according to this
criterion and adopt the following notational convention q⊘1 < q
⊘
2 < · · · < q
⊘
n . It is only
for mathematical convenience that we assume all inequalities to be strict. Clearly we
have by construction
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RESULT 9 If country i is pivotal in S, then all countries j > i are also
pivotal in S.
Notice that, by comparison, in a game with identical countries, as considered by
Carraro et al. (2009), either all countries or none of the countries are pivotal.
At the minimum participation stage, one country is randomly selected to propose
the MPR. Then others are asked to accept or reject the proposal. A rejection results in
q̄ = 0. In this case every coalition formed would be effective. Hence, a country would
reject a proposal if its expected payoff under the proposed MPR would be less than the
expected payoff under q̄ = 0. We denote the set of stable coalitions under q̄ = 0 by S .
As we will usually find a large set of stable coalitions, Erj denotes the expected payoff
if j (or any other country) rejects the MPR proposed by i and q̄ = 0 applies. Hence,
we call a proposed MPR “acceptable” if it stabilizes a coalition where each country j
receives at least Erj . Obviously an equilibrium proposal must be acceptable. We require
that countries have mutually consistent expectations in the sense that the sum of the
expected payoffs cannot exceed the sum of payoffs under the stable coalition S∗ ∈ S
that gives the highest global payoff of all coalitions in S . Formally, mutually consistent
expectations imply the following.
DEFINITION 5 (mutually consistent expectations): If expectations




∗) with ∑i∈N Vi(S
∗) ≥ ∑i∈N Vi(S) for all S ∈ S .
In the remainder of the analysis we assume that the grand coalition is unstable




We know from PROPOSITION 1 that the grand coalition will be internally stable
and therefore stable under q̄ = q⊘N . Also we know that the grand coalition is efficient.
We have the following result.
RESULT 10 The proposal q̄ = q⊘N is acceptable for all under an appro-
priate sharing rule.
Proof : By assumption N /∈ S . Because VN(N) > ∑i∈N E
r
i payoffs in the grand
coalition can be arranged such that Vi(N) ≥ Eri for all i ∈ N . And no country would
reject the proposal. 
The next question then is whether any country can get a higher payoff than in the
grand coalition. For this it is important to note that individual payoffs in the grand
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coalition depend on outside option payoffs –note that the Claim Rights Condition (3)
must be met. The outside option payoffs will, in turn, depend on the MPR. Hence,
the country that proposes the MPR will determine which countries are pivotal. This
will impact the distribution of payoffs. Clearly the proposing country prefers to be
non-pivotal as pivotal countries’ payoffs are reduced to benchmark payoffs. If a country
i is selected as proposer, it will try to set an MPR that stabilizes the grand coalition such
that i is non-pivotal while countries j > i are pivotal. This minimizes others’ outside
option payoff subject to i being non-pivotal. This implies that it could be optimal for
the proposing country i to propose q̄ = q⊘N − q
⊘
i rather than q̄ = q
⊘
N . Clearly if i is
close to |N| most countries will be non-pivotal, the sum of outside option payoffs is
larger and this strategy will eventually undermine the internal stability of N. Still in this
case it may be optimal to propose q̄ = q⊘N − q
⊘
i , provided that this proposal would be
acceptable. To fix ideas, we first examine the “smallest” country, country 1.









and the grand coalition emerges.
Proof. Acceptability of q̄ = q⊘N − q
⊘
i implies VN(N) ≥ ∑j=N−1 E
r
j +V1(N−1).
(i) If it holds, notice that all countries other than 1 are pivotal players and their
outside option payoff is Vj(⊘), for all j 6= 1. Furthermore, by superadditivity we
have VN(N) ≥ VN−1(N−1) +V1(N−1) and VN−1 ≥ ∑j∈N−1 Vj(⊘). Hence condition (3) is
satisfied and N is internally stable under optimal sharing. As N is externally stable by
definition, N is stable. In addition, by positive spillovers, no other proposal will give a
larger payoff to country 1 as it receives at least the outside option payoff V1(N−1).
(ii) If the proposal q⊘N − q
⊘
1 is unacceptable, it will be dominated by proposing q
⊘
N
which is acceptable by RESULT 10 and stable by PROPOSITION 1. Furthermore
q⊘N also dominates any other acceptable proposal that leads to coalitions smaller than
the grand coalition since by superadditivity payoffs can always be arranged such that
V1(N) ≥ V1(S∗). 
Chapter 6. Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries 137
RESULT 11 can be generalized. For a randomly selected proposer we have the
following result.









If q⊘N − q
⊘
i is acceptable, the grand coalition emerges if and only




j=1Vj(N−j). Otherwise coalition N−i
emerges.
If q⊘N is proposed, the grand coalition always emerges.
Proof. To determine whether q⊘N − q
⊘
i is acceptable we have to distinguish two cases:
the grand coalition is either (i) stable or (ii) unstable.




j=1Vj(N−j), the grand coalition is stable given q̄ =
q⊘N − q
⊘
i . By positive spillovers, if acceptable, no other proposal will give a larger payoff

















unacceptable, q⊘N is proposed and part (ii) of the proof of RESULT 11 applies. 
(ii) If the grand coalition is unstable given q̄ = q⊘N − q
⊘
i , then by proposing q̄ =
q⊘N − q
⊘
i country i can still secure Vi(N−i), if the proposal is acceptable. The further
course of play will then be σi = 0 at stage 2 and others’ best response is σj = 1 for all
j 6= i. Hence, coalition N−i is formed. N−i is stable as all its members are pivotal under
q̄ = q⊘N − q
⊘
i . In this case acceptability requires VN−i(N−i) ≥ ∑j∈N−i E
r
j . If the proposal
q⊘N − q
⊘
i is unacceptable, q
⊘
N is proposed and part (ii) of the proof of RESULT 11 applies.
Typically, in a public goods game with a sufficiently large number of countries
coalition S∗ would be “small” compared to N or N−i and it would provide significantly
less than the efficient level of abatement. Therefore, implementation of anMPR is always
an equilibrium. In some cases the MPR will not require full participation. Even though
in that case the proposing country i becomes non-pivotal, members of N−i have no
incentive to decline i’s proposal and country i can exploit a ’first-mover advantage’.
The grand coalition might emerge nevertheless. Only if the proposer is a sufficiently
“large” country, the grand coalition may not be an equilibrium outcome. But notice that
the ’first mover advantage’ is subject to the acceptability of the proposal. A proposal
that allows free-riding of a large country is likely to be unacceptable. In that case the
equilibrium MPR requires full participation and the grand coalition emerges.
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6.4 Policy Coordination and IEAs
As IEAs are wide-spread and important for environmental policy makingwe turn now to
discuss the significance of our theoretical results for environmental policy coordination.
Also we provide a more in-depth review of previous contributions on MPRs in the
literature. Even though, as we show, MPRs may have a decisive role for the stability of
IEAs, only a few previous theoretical contributions exist in the literature with an explicit
focus on MPRs. Closest to our research are models with perfect information. To these
we turn first. Then we broaden the scope and discuss MPRs under uncertainty and
incomplete information about payoff structures.
Rutz (2001) analyzes the role of MPRs in the coalition formation game that has
become canonical for the study of IEAs (Hoel, 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett,
1994a). In this game a coalition forms at stage 1 and, at stage 2, the coalition and the
non-signatories play a transboundary pollution game. Rutz considers identical countries
and shows that the equilibrium number of signatories is equal to a number required by
an exogenously given MPR.
Rubio and Casino (2005) introduce a stock pollutant into the game. The partition
function is generated by a differential game. They consider the effect of MPRs and arrive
at the same conclusion: once an MPR is established, the size of a stable coalition is the
number of countries required by the MPR.
Empirical evidence suggests that IEAs are negotiated to establish a minimum abate-
ment level (instead of optimal levels). Courtois and Haeringer (2008) analyze this case
for identical players. In this setting an MPR is characterized by the number of participat-
ing countries. Similar to other studies they obtain the result that the grand coalition can
be stabilized. They also contrast their result to the empirical observation that most IEAs
have adopted MPRs which do not require full participation. Two possible explanations
are provided. First, a threshold close to full participation might be too demanding and
involves a risk that ratification fails. Second, because incentives to free-ride increase with
coalition size, countries might prefer a threshold below the grand coalition to preserve
an individual option to free-ride.
These studies examine exogenous MPRs. Carraro et al. (2009) have extended the
model to analyze the endogenous choice of an MPR. The MPR is unanimously agreed in
the first stage of the game. Once the MPR is established, the standard IEA formation
game follows. Carraro et al. (2009) arrive at the result that there exists (among other
equilibria) an equilibrium MPR that requires full participation such that the grand
coalition is stable.
Our model is an extension of Carraro et al. (2009). While the basic set-up of our
game is similar, we allow for heterogeneous players. This is an important step towards
practical applicability of the theoretical analysis of MPRs. Introducing heterogeneous
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players poses three challenges for the analysis. First, if players differ with respect to
benefits and costs of abatement, the design of transfer schemes (e.g. tradable permits) is
an important determinant of the stability of coalitions. The benefits from cooperation
can be shared in different ways. A sharing rule (or transfer scheme) that satisfies the
Claim Rights Condition will support stability whenever it is feasible. Second, with
heterogeneous players, the equilibria of the game cannot be described by the number of
players anymore. The identity of players matters. Third, the different characteristics of
players allow for the use of different types of MPRs. An MPR may require a minimum
number of countries, but it may also require some other aggregate characteristics. In
our analysis we choose for the equilibrium abatement level of countries in the non-
cooperative equilibrium of the transboundary pollution game. This captures the ”size”
of the different countries. Addressing these three challenges together is a genuine
novelty in the analysis of MPRs.
We now turn to a more detailed discussion of our results and link them to interna-
tional environmental policy making.
First notice that, due to superadditivity, an increase in coalition size will always
increase the gains from cooperation. With a sufficiently strict MPR it is more likely to
stabilize larger coalitions than in the absence of an MPR (RESULT 8). An immediate
implication is that a social planner would set an MPR sufficiently strict to stabilize the
grand coalition. Hence, the result derived by Rutz (2001) generalizes to heterogeneous
countries.
Comparing our findings to the results obtained by Carraro et al. (2009) there is a
noticeable difference. We find, in contrast to the result of Carraro et al. (2009), that the
equilibrium MPR is not always requiring full participation. The MPR proposed in some
cases allows the proposing country to free-ride on the coalition consisting of all other
countries. Still the grand coalition will emerge if the country that proposes the MPR is
sufficiently small as compared to other countries. The grand coalition also emerges if
the proposing country sets an MPR that requires full participation as a proposal that
allows free-riding would be unacceptable. With identical countries a grand coalition
emerges in an equilibrium, as found by Carraro et al. (2009).
Generally, we find that MPRs can play a significant role in establishing successful
coalitions that overcome the free-rider problem in the provision of public goods, at least
to large extent. In many cases an efficient grand coalition emerges. In some cases a
single large player free-rides. Still in a setting with many players the largest part of the
gains from cooperation can be reaped.
Furthermore, our model underlines the importance of agenda-setting. We model
the first stage of the game as a simple bargaining game with a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
The country that can make a proposal, or set the agenda, can exploit some bargaining
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power if is able to establish an MPR that does not require participation of all countries
(q̄ = q⊘N − q
⊘
i ). In that case a country’s equilibrium proposal makes that country non-
pivotal for the grand coalition. This establishes a larger claim and, hence, a larger payoff
under any sharing rule that satisfies the Claim Rights Condition compared to an MPR
where the proposing country is pivotal to the agreement. The grand coalition can only
emerge if coalition gains are large enough to compensate all countries for their outside
option payoff. This requires that each pivotal country receives at least Vj(⊘) and each
non-pivotal country at least Vj(N−j).





j=1Vj(N−j)), it will be the proposing (large country) that
free-rides. This holds despite of the fact that the equilibrium proposal of a sufficiently
large country (q̄ = q⊘N − q
⊘
i ) also makes all smaller countries non-pivotal and increases
their claims. This can be explained as follows. If condition (3) cannot be met for the
grand coalition, the smaller non-pivotal countries expect the large non-pivotal country
to free-ride at stage 2 of the game. Then all other non-pivotal countries have no better
option than to join the agreement.
If, however, a proposal of the big country that would allow a free-ride turns out to
be non-acceptable, then an MPR that requires full cooperation is proposed (q̄ = q⊘N). The
grand coalition is the resulting equilibrium for that case.
It may be interesting to examine Russia’s position during the ratification process of
the Kyoto-Protocol in the light of our model. In our model each country prefers being
non-pivotal rather than pivotal for an agreement. However, the empirical observation
that Russia produced additional “hot air” seems to indicate that Russia could take
advantage of being pivotal for the Kyoto-Protocol (cf. Dagoumas et al., 2006). This ap-
parent difference between model prediction and evidence highlights another important
implication for environmental policy coordination. Notice that the Kyoto ratification
process was a sequential game while our model analyzes simultaneous ratification.
Sequential accession implies that a single country will become pivotal at some stage and
can bargain with the signatories. Hence, presumably Russia could exploit some bargain-
ing power after others had ratified. However, our model of simultaneous ratification
suggests that Russia, as pivotal country, did not have a credible threat to not ratify the
Kyoto-Protocol indicating that Russia’s bargaining power may have been overestimated.
This sheds new light on the discussion about the apparent advantage of Russia in the
Kyoto negotiation process.
A rather restrictive assumption of our model is the assumption of complete informa-
tion. This implies that each player is informed about choice options (strategy spaces)
and payoffs of all other players. However, the long-term environmental impacts that an
IEA addresses and the technological abatement options are generally uncertain. This
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leads to uncertain payoffs –an issue that hampers, presumably, the formation of a global
climate agreement. In addition coalition formation is a political process and there may
be uncertainties about policy preferences as well.
Black et al. (1993) were the first to provide an analysis of the role of MPRs for IEAs
under uncertainty. They include incomplete information in their model assuming that
individual countries know their cost function but do not know their benefits from the
agreement. Black et al. (1993) use this approach in order to assess the optimality of
MPRs depending on different abatement costs as well as the number of participating
countries. Countries are assumed to be symmetric and the binary choice about coalition
formation is made simultaneously, or at least without knowledge about the decision of
the other countries (Black et al., 1993, p. 284). Therefore, countries are uncertain about
whether a coalition will be formed or not. According to the underlying assumptions
of the model, coalition formation is only possible under the condition that an MPR is
incorporated into the treaty. The motivation to sign an agreement “is the contribution
that added commitment makes to the likelihood that the treaty is effected” (Black et al.,
1993, footnote 9). Under incomplete information about the payoffs the grand coalition
might not be efficient (individual marginal abatement costs may exceed the sum of
expected marginal benefits). Therefore, in contrast to our model, a social planer would
eventually choose a threshold below the grand coalition.
Harstad (2006) models uncertainty about the costs and benefits of the provision of
a public good and discusses incentives for cooperation of heterogeneous countries to
jointly provide the public good. Flexible participation (open membership) is compared
with rigid cooperation (full membership) andminimum participation rules. The decision
about the agreement on the MPR is endogenized assuming majority voting on the
threshold defined by the MPR. (Harstad, 2006, proposition 5) shows that the voting
game may not have a Condorcet winner and there may not be a stable equilibrium MPR.
The MPRs of most IEAs require less than full participation. The models of Black
et al. (1993) and Harstad (2006) explain this by incomplete information and uncertainty.
In our model less than full participation is explained by the bargaining power of the
proposing country.
6.5 Conclusion
In this study we show that the model of endogenous choice of minimum participation
rules (MPRs) for international environmental agreements (IEAs) suggested by Carraro
et al. (2009) can be generalized to heterogeneous countries. We find that MPRs are an
effective tool to stimulate participation in IEAs. The grand coalition, full participation,
can be established in cases where the country that puts a proposal for an MPR on
the bargaining table is small. If a large country makes a proposal the grand coalition
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results if the free-rider proposal is unacceptable to at least one other country. In some
cases, however, free-riding can result in equilibrium. We also find that proposing non-
pivotal countries can exploit negotiating power and take advantage of countries that are
pivotal to the agreement. This implies that non-pivotal large countries bear a particular
responsibility in the negotiation process of a new climate agreement.
Even though our findings shed new light on the formation of IEAs with an MPR,
some open questions remain. Our model could be extended in various directions.
An important issue is to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of coalition
formation, in particular an understanding of the negotiation process (cf. Caparros et al.,
2004) and of the role of renegotiations (cf. Weikard and Dellink, 2008). As discussed
in the previous section uncertainties are an important determinant of IEA formation.
Uncertainties may unravel over time. When renegotiations are considered, learning
becomes an important issue (Ulph, 2004; Kolstad, 2007). Furthermore, signing –and
ratifying– an agreement just means that countries declare their intention to contribute
to the public good. It is an additional step to incorporate the treaty into national law.
Clearly, the important issue here is enforcement. Barrett (2009) argues that the lack of an
enforcement mechanism is a decisive failure of Kyoto-Protocol. McEvoy and Stranlund
(2009) incorporate enforcement into the standard IEA formation game.
Models of IEA formation have been looking at these aspects one by one –a compre-
hensive model of IEA formation that combines MPRs, renegotiations and enforcement
is still missing.
Chapter 7
Environmental Policy and the
European Automotive Industry∗
7.1 Introduction
Based on the assumption of citizens maximizing personal utility, an externality arises
when private marginal costs for the use of fossil fuels are smaller than social marginal
costs. The decision on consumption of fossil fuels as an input factor for transport is
based on an individual preferences and the externality generated on the social level is
not taken into account when individuals focus their consumption decision on given
prices. Since climate change has global impacts, the individual decision to use fossil
fuels can generate global damage. As the problem described holds for all citizens who
consume the non-renewable energy source generating externalities, a social dilemma is
present. Following IPCC (2007) and Stern (2007), we treat climate change as a global
public bad. Private transport (due to the fact that the use of fossil fuels has a positive
impact on carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration in the atmosphere) contributes to this
global public bad.
This chapter aims to derive a solution for the policy proposed by the EU to regulate
the automotive industry by combining the sustainability approach with two normative
criteria, consumer sovereignty, on the one hand, and a high degree of competition, on the
other hand. As these two criteria seem to have played a minor role when developing the
directive for the automotive sector, the outcome’s result may be inefficient, and a certain
degree of disorder is possible.1 The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 starts by
explaining the rationality behind delegating global environmental problems to be the
responsibility of the European Union. In a proceeding step we look at the rules applied
∗This chapter is mainly based on Dettmer and Wangler (2010). We are indebted to Andreas Freytag,
Christoph Vietze and Sebastian Voll for helpful comments on an earlier version of this work.
1The line of argument is based on the voting procedures that influence decision making at the European
level until today. Under the Treaty of Lisbon a reform of the voting procedures is foreseen. However, the
new voting procedure does not enter into force before 2014 and therefore the problems discussed in the
chapter so far still have political relevance.
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on environmental policy in order to understand the decision making process. The
directive coming from the European commission intended to regulate the automotive
industry is discussed in the next step. In Section 2 we define three criteria which we
consider minimum requirements for the policy measure aimed to solve the problem
in question. In section 3 the supply and demand for automobiles is analyzed with a
focus on specialization patterns of automotive manufacturers. In order to evaluate the
impact of the Commission’s proposal on consumer preferences, environmental aspects
are taken into account. In section 4 we try to find the optimal policy instrument that
is able to internalize the externalities generated by private transport. We come to the
result that market-based instruments, namely certificates or a Pigouvian tax, seem to
be adequate. As both instruments can be applied on the supply and demand side, we
also take political economy considerations into account. In a next step international
problems are evaluated. The last section is our conclusion.
7.2 Environmental policy in the European Union
7.2.1 Decision making on the European Level
Environmental policy is a political topic that increasingly attracts political attention
and is, therefore, imbedded in the political agenda of policy-makers. Environmental
initiatives from the European Commission, especially, have increased a development
which began with the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht (Leveque, 1996a, p. 9). One
reason for this can be found in the rules at the European level (compare also footnote 1).
In the case of environmental regulation, a qualified majority is applied to ratify a
proposal coming from the European Commission. Two major exceptions limit the power
of the European Commission with regard to the “fabric of environmental regulation”
(Leveque, 1996a, p. 9). On the one hand, there is the principle of subsidiarity2 and, on
the other hand, article 130 of the Maastricht Treaty. The following three cases define
exceptions with respect to the qualified majority:
• Provisions primarily of fiscal nature.
• Measures concerning town and country planning, land use and management of
water resources.
• Measures significantly affect a member state’s choice between different energy
sources and the general structure of its general supply.
2As stated in article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty, the community will only take action if the objectives of
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved in the member states. Subsidiarity, in general, means
that political action should be undertaken at the lowest level of decision making that can be assumed to be
able to make decisions on a specific problem efficiently.
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In the case the European Commission puts forward a proposal concerning market-
based instruments, e.g. harmonization of the carbon tax, unanimity rule is applied
and decision making requires the agreement of all members of the community. For
regulations which are neither limited due to the principle of subsidiarity nor subject
to the three categories listed, the decision is made with a qualified majority. Thus,
the European Commission has a certain power with respect to industrial regulation
targeting environmental policy. All directives from the European Commission can enter
the national level, if the European Council decides with a qualified majority. At the
national level the legal political process has to be used to transform the directive into
national law (Leveque, 1996b). These considerations have to be taken into account when
evaluating the Commission’s proposal on regulation of the automotive industry.
7.2.2 European Regulation of the Automotive Industry
The European Commission established a framework to improve fuel efficiency to reduce
CO2 emission from passenger cars by environmental regulation (COM, 2007a). The
framework builds upon three main pillars:
1. Voluntary commitments by automobile manufacturers associations:
A cornerstone of this strategy is the voluntary commitment of the associations
of European (ACEA), Japanese (JAMA), and Korean (KAMA) automobile man-
ufacturers. As negotiated in 1998, the ACEA committed to reduce the average
CO2-emission of newly registered cars to 140 gram/km by 2008.3
2. Guidelines on labeling and the supply of information to consumers:
While the EU relies in part on the commitments of the automobile manufacturers,
consumers need to be informed about the importance of fuel efficiency of passenger
cars.
3. Tax measures that favor vehicles with light fuel requirements:
According to the strategy (COM, 2007a, p. 3), fiscal measures such as national taxes
should establish a direct relationship between tax level and CO2 performance to
increase incentives for consumers to buy cars fulfilling the requirements of low
fuel consumption and CO2-emission.
Moreover, the Commission published a proposal for reducing CO2-emission from
private automobiles that set allowable emissions according to the mass of the vehicle.
The core of the strategy is the so-called limit-value-curve relating the vehicle mass to a
CO2-emission limit (COM, 2007a, Article 4/annex I), which is the average CO2-emission
3The Japan and Korean automobile manufacturers associations made a commitment to the level of 140
gram/km by 2009.
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level, 130 gram/km, that should be achieved by manufacturers of newly-registered
cars on the European market. The draft of the new directive states that a CO2-emission
increase is allowed in accordance with the vehicle mass. The permitted specific CO2-
emission shall be determined using the following formula:
CO2emissions = 130 + 0.0457(M− 1289) (7.1)
where M is the vehicle mass in kilograms and the mass of 1289 kilograms reflects the
current sales-weighted average (COM, 2007b, p. 5). While the slope-parameter of the
formula seems arbitrary and remains without any justification, the limit-value-curve is
such that a disproportionate reduction of CO2-emission is requested. The slope param-
eter is below the actual slope parameter of CO2 emission –weight of the car– relation.
With regard to the parameter 0.0457, it should be obvious that manufacturers of heavier
vehicles must achieve a higher percentage reduction in emission than manufacturers of
lighter vehicles. It is required that the goal be achieved by 2012. Additionally, article 7
of the proposal states that penalty payments will be claimed for newly-registered auto-
mobiles which exceed the average emission target (COM, 2007a, p. 21).4 It is foreseen
that the fines start in 2012 with e20 for each additional gram of CO2. It is scheduled that
from 2013 until 2015 the specific fines increase to e35, to e60, and finally to e95 (COM,
2007a, p. 21).
While the Commission’s proposal is aimed at reducing CO2-emissions from passen-
ger cars, the regulation with regard to penalty payments is a considerable incentive for
manufacturers to develop fuel-saving technologies. It is reasonable to argue that con-
sumers will bear the cost imposed on automobile manufacturers resulting from the fines
or from the technological upgrade needed to avoid them, with payment incorporated in
the price structure of automobile manufacturers (with a relatively high CO2-emission
level). A first impression is that the Commission’s proposal to reduce CO2-emission
from passenger cars will fail to be an optimal strategy in achieving environmental
protection. It will also fail to set efficient incentives for automobile manufacturers to
develop fuel-saving technologies.
7.3 Sustainability vs. Consumer Sovereignty and Competition
7.3.1 Environmental Problems and the Constitutional Setting
Complex models are able to predict possible developments in the climate using long-
term forecasts Nordhaus (1994b); Nordhaus and Boyer (2003). It seems to be clear that
doing nothing will be very risky and can destabilize the whole ecosystem. The most
4Moreover, “excess emission is the number of grams per kilometer by which the manufacturer’s average
specific emissions exceeded its specific emissions target.” (COM, 2007b, p. 21).
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important approach to coping with environmental problems is the normative argument
of sustainability.5 As we treat climate change as a global public bad (IPCC, 2007; Stern,
2007), we argue that a first best solution for the internalization of the externality will
require international policy coordination. However, the problems related to negotiations
on a follow-up agreement to the Kyoto-Protocol, which took place in December 2009
in Copenhagen,6 show that international policy coordination is difficult. From this
perspective, it is understandable that the European Union starts its own initiatives.
In thinking about policy measures aimed at reducing the problems related to global
warming, it is challenging to find the appropriate political instruments. The major
concern is that climate change arguments (or more generally the criteria of sustainability)
can easily be used to justify policy measures which contradict basic economic principles
guaranteeing the functioning of a liberal market order (Gerken and Renner, 1996). As
our aim is to derive policy recommendations, we now define two criteria which can be
considered as minimum requirements that have to be fulfilled. The policy measures on
CO2 emission reduction for private transport, proposed in the directive of the European
Commission, should be in line with ourminimum requirements in order to be considered
desirable.
7.3.2 Minimum Criteria Imposed on Policy Measures
The following discussion outlines the motivation behind a call for two minimum re-
quirements for policy measures by focusing on potential conflicts between sustainability,
non-discrimination between competitors, open market access and consumer sovereignty.
Since the EU directive is formulated in such a way that all automobile manufacturers
are treated the same, it seems that different specialization patterns, as well as the variety
of consumer preferences or needs of citizens, are overlooked. By defining an average
emission goal for each automotive manufacturer it seems that each firm will generate
the same average emissions per produced car in the long run. Therefore, the variety of
preferences with respect to product characteristics (such as speed, size or functionality)
will be distorted and consumer sovereignty does not play a major role anymore. As
emissions are linked to the utilization of the product (e.g. measured in km per year), it
cannot be said that a car which generates high emissions per definition also does so in
reality.7 The preferences with regard to a passenger car may differ for a family and a
single member household. As a result, higher costs are imposed on social groups which
5The United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development has defined sustainable development in
its Brundtland report as a “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Hauff, 1987, p. 46).
6A short overview is given by (Macintosh, 2010) and Nicoll et al. (2010).
7It might be that so-called “sports cars” are only driven on Sundays and therefore the burden they will
impose on the environment is rather low compared to small cars which are used every day for a distance
which could easily be covered by public transport.
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might not have been the initial target group of the resulting cost increases.8 Based on the
main criticism of the first directive from the Commission, we derive the first criterion
that should be fulfilled:
CRITERION 1 High degree of consumer sovereignty under the condition that the exter-
nality will be internalized.9
The second point is related to competition between automobile manufacturers. As
stated above, specialization patterns are desirable from an economic perspective. The
actual proposal coming from the commission carries the potential threat that automotive
manufacturers which specialize in higher class or more expensive cars have disadvan-
tages compared to those automotive manufacturers that produce a greater variety of
automobiles. Mergers between automotive producers seem to be likely, forcing even
more concentration on the market for passenger cars. It is also possible that car pro-
ducers enter into different manufacturing segments or areas(e. g. producers of big
cars offer also small cars) which will increase competition within the segments of cars.
Nevertheless, there is also the risk that such a development leads to disinvestment, in the
sense that investment in a market entry strategy for new types of passenger cars could
have been better invested in new technologies reducing CO2 emissions. Hence, the
second condition considers competition and different specialization patterns explicitly:
CRITERION 2a Minimization of distortions with respect to competition at the European
level.
Even though it is possible to develop a concept for regulation in a way that the dis-
tortions in competition at the EU level are minimized, it is likely that such a reform goes
hand in hand with entry barriers for potential foreign competitors. Due to the export
orientation of European automobile manufacturers, lobbying in favor of entry barriers
is not very likely in the short run. However, the question is whether the regulation
will increase international demand for cars produced in Europe or whether it reduces
comparative advantages. If the former is the case, regulation increases competitiveness
of European car producers. If the latter is the case, then with respect to the loss of
international market shares entry barriers become likely. Therefore the third criterion is
8Of course, this will enter the political debate afterwards, such that the state has to think about compen-
sation of social groups. Anyway, it seems clear that the initial idea of regulating passenger cars will require
further state intervention.
9Vanberg (2000), p. 89: “Consumer sovereignty means that the economic process should be organized-or
be framed by rules-in such a way that producers are made most responsive to consumer wants. In other
words, consumer sovereignty describes the ideal of an economic process in which consumer wants are the
principal controlling variable”.
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defined as follows:
CRITERION 2b Minimization of distortions with respect to competition at the interna-
tional level.
The criteria are a first step in constructing a theory of what should be done to reduce
CO2 emissions generated by private transport. So far, nothing has been said on the
implementation of policy measures. The European Commission has focused on the
supply side. Nevertheless, an alternative would be to implement policy measures on
the demand side. What follows is a positive analysis of market structures in order to
evaluate policy measures with regard to demand or supply sides from a normative
perspective.
7.4 Supply and Demand Patterns in the Automotive Industry
This section puts the European automotive industry into perspective. The first part sheds
some light on the supply side, while the second part concentrates on automotive demand
in the home market. Consumer preferences play an important role in the international
market for automobiles. One of the major challenges for automobile manufacturers is
the rising importance of environmental issues, as set out by the Kyoto-Protocol, which
will be considered in the chapter as well.
7.4.1 Automotive Supply and Demand
Automobile production is highly concentrated in the EU-15. Germany alone accounts for
nearly half of total value-added production COM (2004).10 Many studies conclude that
European enlargement has been beneficial to the automotive industry (Radosevic and
Rozeik, 2005; COM, 2004). One third of world production of passenger cars is located
in Europe, and Germany alone accounts for one third of the European automotive
production (VDA 2008). Due to high export activities, automotive producers face a
variety of consumer preferences in different countries. The trade structure of important
European automotive producing countries (Germany, England, Italy, France and Spain)
is shown in table E.1 (App. E, p. 216). The majority of automotive trade occurs within
the European Union, intra EU-25 trade accounts for around 70 percent on average.
According to Heitger et al. (1999), the Grubel-Lloyd-Indicator, measuring the share
of intra-industry trade in total trade, was around 80 for German bilateral automotive
10According to the data of the German Federal Statistical Office, from 2007, themanufacturing of transport
equipment contributes about 17 percent to total manufacturing employment as well as to value-added
production in 2006 (Destatis, 2007a,b).
Chapter 7. Environmental Policy and the European Automotive Industry 150
trade with France, Italy and the United Kingdom in the year 1996.11 Thus, consumer
preferences and economies of scale and scope explain the specialization pattern of the
European automotive industry, as trade in differentiated (automotive) products occurs
(in terms of quality). Based on the “love of variety” approach, consumer preferences
play an important role in the automotive market when exporting differentiated products
to international markets.12



































In Germany, nearly 70 per cent of cars registered since 1990 have been those classified
as compact cars and (lower-middle and) middle-sized cars (figure 7.1). While demand
for mini cars has declined, sports utility vehicles (SUVs) and vans gained market share
in new registrations in 2007. However, comparing the structure of the registered car fleet
over time may be more valuable in terms of assessing fundamental changes in demand.
In 2007, demand for compact cars (in terms of new registrations) increased in terms of
market share compared to the car fleet as a whole (figure 7.1). In contrast, registration
of passenger cars in the middle-sized car segment declined. Rather, there has been a
shift in demand for passenger cars from the middle-sized type to passenger cars of the
compact-type on the one hand, and vans and SUVs on the other hand. This change in
11See Grubel and Lloyd (1975) and Fontagné and Freudenberg (1997) for methodological issues on
intra-industry trade.
12See Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Krugman (1979, 1980) and Dixit and Norman (1980).
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automotive demand has important implications for the overall CO2-emission level of
the car fleet on European markets.
7.4.2 Environmental Perspective
The transport sector, electricity generation notwithstanding, is one of the largest sources
of greenhouse gas emission in Europe. In 2005, it was responsible for about 20 percent of
CO2-emission in the European Union (EEA, 2004, p. 64). Moreover, the use of passenger
cars accounts for about 12 percent of overall European CO2-emission (COM, 2007c, p. 2).
Road traffic is one of the few sectors in which emissions have increased (26 percent
from 1990 to 2005) (EEA, 2004, p. 65), despite the fact that emissions from the average
new car sold on the EU-15 Market in 2004 were 163g CO2/km, 12.4 percent below the
1995 starting point of 186g CO2/km (COM, 2007c, p. 7). The proposed directive by
the Commission has been more or less motivated by the failure to achieve an average
CO2-emission level of 140g CO2/km by 2008, based on a voluntary commitment of the
European Automobile Manufacturers Association.
By looking at table E.2 (App. E, p. 217) it can be seen that German brands have
an above average market share in nearly all passenger car segments, except the mini-,
compact- and mini-van segments, where German brands account for around 40 percent
on average. These segments reveal a relatively higher consumer demand for French,
Italian and Japanese brands of passenger cars compared to other passenger car seg-
ments. In contrast, the middle-sized-, upper-middle-sized-, premium- and roadster
segments, which are dominated by German brands, have the highest CO2-emission
on average (middle-sized, 174.9g CO2/km; upper-middle, 201.0g CO2/km; premium,
250.4g CO2/km; roadster, 232.5g CO2/km) . Cars in these segments have a relatively low
share of total passenger registration (except the middle-sized passenger car segment
with 17 percent). According to the first part of table E.2, it is interesting to note that
German brands perform on average better in terms of CO2-emission levels within seg-
ments (lower-middle, 155.4g CO2/km; upper-middle, 199.4g CO2/km; premium-vans,
172.5g CO2/km; and roadster, 224.2g CO2/km) in which they are specialized (in terms
of relatively high market share) compared to their foreign counterparts which is an
indication of technological advantage.13
Despite the fact that Japanese brands are demanded in all segments to a greater
(mini, mini-van and SUVs) or lesser extent (lower- and upper-middle-sized cars), in
segments with a relatively low average CO2-emission level (mini-class, 124.8g CO2/km;
and compact-class, 143.7g CO2/km) Japanese brands perform still better (mini-class,
109g CO2/km; compact-class, 134.4g CO2/km) than the European brands, respectively
13These segments account for around 40 percent of total passenger car registrations in 2007.
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(mini-class: 125.7g CO2/km, compact-class: 144.3g CO2/km) (last part of table E.2).14 As
a result, German brands compete in markets where Japanese brands are less competitive
and vice versa.
The change in automotive demand shown by figure 7.1 will be affected by the CO2-
emission level set by the Commission as it plays an increasing role in the consumer’s
choice of passenger car type. If smaller passenger cars are demanded by an increasing
share of consumers, this will have an impact on the specialization pattern of automotive
manufacturers. While French, Italian and Japanese automotive manufacturers are mainly
present in the smaller car segments, German manufacturers are more specialized in
production of cars in the higher classes.
According to the limit-value-curve proposed by the Commission, manufacturers
that specialize in car segments with higher emissions on average have to achieve higher
percentage reductions in CO2-emissions relative to the weight of the car, compared to
manufacturers of lighter vehicles. It is also proposed by the Commission that penalty
payments result for each gram of CO2 exceeding the required average level of the car
fleet. Frondel et al. (2008) state that the abatement cost that emerge from the penalty
structure shown in section 7.2 are substantial. They calculated CO2 abatement costs of
about e200 per ton in the case that the automobile is driven 100, 000 kilometers. As a
benchmark, Böhringer and Löschel (2002) estimated average abatement costs within the
ETS of about e30 per ton CO2.15
It seems reasonable to assume that the per kilometer CO2 emission limit will have
effects on the differentiated market segments of the automobile industry in such a way
that the competitive position of manufacturers will change relative to the current situa-
tion. While the penalty payments are inducements to make technological innovations to
further reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars, it seems questionable whether the
incentives will be directed into the right areas. As shown by the analysis in table E.2,
German automotive manufacturers are among the best performing brands in terms of
CO2 emission in the particular passenger car segments (within those segments emissions
on average are higher compared to other segments). Due to the specialization pattern it
is not surprising that the German automotive industry lobbies against the Commission’s
proposal. In order to internalize the externality, alternative policy options exist and
will be discussed in the next section. As it is of considerable interest to explain why
the Commission proposal is directed at regulating the automotive industry, political
instruments will be evaluated based on the minimum criteria mentioned in the last
section.
14Passenger car segments in which there is less demand for German brands (mini, compact and SUVs)
account for around 30 percent of total passenger car registration in 2007.
15This comparison is somewhere misleading as Frondel et al. (2008b) used an example of an automotive
producer rather than calculating the average abatement cost for the automotive industry as a whole.
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7.5 Search for an Optimal Political Instrument
This section aims to show an upcoming conflict when economic policy is used to tackle
environmental problems.16 The reason for this can be found in the lack of political
consistency. We start with a description of policy instruments which we consider to
have the potential to solve the environmental problems related to emission reduction in
private transport. Previous results have shown that the automotive industry is important
from an industrial perspective and therefore has considerable lobbying power. Different
aspects related to this are discussed from a closed economy perspective. We extend this
discussion to include international considerations. We then bring the different aspects
together and come up with policy recommendations at the end of the section.
7.5.1 Environmental Instruments
Three different policy instruments will be discussed: emission trading with certificates,
the Pigouvian tax and negative rules. We restrict our discussion to these three instru-
ments as other political instruments do not seem to be helpful to internalize the CO2
emissions generated by private transport.17 Regulation in the form of command and
control policy, as in the Commission’s proposal, is considered to be inferior compared to
market-based policies (cf. Buchanan and Tullock, 1975).
One classic approach to externalities is the so-called Pigouvian tax (Pigou, 1920,
pp. 129). Pigou’s idea was to tax negative externalities and subsidize positive exter-
nalities.18 Of course from a static perspective and under the assumption of complete
information, a Pareto efficient result is possible. One major criticism of this approach
is that the optimal tax is not known. Even though the Pigouvian tax has limitations, it
is, nevertheless, in many cases considered to be an effective market-based instrument.
16One of the first contributions which shows the weak performance of such an approach comes from
Kydland and Prescott (1977).
17Beside the instruments proposed above, subsidies still remain an alternative, but will not be further
discussed, because they are not relevant for emission reduction in private transport. Accountability for the
social damage, as per the constitutional principles of Eucken (1955), is also an alternative which seems not
to be very convincing if it is to be implemented at the international level. Praxis has shown that use of moral
suasion to address the problem in question does not lead to the desired outcome, from the perspective
of the EU. Ecologic labeling is also an alternative which seems to be promising for the internalization of
externalities but does not seem to be helpful in the case of the automotive industry. From an international
perspective this alternative can also be abused with regard to protectionism (Gerken and Renner, 1996,
pp. 83).
18Coase (1960) criticized Pigou’s approach (1924) using an example of environmental damage caused
by railways. Coase gives an example what kind of policy implementation would result from using the
Pigouvian approach, which he criticizes in the following sentence: “[. . . ] Pigou does not seem to have
noticed that his analysis is dealing with an entirely different question. The analysis as such is correct. But
it is quite illegitimate for Pigou to draw the particular conclusions he does. The question at issue is not
whether it is desirable to run an additional train or a faster train or to install smoke-preventing devices; the
question at issue is whether it is desirable to have a system in which the railway has to compensate those
who suffer damage from the fires which it causes or one in which the railway does not have to compensate
them” (Coase, 1960, p. 141).
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With some slight modifications it is also an applicable model (Baumol and Oates, 1971).
Criticism of the approach came from, among others, Coase (1960).
Coase (1960) demonstrates that private negotiations under the assumption that
transaction costs are neglectable and property rights are adequately defined, will lead
to a Pareto optimal outcome. According to Coase (1960), two major problems lead to
market failure: inadequately defined property rights and the existence of transaction
costs. One lesson to be drawn for political intervention is the need to create markets
by defining property rights and, additionally, providing an infrastructure that reduces
transaction costs.
The third alternative instrument proposed to internalise the externality comes from
Hayek (1978). Property rights should be defined in such a way that the owner of the
right is allowed to do whatever he wants with his own property as long as there is no
interference with the protected sphere of the non-owners. The type of rules Hayek (1978)
proposes to tackle such problems are negative rules. The evolutionary approach on the
selection of rules and the constitutional order has the advantage that it leaves enough
room for private decisions and space for autonomous innovative creativity of firms. It is
the consumer’s decision whether a product (or technique) is acceptable or not.
The limitations of this approach are as follows: a framework which is based on
negative rules needs to be stable, problems occur in those cases where rules have to be
adjusted to the actual changing knowledge (Wegner, 1998, p. 221). Thus, we think that
negative rules are not the optimal instrument to reduce CO2 emissions generated by
private transport. Certificates are also not without problems. For trade with certificates,
the overall quantity or volume of the tradable certificates has to be defined. It can be seen
as an advantage that this instrument is flexible in the way it can be adjusted quickly to
the actual knowledge; nevertheless it is also likely that the overall quantity of certificates
might be too big or too small with respect to an optimum. To summarize, we consider
the definition of property rights and trade with certificates to be a first best solution to
our problem. The Pigouvian tax is a kind of second best solution. Hayeks approach does
not seem to be the optimal one for addressing the problem of CO2 emissions generated
by private transport.
7.5.2 Political Economy Perspective
The previous discussion has highlighted the pros and cons of environmental instruments.
The European Commission opts for regulating the supply side. The interaction between
state activities, on the one hand, and private markets, on the other, is a critical issue and
may impose additional problems. In the case of Europe, decisions on environmental
regulation by the European Council are made with a qualified majority vote. The
sustainability approach serves as a key to initiate regulations at national levels. In cases
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where regulations are poorly defined, they can conflict with the liberal market order.
Due to a lack of knowledge, policy measures originally intended to increase welfare
may rather lead to an overall decline in welfare. This threat seems to be present in the
regulation on the automotive industry.
We give emphasis on this argument by constructing a kind of “worst case scenario”
using basic political economy arguments. A developed directive which aims to tackle
a specific problem is the starting point. Sustainability is the only normative criterion
which is applied. A decision on the topic in question is made by a simple majority vote.
As the burdens of the regulative intervention will be regionally clustered, the industry
in question starts with lobbying activities. If they are successful, governments will start
to cooperate with the industry to reduce the burdens of the directive coming from the
EU. In turn, policy can enter a kind of intervention process Mises (1929).19
Interaction between state and industry may increase and the regulation, which was
initially intended to generate structural change towards an environmental friendly
technology, may be a hinderance as the process of creative destruction described by
Schumpeter (1987b,a)20 is not driven by market forces (Wegner, 1998, p. 225). The major
costs imposed on citizens can be summarized as follows: (i) higher consumption costs,
(ii) costs for the adjustment of production processes, (iii) costs of lobbying activities,21
(iv) an additional loss of consumer sovereignty, (v) additional costs due to distortions,
and (vi) costs if a conflict with open market access occurs.
It is clear that the benefits with respect to climate protection remain an asset. On the
other hand, the benefit of regional protection is also highly questionable, because Euro-
pean policy cannot tackle the problem of climate change alone, it being a global problem.
Of course these arguments cannot be taken as an excuse for doing nothing about climate
change, but the example shows how necessary it is to follow a clear, defined rule-based
approach which puts enough emphasis on the protection and functioning of the market.
Looking at the topic from an international perspective supports an even more skeptical
view.
7.5.3 International Political Economy Perspective
With respect to climate change, it is important to mention relevant issues related to
international markets and prices. If reduced demand for fossil fuels, as a result of energy
19Due to the local concentration of certain industries and the incentive for politicians to maximize votes
Schumpeter (1987a) the political power of industries is at least explained in certain regions. Additionally,
due to the regulation, it is also possible that the devaluation of private capital will increase capital costs for
the automotive industry. As a result, necessary investments into future technologies will not be undertaken
20Creative destruction means that the dynamics of a market order will always generate winners and
losers. Due to technological innovations which destroy or displace old ways, new opportunities arise such
that creative destruction can be seen as one of the major driving forces behind growth leading to an increase
in welfare.
21For a discussion about the costs of lobbying see Krueger (1974).
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efficiency improvements, also decreased international prices, the positive impact of
the EU on the world climate would be redundant if total demand remained constant
Sinn (2008).22 Further it has to be taken into account that an increase of wealth in other
countries would raise automotive demand and consumption of petrol even further.
Beside this criticism, it is unclear whether the so-called “rebound effect” is so strong that
European policy will be without any positive global impact. Due to increasing demand
for fossil fuels, industries have to adapt to changing consumption patterns anyway.
Further, it has been stated that the high carbon tax in Germany is one of the main reason
why German technology with respect to car production is relatively more efficient
(according to table E.2) than in countries with lower carbon taxes (Kunert et al., 2002,
p. 440). This shows that demand has some effects on supply of a product and positive
spillovers can be assumed when the technology is exported (compare also Freytag and
Wangler, 2008). Therefore, if policy instruments are applied appropriately, welfare gains
can be expected. In contrast to this, if European standards are wrongly designed and
go hand in hand with decreasing comparative advantages of the automotive industry,
then it becomes likely that European car producers lobby in favor of import barriers.
The “voluntary” commitments of JAMA and KAMA to agree on Europeans regulation
can also be interpreted as meaning the fear of losing market access is present. But then,
what is the consequence of the directive for car producers outside Japan and Korea? It
seems that not fulfilling the requirements very likely has the potential for a response
with import restrictions (e.g. for car producers in emerging economies).
The results which can be derived so far can be summarized as follows. Taking
the global nature of climate change into account, more emphasis on global policy
coordination seems to be desirable. If international cooperation fails, it is difficult to
determine the net impact of policy measures intended to have a global impact. The
resulting partial equilibrium may set wrong incentives at the global level and the
resulting general equilibrium might differ. In the worst case, the investment will yield
low positive spillovers and there is a risk that high standards at the European level will
be used to implement import barriers on car producers outside of Europe.
7.5.4 Competition, Consumer Sovereignty and Policy Measures
For the following discussion two different approaches have to be distinguished: market-
based approaches applied on the supply side and internalization of the externality
through market-based approaches applied on the demand side. So far, these two ap-
proaches seem to be the most satisfactory in reducing CO2 emissions by passenger cars.
If the question is whether the policy instruments should be applied on the supply side
22Of course, this view is far too easy because there is no evidence to assume that the so-called “rebound
effect” will be translated 1:1 to a price decrease.
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or on the demand side, we opt in favor of a demand side approach.23 Regulation seems
to be inferior to market-based approaches and therefore non-optimal for CO2 emissions
reduction in passenger cars. What has to be kept in mind is that in the case of non-
market-based approaches like regulations, a qualified majority is the voting standard in
the European Council. For market-based approaches such as taxes, the unanimity rule
is applied.24 This leads us to derive the first result:
RESULT 1 In cases where different useful instruments are available to reach the same
target; application of the same voting rule would reduce distortions.
We justify this result because of the political economy considerations.25 Industrial
regulations are a sensible topic but in the case of CO2 emissions generated by passenger
cars may be problematic. To underline our arguments we rank the policy measures
from first best to fourth best. A ranking of the four alternatives based on the previous
discussion and our two criteria looks as follows:
• First best (demand side (a)): Tradable certificates,
• Second best (demand side (b)): Pigouvian tax,
• Third best (supply side (aa)): Segment specific emission targets (small, medium,
big) implemented by using tradable certificates,26
• Fourth best (supply side (ab)): Segment specific emission targets (small, medium,
big) implemented by using penalty payments,
• Fifth best (supply side (ba)): Same emission targets on all automobile manufactur-
ers implemented by using tradable certificates,
• Sixth best (supply side (bb)): Same emission targets on all automobile manufactur-
ers implemented by using penalty payments.
The directive coming from the European commission might result in a different,
less efficient order. We hypothesize that this inefficient result would be due to the two
different voting mechanisms. The different voting rules for taxes and regulations might
generate a kind of bias in favour of non-market-based instruments. The distinction
23The main argument is that a demand side approach leaves the decision on adequate technology to the
automotive industry.
24For a more detailed discussion on the features of the majority rule and unanimity rule see Buchanan
and Tullock (1962).
25Because consumers have to bear the costs of the externality anyway a tax would be transparent and the
state as such would be safe from lobbying activities by the automotive industry.
26We think that segment specific regulations would lead to less distortion related to different specializa-
tion patterns of automotive manufacturers.
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between the first best and second best options can be questioned. Even though, theo-
retically, emission trading with certificates is considered as first best, it does not seem
too unrealistic that it is possible to calculate the externality which results from each liter
of fossil fuels consumed (compare also Baumol and Oates, 1971). For the problem at
hand it might be that the definition of property rights and the installation of a tradable
certificate system makes implementation difficult and that the tax solution has some
advantages (with respect to effectiveness and applicability) (Raux and Marlot, 2005).
This leads to the second result of the chapter:
RESULT 2 Market-based instruments (taxes or certificates) are adequate in the case that
private mobility shall contribute to CO2 emission reduction.27
The instruments we propose seem to be the best to cope with emissions generated
by private transport and come close to the criteria we have defined:
1. High degree of consumer sovereignty under the condition that the externality will
be internalized,
2. Minimization of distortions with respect to competition at the European level,
3. Minimization of distortions with respect to competition at the international level.
It is difficult to take for granted that the best result will also turn out to be the best
alternative for the European Commission, if the same voting rule were to be applied
for regulations and taxes. Under the Treaty of Lisbon it is foreseen that in 2014 a
double majority will be needed for most of the decision.28 However, even though one
can expect less discrimination between regulation and market-based instruments, the
political process tends to favor regulation over market-based instruments, in general
(Kirchgässner and Schneider, 2003). One possibility could be that the Commission
buys accord from the automobile industry by offering additional rents (cf. FAZ, 2008).
Nevertheless, it will be more difficult to impose regulations if other options have to be
taken more seriously, and it becomes more difficult to use regulation as an instrument to
intervene in private markets if their only justification is that they are “easier” to install.
Without rules on limiting the regulative power of the European Union, the initial notion
of a “strong state” at the national level (Eucken, 1955) may be undermined by arguing
for a sustainability approach. Obviously, this is not optimal and in some cases it may
even be problematic.
27If a carbon tax was implemented then it is likely that the price level will not be set at the optimal stage.
Nevertheless, our proposition is that in comparing the supply and demand side approach, the demand side
approach is superior. On the demand side, because all citizens using and owning a car would be affected,
the transaction costs argument is convincing, and in favour of a carbon tax.
28Double majority means that 55 percent of the member states have to agree upon the issue, and those
states in agreement have to represents at least 65 percent of all people within the European Union.
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7.6 Conclusion
This study focuses on the European Commission’s proposal to reduce CO2 emissions
from passenger cars by finding an optimal policy instrument to internalize an externality.
While automotive demand shifts to smaller passenger car segments under the proposal,
to a relatively high extent, the study also looks at specialization patterns of automotive
manufacturers. It turns out that different specialization patterns exist. The Commission’s
proposal for regulation can lead to market distortions in competition. One further
finding is that sustainability is a quite powerful normative criterion if it is applied
by policy-makers to justify political intervention in market processes. We try to show
that the political process violates the basic principles of consumer sovereignty and
competition. We have focused on those points where we think there is a weak link
and therefore potential threat to the functioning of competitive private markets. We
have highlighted potential problems related to different voting rules applied in the
cases of regulation and taxation aimed at internalizing externalities. While a qualified
majority applies in the case of environmental regulations, regulation of the industry
can be applied on lower decision making costs than this would be the case for market-
based instruments. This approach can be criticized, because in the medium and long
term regulation carries the potential threat of further state interventions and further
inefficiencies.
Chapter 8
Summary and Final Conclusions
This thesis is devoted to the “Political Economy of Climate Policy”. Its aim is to deepen
the understanding of interest groups and their influence on public economic decision-
making in the context of climate change policy. The topic, as such, is broad. In order to
gain some insights it was necessary to approach the research question using different
methods, such as econometrics, laboratory experiments and theoretical modeling.
The different topics are more or less related to each other. They can be grouped
into three main subject areas: structural change in the energy sector (chapter 2-4),
policy coordination (chapter 4-6) and industry regulation (chapter 7). Chapter 4 relates
structural change in the energy sector to international policy coordination. In the
following the chapter results are discussed and some final conclusions are drawn.
8.1 Structural Change in the Energy Sector
In chapter 2 we were able to show that diffusion of green technologies, even though
inefficient, was able to achieve some pre-defined political targets. The instrument used
to foster diffusion of green technologies (GTs) is a form of command and control policy.
However, industries producing GTs seem to compete with each other and also face
international competition. From this point of view, there are incentives to be innovative
(as shown in chapter 3) and the prices for the technology can be expected to reflect
somehow the related production costs. It seems that producers of green electricity
gain most from the steady feed-in tariffs as price reductions in GTs increase the related
revenues to green electricity production.
From an economic point of view structural change in the energy sector towards
climate friendly technologies is confronted with two major problems. First, from the
perspective of welfare economics (in case of a closed economy), diffusion of GTs is
related to losses in gross domestic product (GDP). Second, inefficiencies are supposed to
be high as feed-in tariffs are relatively stable and diffusion of GTs does not focus on the
cheapest GT available.
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The first criticism can be countered with the argument that there is a need for carbon
dioxide (CO2) neutral backstop technologies (also in developing countries). This requires
a transition in the energy system which can be fostered by policy-makers. Other energy
technologies generate long lasting externalities which are not integrated into energy
prices. Green technologies might become substitutes in the near future what somehow
justifies policies aimed to foster diffusion of GTs. However, the question about the
optimal “transition path” is difficult to answer. Based on the current information, it
would be optimal to raise standards for conventional energy technologies to a level that
requires the internalizing of all the related externalities. This would require a more strict
application of the emission trading scheme. Additionally, market access for GTs has to
carry a guaranteed remuneration that is calculated on the basis of electricity prices and
the related positive externalities. This can be seen as a first best solution. For a more
precise answer additional insights are needed.
The second point is not so difficult to evaluate. The proposition can be labeled as
second best. If it is the aim to foster diffusion of GTs, then it seems convincing to invest
in the cheapest alternatives available. However, this argument might overlook positive
externalities (like the creation of knowledge) that are related to certain technologies.
This has to be taken into account. The theory of transition management underlines the
need for a certain technology base to facilitate structural change. From this point of
view, in early stages of structural change it seems to be important to establish different
technologies to reduce the risk of technological lock-in. This, of course, can theoretically
be done by establishing different feed-in tariffs. Nevertheless, at a certain stage, it is
important to invest in those technologies which are able to produce green electricity at
the lowest price. The target to produce about 30 percent of electricity with GTs by 2020
seems to require a reform of the related feed-in system. In this context, it is important to
keep in mind that as long as there is competition among GT industries one can expect
efficient prices related to the supply of GTs. Hence, any reform has to focus on the
demand side (the producers of green electricity).
One possible way to increase efficiency is to switch from (pure) command and
control to a charges and standards approach (Baumol and Oates, 1971, 1988) without
pre-selecting different GTs. It would be sufficient to define a standard (e.g. 15 percent of
electricity produced with GTs in 2012) and regulate this standard over one single feed-in
tariff. The overall price (in this case the single feed-in tariff) that has to be paid depends
on the pre-defined diffusion path. If the growth rate of GTs is too low to reach the
pre-defined standard within the pre-defined time, the feed-in tariff has to be increased.1
If diffusion is at a level that is too high, the feed-in tariff has to be reduced. Other
1Nevertheless, the feed-in tariff for the contracts signed at the given point in time have to be kept stable
for a pre-defined period (e.g. 10 or 15 years).
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approaches (like the application of tradable certificates) are also promising, but would
require more fundamental reforms.
However, such reform would reduce demand for particular GTs. One lesson that can
be drawn from the previous chapters is that technology specific interest groups try to
prevent any reform that is against their economic interests. This makes policy reforms
difficult. Without reforms the technology specific rents can also be expected to increase
which might consolidate technological lock-in. An early reform is supposed to face
lower opposition from interest groups. Focusing on the regulation of the feed-in tariff
(what determines the diffusion level of GTs) has the major advantage that efficiency
increases and decision makers become more independent of industry specific interests.
8.2 Policy Coordination
In chapter 4 diffusion of GTs in Germany is related to international policy coordination.
One important aspect resulting from the analysis is that structural change at the national
level may also positively affect climate change policy at international levels. One inter-
esting finding is that the free-riding positions of some countries (regarding investment
in backstop technologies) might increase the incentives for other countries to invest even
more into diffusion of GTs. This contradicts the general wisdom that the free-riding po-
sitions of some countries always reduces incentives to invest in global public goods. The
country specific interest in high emission reduction targets might even have a positive
impact on the efficiency of future international environmental agreements (IEAs). The
long-term time horizon, in combination with external constraints (in the form of IEAs),
might further increase the pressure on previous free-riding countries to implement high
environmental standards of their own.
Chapter 5 looks at the impact of policy coordination over time. One of the findings is
that milestones (as a proxy for an IEA) may be helpful in approaching long-term targets.
This is especially the case if investment in the public good does not generate additional
payoffs. However, if public good contributions positively affect payoffs, milestones are
not efficiency enhancing. One example could be the investment in geo-engineering,
as described in the introductory chapter 1. In this case policy coordination aimed at
fostering investment in knowledge creation seems to be redundant. This is in line with
game theory predictions (Schelling, 1996).
The impact of minimum participation rules on stabilizing IEAs is examined in Chap-
ter 6, it already having been pointed out in Chapter 4 that minimum participation rules
(MPRs) have the advantage that IEAs can be established even though some countries
free-ride on the agreement. Also, in the case of heterogeneous countries, welfare is maxi-
mized when the MPR requires participation of all countries. However, as the decision
on the MPR is endogenized, it turns out that the participation of all countries is not
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necessary for there to be an equilibrium. Another result is that being the agenda-setter
allows a country to be non-pivotal with regard to the agreement, which positively affects
negotiating power.
The chapters discussing climate change from an international perspective emphasize
the importance of IEAs in increasing the efficiency of national climate change policies.
Institutions integrated in IEAs can help overcome free-riding problems. However, in-
centives to free-ride are still high because of missing sanctioning mechanisms. Some
propositions point out that trade barriers integrated into IEAs could work as a sanction-
ing mechanism (e.g. Barrett, 1997). There are substantial concerns with such an approach.
Some arguments are discussed in Barrett (2009). The research in the field of “Interna-
tional Political Economy” highlights further problems related to trade sanctions (for an
overview see Helpman, 1997; Gawande and Krishna, 2003). Chapter 4 was able to show
that free-riding may become beneficial for non-free-riding countries. One necessary
condition is that non-free-riding countries can rely on liberalized markets. The result
from chapter 4 and 6 raise hope that an IEA can be effective even without application
of an international sanctioning mechanism. However, the results from chapter 5 imply
punishment. This seems to indicate that punishment is important. There is further
the result that an efficient IEA requires the cooperation of (almost) all countries. More
research is needed to come to a better understanding of the role that institutions can
play in increasing the opportunity costs of free-riding.
8.3 Industry Regulation
In chapter 7 different aspects of industry regulation are considered as part of the analysis.
First, the way in which the application of different voting rules for different policy in-
struments can cause a bias in the choice of the instruments is described. At the European
level there is a bias towards command and control policies. This is a result of the fact that
the simple majority rule is applied for command and control, whereas the unanimity
rule is used for market-based instruments. The second lesson that can be drawn from
the discussion in chapter 7 is that policy should favor market-based approaches over
command and control in order to be more independent of the pressure of vested interest
groups. Command and control policies carry the threat of decreasing the international
competitiveness of certain export goods which might then result in demands for protec-
tion. This problem can be reduced by using market-based instruments for environmental
protection.
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8.4 Concluding Remarks
The contribution of this thesis is small compared to the extent of the problem at hand.
The related spillover effects requires an approach to the problem from an international
perspective. However, implications on the micro level are equally important. The
predicted climate problems carry the associated threat of encouraging decision mak-
ers to apply discretionary policies with high inefficiencies. Research in the field can
help prevent short-term oriented policy reactions. There is the possibility of applying
market-based approaches in order to foster structural change. Appropriately designed
policy instruments allow for an efficient transition, thus reducing the related costs. The
increasing relevance of climate change policy shows the importance of giving adequate
advice to policy makers, and of increasing their awareness of the costs related to wrongly
designed policies. More research is needed to further understand the “Political Economy
of Climate Policy”.
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Data source BMU (2008).
193
Appendix A. Chapter 2. 194





























Data source BMU (2008).
TABLE A.1: Overview of the installed capacity of GTs
Year WATER WIND SOLAR BIO GEO TOTAL
MW MW MW MW MW MW
1990 4403 56 2 190 0.0 4651
1991 4403 98 3 190 0.0 4504
1992 4374 167 6 227 0.0 4774
1993 4520 310 9 227 0.0 4839
1994 4529 605 12 276 0.0 5422
1995 4521 1094 16 276 0.0 5631
1996 4563 1547 24 358 0.0 6492
1997 4578 2082 36 400 0.0 7096
1998 4601 2875 45 409 0.0 7930
1999 4547 4444 58 604 0.0 9653
2000 4572 6112 100 664 0.0 11448
2001 4600 8754 178 790 0.0 14322
2002 4620 11965 258 952 0.0 17795
2003 4640 14609 408 1137 0.0 20794
2004 4660 16629 1018 1550 0.2 23857
2005 4680 18428 1881 2192 0.2 27181
2006 4700 20622 2711 2740 0.2 30773
2007 4720 22247 3811 3238 2.4 34018
Source: Data source BMU (2008).
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TABLE A.2: Feed-in tariffs for the SEG/EEG
StrEG EEG EEG Am.
GT j Size 1990-19991 2000 2002 2003 2004E Annual Reduction
cents/KWh 2002 ff. 2005ff.
<500 KW 7.67 9.67 0%
HYDRO 500 KW - 5 MW 6.5 6.65 6.65 1%
5 - 150 MW 0.0 0.0 3.7-7.672 NA
Landfill Gas, < 500 KW 6.5 7.67 7.67-9.67 0%
Sewage Gas, 500 KW - 5- MW 6.65 6.65-8.65 1.5%
Coal Mine > 5 MW8 0.0 0.0 6.65-8.65 NA
Methane
<150 KW 7.1 10.23 10.1 10.0 11.5-17.5
BIO <500 KW 9.9-15.9 1% 1.5%
< 5MW 9.21 9.1 9.01 8.9-12.9
> 5MW 0.0 8.7 8.6 8.51 8.4
< 5 MW 15.0
GEO < 10 MW NA 8.95 14.0 0% 1%3
< 20 MW 8.95
>20 MW 7.16 7.16
< 5 Years 9.1 9.0 8.87 0.0 or 8.74
WIND 8.2 1.5% 2%
Onshore > 5 Years 6.19 6.1 6.01 0.0 or 5.5-8.74
WIND < 9 Years NA 9.1 9.0 8.87 9.15 1.5% 2%7
offshore > 9 Years 6.19 6.1 6.01 6.196
SOLAR stand-alone 8.2 50.62 48.1 45.7 45.7 5% 5%
building-integr. 54.0-62.4
1 The indicative numbers are based on actual values from 1998.
2 Applies to refurbishment of already existing hydropower plants dependent on the size.
3 Degression starts in 2010.
4 For projects on poor wind sites (< 60% of average wind resource), no compensation will be payed.
5 Will be applied for 12 years on offshore projects commissioned prior 2010.
6 Applies on other offshore projects than in 5.
7 Degression is starting in 2008.
8 Is only for coal-bed methane.
Own illustration following (Wüstenhagen and Bilharz, 2006, p. 1686).
A.2 Theoretical Model (Complete Competition)
There is still the assumption that demand is supported by monetary transfers from the
government and therefore total demand for GTs is given by
pj − pidj = 1−Qj, (A.1)
= 1 + pidj −Qj. (A.2)
Residual demand is given by
pj = 1 + pidj − (N − 1)qj − qj. (A.3)
Firms maximize profits at pj = MCj with
cj = [1 + pidj − (N − 1)qj]− qj. (A.4)
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Taking (A.4) into account the quantity of output produced by one single firm is given by
qcj =
1− cj + pidj
(N)
. (A.5)
Multiplying qj with N leads to the total output (Q∗j ) which is
Qcj = (1− cj + pidj). (A.6)
Using (A.6) for the market demand gives p∗ which is
pcj = cj, (A.7)
and profit πcj is equal to zero (the notation
c stands for equilibrium under competition).
Governments
TPI transfers
TPI transfers lead to the optimal outcome without any state failure. It is assumed that
welfare W (compare equation A.8) generated by the GT industry j comes from the
GEP surplus (GEPj = 1/2 ∗ Qcj ∗ (1 + pidj − p
c
j )) minus the support plus the positive
effect (bj) expected from GTs times Qcj . The optimal solution can be found by choosing
the support pidj able to maximize welfare. This leads to an optimal support pidcj and an
optimal welfare levelWcj . It follows
max
pidj
Wj(pidj) = GEPj − (pidj − bj)Q
c
j . (A.8)
The partial derivative from (A.8) with respect to pidj leads to
∂Wj
∂pidj
= bj − pidj. (A.9)
Therefore, the optimal support pidcj is given by the solution for the first order condition
which is given by
pidc_TPIj = bj. (A.10)
Substituting pid_jcTPI into the equations for price and total output, the corresponding
welfare level can be calculated. This leads to
pc_TPIj = cj (A.11)




(1− cj + bj)
2. (A.13)
ETR transfers
Political support for the GT industry j (Vj) comes from three different sources: First, as
the output coming from the GT sector increases, jobs are created which also leads to
greater support for the incumbent government. Second, electricity prices (as a function
of pidjQj) enter negatively into the political support function. Third, GEPs which install
Appendix A. Chapter 2. 197
GTs or buy assets on GTs are aware of the FITs that are positively related to pidj. If pidj
increases political support also increases.





j (pidj) + (1− α)V
c
j
= αWcj (pidj) + (1− α)[Q
c −
pidjQ
c + pidj(FITj)] (A.14)
with 0 < α ≤ 1. Maximizing equation A.14 relative to pidj leads to
pidc_ETRj =
−αbj + (α− 1)cj + (α− 1)
(α− 2)
, (A.15)




(α− 1)(2bj − 1− cj)
(α− 2)
. (A.16)
Compared to the equilibrium which arises under Cournot competition, the number of
firms operating in the market does not play a role anymore. This leads to the result that
the optimal support has to be adjusted to the market structure. If there is a change in
market structure towards complete competition (e.g. if the learning curve becomes less
significant), the optimal pidj for the GT industry j is given by the positive externality bj.
Appendix B.
B.1 Empirical Data
Patents (PAT) and all patents Germany (APAT), source DEPATIS net
Table B.1 contains the list of patent classes from which the patent counts are extracted.
The “renewable energy sector-specific technologies” of interest are electricity production
with wind (WIND), solar (SOLAR), water & ocean (WATER), geothermal (GEO) and
biomass (BIO). The original table is from Johnstone et al. (2010).1 The patent data comes
from the German Patent office.2 The vector of PAT contains patents that have been
granted in Germany (including the “Neue Bundesländer”) using the date of application.3
The data does not contain double counting and only those patents with priority for
Germany are taken into account with the intention to exclude foreign inventors. Infor-
mation captured with PAT is on the national level and sector-specific (WIND, SOLAR,
WATER, GEO, BIO).
Information captured with APAT is also on the national level but is not sector-specific.
APAT stands for the count of all patents applied for in Germany.
German R&D expenditures(RuD), source IEA
The data on sector-specific public expenditures on R&D in the different GT industries
comes from the International Energy Agency.4 R&D refers to expenditures of the federal
government. The resources can be given to private as well as to public entities. The data
is in million Euro on exchange rates from 2006.5 Information captured with RuD is on
the national level and is sector-specific (WIND, SOLAR, WATER, GEO, BIO).
German installed capacity of sector-specific technology INCAP,
source BUND
INCAP is used as a proxy for the size of the market for different GTs. The data contains
1Note that the list is extended with patent classes for WATER as the law for renewable energy which is
analyzed for Germany also changed the institutional framework for energy produced with water. On the
other hand WASTE is excluded from the list because it is difficult to separate non-renewable waste from
renewable waste.
2For further information see http://depatisnet.dpma.de/DepatisNet/depatisnet?window=-
1&space=menu&content=index&action=recherche&session=c23b66f230d535e054a0e96346f598d6b4b3c-
0c1ada0&stamp=34353.
3Even though information about patents until 2007 is available, the analysis is restricted to 2005. The
information about the last two years is dropped to get rid of the problem that there is a long time lag
between the application for a patent and patent granting. Once the patent is granted, the patent protection
goes back to the application date. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the data from 2006 and 2007
contains a lack of information (Popp, 2005b, p. 5).
4For further information see http://www.iea.org/.
5The data for Germany at the national level does not contain information about the expenditures of
regional governments.
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information about the installed capacity measured in megawatt-hours (MWh). It mea-
sures the overall installed capacity of the sector-specific technology per year. The data
comes from the Ministry for the Environment in Germany.6 Information captured with
INCAP is on the national level and is sector-specific (WIND, SOLAR, WATER, GEO,
BIO).
Electricity price index (CPIE), electricity consumption (ELC), source GSO
and IEA
The electricity price index comes from the German Statistical Office. CPIE is inflation
corrected and the year 2004 is set to 100. Consumption taxes are not taken into account.
Information about ELC comes from the International Energy Agency. ELC is measured
in kilowatt hours per capita. Information captured with CPIE and ELC is on the national
level and is not sector-specific.
6Compare BMU (2007b).
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B.2 List of IPC Codes
TABLE B.1: IPC codes for renewable energy technologies*
WIND Class Sub-Classes
Wind motors with rotation axis substantially in wind direction F03D 1/00-06
Wind motors with rotation axis substantially at right angle to wind direction F03D 3/00-06
Other wind motors F03D 5/00-06
Controlling wind motors F03D 7/00-06
Adaptations of wind motors for special use F03D 9/00-02
Details, component parts, or accessories not provided for in,
or of interest, apart from the other groups of this subclass F03D 11/00-04
Electric propulsion with power supply from force of nature, e.g. sun, wind B60L 8/00
Effecting propulsion by wind motors driving water-engaging propulsive elements B63H 13/00
SOLAR
Devices for producing mechanical power from solar energy F03G 6/00-08
Use of solar heat, e.g. solar heat collectors F24J 2/00-54
Machine plant or systems using particular sources of energy - sun F25B 27/00B
Drying solid materials or objects by processes involving the application
of heat by radiation -e.g. sun F26B 3/28
Semiconductor devices sensitive to infra-red radiation - including a panel or
array of photoelectric cells, e.g. solar cells H01L 31/042
Generators in which light radiation is directly converted into electrical energy H02N 6/00
Aspects of roofing for the collection of energy - i.e. solar panels E04D 13/18
Electric propulsion with power supply from forces of nature, e.g. sun, wind B60L 8/00
WATER/OCEAN
Engines of impulse type, i.e. turbines with jets of high-velocity liquid impinging
on bladed or like rotors, e.g. Pelton wheels F03B 1/00-04
Machines or engines of reaction type; Parts or details peculiar thereto F03B 3/00-18
Water wheels F03B 7/00
Adaptations of machines or engines for special use; Combinations of machines
or engines with driving or driven apparatus F03B 13/00-10
Controlling F03B 15/00-22
Adaptations of machines or engines for special use; combinations of machines
wave or tide energy F03B 13/12-24
Mechanical-power producing mechanisms - ocean thermal energy conversion F03G 7/05
Mechanical-power producing mechanisms - using pressure differentials or
thermal differences F03G 7/04
Water wheels F03B 7/00
GEOTHERMAL
Other production or use of heat, not derived from combustion - using
natural or geothermal heat F24J 3/00-08
Devices for producing mechanical power from geothermal energy F03G 4/00-06
Electric motors using thermal effects H02N 10/00
BIOMASS
Solid fuels based on materials of non-mineral origin - animal or vegetable C10L 5/42-44
Engines operating on gaseous fuels from solid fuel - e.g. wood F02B 43/08
Liquid carbonaceous fuels - organic compounds C10L 1/14
Anion exchange - use of materials, cellulose or wood B01J 41/16
*From the original table WASTE has been excluded and WATER has been added.



































































estimation OLS AR(1) OLS AR(1) AR(1) neg.Bin.
method FD FD FD FD FD
(random effects) (random effects) (random effects) (random effects) (fixed effects) (fixed effects)
Independent Variable PATt−1 PATt−1 PATt−1 PATt−1 PATt−1 PATt−1
INCAP 0.0071795∗ 0.0073236∗ −− −− −− −−
(0.0029073) (0.0030653)
∆INCAP −− −− 0.031745∗∗ 0.0318642∗∗ 0.0288904∗∗ 0.0001964∗∗
(0.0087984) (0.0088353) (0.0097047) (0.0000473)
RuDt−1 1.198481∗∗ 1.249239∗∗ 1.152284∗∗ 1.163613∗∗ 1.260779∗∗ 0.0074726∗
(0.3905481) (0.3896302) (0.3653252) (0.3649809) (0.4376515) (0.003264)
CPIEt−2 −0.1348853 −0.1289086 −0.0893127 −0.087851 −0.0916542 0.0032765
(0.440692) (0.4434311) (0.4143496) (0.4144228) (0.4400515) (0.0066363)
∆ELCt−2 −0.0087178 −0.0086222 −0.0112142 −0.0112018 −0.010779 0.0004999
(0.0170297) (0.0166748) (0.0160142) (0.0159367) (0.0169107) (0.0003443)
APATt−2 0.0008593 0.0008798 0.0003491 0.0003511 0.0003264 0.0000378∗
(0.0017597) (0.0017789) (0.0016241) (0.0016253) (0.0017243) (0.000015)
β0 −0.740014 −0.7279031 1.679 1.69379 1.935938 1.816683
(4.033444) (4.13823) (3.553627) (3.563932) (3.760159) (1.473224)
time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-sq 0.3732 0.3730 0.4467 0.4467 0.4198 –
Wald chi2 – – – – – 110.76
Baltagi-Wu LBI – 2.1771212 – 2.1013374 – –
Nr. of observations: 60 60 60 60 55 65
Nr. of groups: 5 5 5 5 5 5












TABLE B.3: Estimation result 1b, Alternative Estimations
estimation neg.Bin. neg.Bin. OLS OLS OLS AR(1) AR(1)
method FD FD FD FD
(fixed effects) (fixed effects) (fixed effects) (fixed effects) (fixed effects) (fixed effects) (fixed effects)
Independent −− −− RELPATt−1 RELPATt−1 RELPATt−1 RELPATt−1 RELPATt−1
Variable PATt−1 PATt−1 −− −− −− −− −−
INCAP 0.000039∗∗ −− −− −− −− −− 2.93e− 07∗
(6.82e− 06) (1.21e-07)
∆INCAP −− 0.0001845∗∗ 5.73e− 07∗∗ 5.08e− 07∗∗ 4.78e− 07∗∗ 5.47e− 07∗∗ −−
(0.0000509) (8.85e-08) ( 1.60e-07 ) (1.60e-07) (1.71e− 07)
RuDt−1 0.0075649
∗∗ 0.0064701+ 9.34e− 06+ 0.0000238∗∗ 0.0000234∗∗ 0.0000392∗∗ 0.0000412∗∗
(0.0029366) (0.0036583) (4.81e− 06) (6.00e-06) (6.56e-06) (8.32e-06) (8.70e-06)
CPIEt−3 0.0142486∗∗ 0.0064506 −− −− 0.0000209+ 0.0000242∗ 0.0000341∗∗
(0.0035858) (0.0040973) (0.0000105) (0.0000109) (0.0000119)
∆ELCt−3 0.0000463 −0.000047 −− −− 3.41e− 07 3.88e-07 6.88e− 07
(0.0002292) (0.0002831) (4.22e-07) (4.30e-07) (4.75e-07)
CPIEt−2 −− −− 1.20e− 06 1.66e− 06 −− −− −−
(3.36e− 06) (6.72e-06)
∆ELCt−2 −− −− 1.69e− 07 −1.91e− 07 −− −− −−
(3.96e− 07) (2.59e− 07)
APATt−2 0.0000536∗∗ 0.0000384∗∗ −− −− −− −− −−
(9.13e− 06) (0.0000122)
β0 0.5222763 1.265181 0.001037
∗∗ 0.0000292 0.0000926+ 0.0000624 0.0000178
(1.103971) (1.119384) (0.0003837) (0.0000398) (0.0000539) (0.0000514) (0.0000623)
time dummies No No No No No No No
R-sq – – 0.4747 0.3572 0.3635 0.4268 0.3125
Wald chi2(5) 112.05 66.43 – – – – –
Nr. of observations: 60 60 65 60 55 50 50
Nr. of groups: 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Significance: ∗∗ ≤ 1%,∗ ≤ 5%,+ ≤ 10%
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B.4 Correlation Matrices for Different Econometric Models
TABLE B.4: Correlation matrices
Correlation matrix 1
PAT INCAP CPIE ELC APAT RuD
PAT 1.0000
INCAP 0.1745 1.0000
CPIE -0.2146 -0.2630 1.0000
ELC 0.1380 0.3558 -0.5783 1.0000
APAT 0.2214 0.2927 -0.9467 0.5699 1.0000
RuD 0.7675 -0.2187 0.1156 -0.0693 -0.1271 1.0000
Correlation matrix 2
PATt−1 INCAP CPIEt−2 ∆ELCt−2 APATt−2 RuDt−1
PATt−1 1.0000
INCAP 0.2117 1.0000
CPIEt−2 -0.1603 -0.3318 1.0000
∆ELCt−2 0.1095 0.1854 -0.6231 1.0000
APATt−2 0.1653 0.3237 -0.9462 0.6053 1.0000
RuDt−1 0.8098 -0.2125 0.1162 0.1162 -0.1407 1.0000
Correlation matrix 3
PATt−1 ∆INCAP CPIEt−2 ∆ELCt−2 APATt−2 RuDt−1
PATt−1 1.0000
∆INCAP 0.4073 1.0000
CPIEt−2 -0.1603 -0.3310 1.0000
∆ELCt−2 0.1095 0.2000 -0.6231 1.0000
APATt−2 0.1653 0.3216 -0.9462 0.6053 1.0000
RuDt−1 0.8098 0.8098 0.1162 -0.0919 -0.1407 1.0000
Correlation matrix 4
PATt−1 ∆INCAP CPIEt−3 ∆ELCt−3 APATt−2 RuDt−1
PATt−1 1.0000
∆INCAP 0.4111 1.0000
CPIEt−3 -0.1156 -0.2951 1.0000
∆ELCt−3 0.0852 0.1595 -0.5938 1.0000
APATt−2 0.1421 0.3066 -0.9249 0.6332 1.0000
RuDt−1 0.8386 0.0508 0.1017 -0.0340 -0.1205 1.0000
Correlation matrix 5
∆PATt−1 ∆INCAP ∆CPIEt−2 ∆(∆ELCt−2) ∆APATt−2 ∆RuDt−1
∆PATt−1 1.0000
∆INCAP 0.1970 1.0000
∆CPIEt−2 -0.1590 -0.0075 1.0000
∆(∆ELCt−2) -0.0468 -0.0468 -0.0468 1.0000
∆APATt−2 -0.0468 -0.0468 -0.2671 -0.1773 1.0000
∆RuDt−1 0.3274 -0.0615 -0.0748 0.0071 -0.0110 1.0000
Correlation matrix 6
∆PATt−1 ∆(∆INCAP) ∆CPIEt−2 ∆(∆ELCt−2) ∆APATt−2 ∆RuDt−1
∆PATt−1 1.0000
∆(∆INCAP) 0.4517 1.0000
∆CPIEt−2 -0.1590 -0.1672 1.0000
∆(∆ELCt−2) -0.0468 0.0150 -0.2191 1.0000
∆APATt−2 -0.2191 -0.0208 -0.2671 -0.1773 1.0000
∆RuDt−1 0.3274 0.3274 0.3274 0.0071 0.0071 1.0000
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C.1 Different Scenarios
TABLE C.1: Scenarios 3-5
Description Modifications on the model Expectations
Scenario 3 F decides to support
firms located in F di-





(Ae − qeHj − q
e
Fj
− cHprj )− clj ≤ 0.
No additional exports.
Case (3a): The first
mover advantage does





(Ae − qeHj − q
e
Fj
− cHprj )− clj > 0.
If the GT industry is so competitive that it was
already exporting GTs to F without any subsi-
dies→ In this case it can continue to export, if it
is still able to compete with the GT industriesj
located in F.
Case (b): Decreasing ex-
ports of GTs compared
to the case without local
content clause.
Scenario 4 H competes with the
GT industry located in
another country (coun-
try I) in a “third” mar-
ket in F. In this case
F is not able to produce
GTs but is forced to buy
them (e. g. because of
high international envi-
ronmental standards).
There is competition between H and I. The
underlying game depends on which cost curve
H and I are operating. They can play Stackel-
berg, or if they have the same marginal costs,
the market has the characteristic of a duopoly
with simultaneous market entrance.
Increasing exports of
GTs.
Scenario 5 There is also the possi-
bility that a firm located










q̂eHj − clj > 0.
q̂Hj stands for “agreed quantity of GTs” which
the GT industriesj located in H can sell at the
agreed price p̂j.
Case (a) F buys the
technology from the
GT industriesj located
in H. In this case the
GT industry would sell










q̂eHj − clj − ttr > 0.
ttr stands for “technology transfer”.
Case (b): The contract
is combined with a lo-
cal content clause → In-
creasing exports of GTs,
but less than in case (a).
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C.2 Stackelberg Game
In our framework, the GT industry j in H benefits from pidFj and enters the foreign
market as a Stackelberg leader. The Stackelberg game can be solved as follows: the
GT industry in H and F are assumed to maximize profits. For F the profit function is
given by equation 4.1.
The profit maximization problem leads to
∂πeFj
∂qeFj





+ pideFj = 0
qFj = RF(qHj) =






RF(qeHj) represents the response function for F. H maximizes its expected profits with
respect to qeHj by taking equation C.1 into account. It follows
∂πeHj
∂qeHj
= Ae − 2qeHj −
1
2

















Finally we can solve the maximization problem for the industry j in F. The solution for
F is given by
qe∗Fj =





If we substitute the values for qe∗Fj and q
e∗
Hj
into equation 4.1 we obtain
πeHj =





− cprHj + pid
e
Fj









(Ae − cprHj + pid
e
Fj)
2 − clj . (C.4)
The expected contribution to the national GDP of H through exports of GTs is simply






(Ae − cprHj + pid
e
Fj)
2 − clj . (C.5)
In contrast to the costs which go in hand with policy induced demand for GTs at the
national level, yeH enters positively into the GDP of H.
1
1This is true as long as Ae + pideFj > c
pr
Hj
and clj < (A
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C.3 Econometric Model
Empirical Data
Patents (PATENTHF), source EPO: Table B.1 on page 200 contains the list of patent classes
from which the dataset is extracted. The “renewable energy industry specific technologies”
of interest are for electricity production with wind (WIND), solar (SOLAR), water & ocean
(WATER), geothermal (GEO) and biomass (BIO). The original table on patent classes comes
from Johnstone et al. (2010).2 The dataset contains patents which are granted in at the EPO,
JPO and APO with priority in Germany (including the “Neue Bundesländer”).3 The dataset
includes patents and utility patents. The data we use comes from a freely available dataset of
the European Patent (DOC-DB).4 Information captured with PATENTHF therefore is industry
specific (WIND, SOLAR,WATER, GEO, BIO) and country/ territorial specific (EP, JPO and APO).
Patent counts about patents applied in region r (APATENTF), source OECD: The variable
APATENTF contains information about the overall number of patents applied in the specific
territory (EPO, JPO, APO). This variable captures all patents applied for at the EPO, JPO and
APO with the inventor’s country of residence and fractional counts. The patent counts are based
on the earliest priority date. The data mainly derives from EPO Worldwide Statistical Patent
Database (April 2007).5 Information captured with APATENTF is country/ territorial specific
(EP, JPO and APO).
German R&D expenditures(RuDH), source IEA: The data about industry specific expenditures
concerning public expenditures on research and development related to R&D in the different
GT industries comes from the international energy agency.6 The data for Germany is in million
Euro on exchange rates from 2006.7 Information captured with RuDH is at the German level
and industry specific (WIND, SOLAR, WATER, GEO, BIO).
German installed capacity of industry specific technology INCAPH , source BUND: INCAPH
is used as a proxy for the induced demand implemented by institutional changes because of
laws such as the EEG. The data contains information about the installed capacity measured
in megawatt-hours (MWh). It measures the overall installed capacity of the industry specific
technology per year. The data comes from the Ministry of Environment.8
Information capturedwith INCAPH is at the German level and industry specific (WIND, SOLAR,
WATER, GEO, BIO).
2Note that the list is extended in the case of patent classes for Water, because the law for renewable
energy which is analyzed for Germany also changed the institutional framework for energy produced with
water. On the other hand, we excluded WASTE, because we focus on GTs and therefore WASTE is not
really considered as a renewable energy source.
3Note that the date for the patents that are granted goes back to the date when inventors applied for the
patent. Even though information about patents until 2006 is available, the analysis is restricted to from
1992 to 2002. The information about the last three years is dropped to get rid of the problem that granted
patents always go back to the priority date. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the data from 2004 and
2006 contains a lack of information (Popp, 2005b, p. 5).
4For further information look at http://www.epo.org/patents/patent-information/free.html.
5For more detailed information see Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD),
Patent Database, June 2007.
6For further information look at http://www.iea.org/.
7The data for Germany at the national level does not contain information about the expenditures of
regional governments.
8Compare BMU (2007b).
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Energy price index (CPIEF), electricity consumption (ELCF) and installed capacity of renew-
able energies in the foreign country (INCAPF), source IEA: CPIEF is a consumer price index
for energy. CPIEF is country specific. Year 2000 is set to 100, taxes are included in the calcula-
tion. ELCF measures the electricity consumption in KWh per capita ELCF is country specific.
INCAPF measures the overall installed capacity of renewable energies in the foreign country.
Information captured with CPIEF, ELCF and INCAPF is country/ territorial specific (EP, JPO
and APO).
C.4 Alternative Estimations
In table C.2, we use a fixed effects Poisson-model, which more or less replicates our
results (compare table 4.1, page 107). Using a first differences model (OLS) as shown in
table C.3 still shows significant results for INCAPH2000−2002 in JPO and APO.
TABLE C.2: Fixed effects Poisson regression
PATENTHF EPO JPO APO











lagINCAPF 4.78e− 06 0.0005027∗ −0.000037
(0.0000164) (0.0003115) (0.0000375)
lagAPATENTF −0.0001206 −0.0001457 0.0007427∗∗
(0.000266) (0.000173) (0.000334)
lagCPIEF1992−1999 0.0190602 −0.003186 −0.0009674
(0.025742) (0.0246747) (0.0269702)
lagCPIEF2000−2002 0.023799 −0.0020967 0.0032361
(0.02162) (0.0249417) (0.0220473)
lagELCF −0.0035969 −0.0058992∗∗ 0.0023531∗∗∗
(0.003572) (0.0024022) (0.0005705)
Wald chi2 411.06
Nr. of observations: 165
Significance: ∗∗∗ ≤ 1%,∗∗ ≤ 5%,∗ ≤ 10%
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TABLE C.3: OLS fixed effects first differences model
PATENTHF EPO JPO APO
lag1RuDH1992−1999 −0.2735567 −0.0252574 −0.053742
(0.1733541) (0.0849316) (0.1719576)
lag1RuDH2000−2002 −0.2446132 −0.0247744 −0.1965391
(0.2085309) (0.1635901) (0.2077007)





lagINCAPF 0.0009494 0.0024222 0.0013545
(0.0106794) (0.0238106) (0.0095546)
lagAPATENTF 0.0060522 −0.0036444 0.0060825
(0.0559459) (0.0571749) (0.0470171)
lagCPIEF1992−1999 −0.538605 0.0867416 −0.0706172
(10.112697) (0.7568268) (0.5441484)
lagCPIEF2000−2002 −0.3647433 0.1282116 0.0190248
(10.356288) (10.207714) (0.8598966)






Nr. of observations: 150
Significance: ∗∗∗ ≤ 1%,∗∗ ≤ 5%,∗ ≤ 10%
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C.5 Correlation Matrices
TABLE C.4: Correlation matrix 1 for the model with a one year lime lag for RuD







-0.0242 0.0860 -0.0598 1.0000
E: INCAPH2000−2002EU
0.3678 -0.0142 0.2504 -0.0548 1.0000
F: lagELCFEU 0.2345 -0.1872 0.2733 -0.1485 0.2095 1.0000
G: lagCPIEF1992−1999EU
0.1077 0.5518 -0.1186 0.5036 0.0147 -0.2615 1.0000
H: lagCPIEF2000−2002EU
0.2786 -0.0998 0.6637 -0.0901 0.4320 0.4127 -0.1787 1.0000
I: lagINCAPFEU 0.2001 -0.1931 0.2953 -0.1650 0.1874 0.9697 -0.2863 0.4453 1.0000
J: lagAPATENTFEU 0.2361 -0.1617 0.1995 -0.1028 0.1864 0.9403 -0.1805 0.3010 0.8616 1.0000
K: lag1RuDH1992−1999JAPAN
0.0422 -0.0996 -0.0662 -0.0900 -0.0607 -0.1872 -0.1783 -0.0998 -0.1931 -0.1617
L: lag1RuDH2000−2002JAPAN
0.0257 -0.0662 -0.0441 -0.0598 -0.0404 0.2733 -0.1186 -0.0664 0.2953 0.1995
M: INCAPH1992−1999JAPAN
-0.1398 -0.0900 -0.0598 -0.0813 -0.0548 -0.1485 -0.1611 -0.0901 -0.1650 -0.1028
N: INCAPH2000−2002JAPAN
0.1228 -0.0607 -0.0404 -0.0548 -0.0370 0.2095 -0.1086 -0.0608 0.1874 0.1864
O: lagELCFJAPAN 0.2180 -0.1711 0.2053 -0.1011 0.1716 0.9126 -0.1851 0.3078 0.8517 0.9767
P: lagCPIEF1992−1999JAPAN
-0.1835 -0.1784 -0.1187 -0.1611 -0.1087 -0.2888 -0.3194 -0.1787 -0.3075 -0.2187
Q: lagCPIEF2000−2002JAPAN
-0.0544 -0.0998 -0.0664 -0.0901 -0.0608 0.4120 -0.1787 -0.1000 0.4433 0.3010
R: lagINCAPFJAPAN 0.2178 -0.1814 0.2363 -0.1184 0.1847 0.9608 -0.2195 0.3562 0.9205 0.9771
S: lagAPATENTFJAPAN 0.2571 -0.1869 0.2798 -0.1626 0.2275 0.9764 -0.2680 0.4199 0.9425 0.9149
T: lag1RuDH1992−1999USA
0.1728 -0.0996 -0.0662 -0.0900 -0.0607 -0.1872 -0.1783 -0.0998 -0.1931 -0.1617
U: lag1RuDH2000−2002USA
0.1031 -0.0662 -0.0441 -0.0598 -0.0404 0.2733 -0.1186 -0.0664 0.2953 0.1995
V: INCAPH1992−1999USA
-0.1169 -0.0900 -0.0598 -0.0813 -0.0548 -0.1485 -0.1611 -0.0901 -0.1650 -0.1028
W: INCAPH2000−2002USA
0.2145 -0.0607 -0.0404 -0.0548 -0.0370 0.2095 -0.1086 -0.0608 0.1874 0.1864
X: lagELCFUSA 0.2551 -0.1625 0.2090 -0.1104 0.1816 0.8836 -0.1897 0.3101 0.8129 0.9425
Y: lagCPIEF1992−1999USA
-0.0891 -0.1784 -0.1187 -0.1612 -0.1087 -0.2722 -0.3195 -0.1788 -0.2945 -0.1953
Z: lagCPIEF2000−2002USA
0.0258 -0.0997 -0.0664 -0.0901 -0.0608 0.4121 -0.1786 -0.1000 0.4429 0.3012
AA: lagINCAPFUSA 0.0624 -0.0069 -0.0717 0.0056 0.0626 -0.0133 0.0860 -0.1108 -0.0567 0.2059
BB: lagAPATENTFUSA 0.2409 -0.1714 0.2249 -0.1269 0.1892 0.9651 -0.2070 0.3379 0.9047 0.9724








0.0860 0.2504 -0.0548 1.0000
O: lagELCFJAPAN -0.0142 0.2053 -0.1011 0.1716 1.0000
P: lagCPIEF1992−1999JAPAN
-0.171 -0.1187 0.5050 0.0028 -0.2226 1.0000
Q: lagCPIEF2000−2002JAPAN
0.5610 0.6636 -0.0901 0.4359 0.3081 -0.1787 1.0000
R: lagINCAPFJAPAN -0.0998 0.2363 -0.1184 0.1847 0.9827 -0.2537 0.3558 1.0000
S: lagAPATENTFJAPAN -0.1814 0.2798 -0.1626 0.2275 0.9024 -0.2938 0.4206 0.9373 1.0000
T: lag1RuDH1992−1999USA
-0.1869 -0.0662 -0.0900 -0.0607 -0.1711 -0.1784 -0.0998 -0.1814 -0.1869 1.0000
U: lag1RuDH2000−2002USA
-0.0996 -0.0441 -0.0598 -0.0404 0.2053 -0.1187 -0.0664 0.2363 0.2798 -0.0662
V: INCAPH1992−1999USA
-0.0662 -0.0598 -0.0813 -0.0548 -0.1011 -0.1611 -0.0901 -0.1184 -0.1626 0.0860
W: INCAPH2000−2002USA
-0.0900 -0.0404 -0.0548 -0.0370 0.1716 -0.1087 -0.0608 0.1847 0.2275 -0.0142
X: lagELCFUSA -0.1625 -0.0607 -0.1104 0.1816 0.9581 -0.2247 0.3116 0.9351 0.9231 -0.1625
Y: lagCPIEF1992−1999USA
-0.1784 -0.1187 -0.1612 -0.1087 -0.1989 -0.3196 -0.1788 -0.2323 -0.2778 0.5556
Z: lagCPIEF2000−2002USA
-0.0997 -0.0664 -0.0901 -0.0608 0.3073 -0.1787 -0.1000 0.3556 0.4198 -0.0997
AA: lagINCAPFUSA -0.0069 -0.0717 0.0056 0.0626 0.2872 0.0647 -0.1073 0.1727 0.0669 -0.0069
BB: lagAPATENTFUSA -0.1714 0.2249 -0.1269 0.1892 0.9593 -0.2413 0.3375 0.9643 0.9503 -0.1714







X: lagELCFUSA 0.2090 -0.1104 0.1816 1.0000
Y: lagCPIEF1992−1999USA
-0.1187 0.5042 0.0098 -0.2035 1.0000
Z: lagCPIEF2000−2002USA
0.6631 -0.0901 0.4402 0.3094 -0.1787 1.0000
AA: lagINCAPFUSA -0.0717 0.0056 0.0626 0.3339 0.0757 -0.1077 1.0000
BB: lagAPATENTFUSA 0.2249 -0.1269 0.1892 0.9270 -0.2197 0.3369 0.1183 1.0000
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TABLE C.5: Correlation matrix 1 for the model with a two year lime lag for RuD







-0.0221 0.0923 -0.0486 1.0000
E: INCAPH2000−2002EU
0.3709 0.0460 0.1404 -0.0573 1.0000
F: lagELCFEU 0.2224 -0.1583 0.2304 -0.1644 0.2022 1.0000
G: lagCPIEF1992−1999EU
0.1070 0.5202 -0.0945 0.5127 0.0187 -0.2770 1.0000
H: lagCPIEF2000−2002EU
0.2770 -0.0011 0.5183 -0.0945 0.4288 0.4081 -0.1837 1.0000
I: lagINCAPFEU 0.1840 -0.1680 0.2740 -0.1844 0.1785 0.9641 -0.3066 0.4453 1.0000
J: lagAPATENTFEU 0.2300 -0.1321 0.1557 -0.1199 0.1835 0.9428 -0.1931 0.2961 0.8357 1.0000
K: lag2RuDH1992−1999JAPAN
0.0477 -0.1106 -0.0570 -0.0943 -0.0672 -0.1583 -0.1834 -0.1109 -0.1680 -0.1321
L: lag2RuDH2000−2002JAPAN
-0.0101 -0.0570 -0.0294 -0.0486 -0.0347 0.2304 -0.0945 -0.0572 0.2740 0.1557
M: INCAPH1992−1999JAPAN
-0.1360 -0.0943 -0.0486 -0.0804 -0.0573 -0.1644 -0.1563 -0.0945 -0.1844 -0.1199
N: INCAPH2000−2002JAPAN
0.1203 -0.0672 -0.0347 -0.0573 -0.0408 0.2022 -0.1114 -0.0673 0.1785 0.1835
O: lagELCFJAPAN 0.2109 -0.1267 0.1432 -0.1211 0.1687 0.9175 -0.2035 0.3102 0.8295 0.9674
P: lagCPIEF1992−1999JAPAN
-0.1801 -0.1834 -0.0946 -0.1563 -0.1114 -0.3005 -0.3039 -0.1838 -0.3233 -0.2257
Q: lagCPIEF2000−2002JAPAN
-0.0648 -0.1109 -0.0572 -0.0945 -0.0673 0.4074 -0.1837 -0.1111 0.4431 0.2961
R: lagINCAPFJAPAN 0.2081 -0.1516 0.1990 -0.1401 0.1819 0.9708 -0.2430 0.3634 0.9140 0.9671
S: lagAPATENTFJAPAN 0.2476 -0.1415 0.1903 -0.1812 0.2221 0.9720 -0.2850 0.4166 0.9313 0.9077
T: lag2RuDH1992−1999USA
0.1987 -0.1106 -0.0570 -0.0943 -0.0672 -0.1583 -0.1834 -0.1109 -0.1680 -0.1321
U: lag2RuDH2000−2002USA
0.0375 -0.0570 -0.0294 -0.0486 -0.0347 0.2304 -0.0945 -0.0572 0.2740 0.1557
V: INCAPH1992−1999USA
-0.1200 -0.0943 -0.0486 -0.0804 -0.0573 -0.1644 -0.1563 -0.0945 -0.1844 -0.1199
W: INCAPH2000−2002USA
0.2141 -0.0672 -0.0347 -0.0573 -0.0408 0.2022 -0.1114 -0.0673 0.1785 0.1835
X: lagELCFUSA 0.2563 -0.1029 0.0870 -0.1320 0.1798 0.8747 -0.2078 0.3108 0.7747 0.9164
Y: lagCPIEF1992−1999USA
-0.0884 -0.1834 -0.0946 -0.1563 -0.1114 -0.2862 -0.3040 -0.1838 -0.3130 -0.2056
Z: lagCPIEF2000−2002USA
0.0176 -0.1108 -0.0571 -0.0945 -0.0673 0.4076 -0.1837 -0.1111 0.4426 0.2963
AA: lagINCAPFUSA 0.0045 0.1268 -0.2400 0.0232 0.0292 -0.4151 0.1714 -0.2443 -0.4970 -0.2725
BB: lagAPATENTFUSA 0.2304 -0.1351 0.1703 -0.1421 0.1814 0.9594 -0.2172 0.3291 0.8845 0.9732








0.0460 0.1404 -0.0573 1.0000
O: lagELCFJAPAN -0.1267 0.1432 -0.1211 0.1687 1.0000
P: lagCPIEF1992−1999JAPAN
0.5276 -0.0946 0.5158 0.0080 -0.2348 1.0000
Q: lagCPIEF2000−2002JAPAN
0.0008 0.5133 -0.0945 0.4328 0.3105 -0.1838 1.0000
R: lagINCAPFJAPAN -0.1516 0.1990 -0.1401 0.1819 0.9758 -0.2711 0.3628 1.0000
S: lagAPATENTFJAPAN -0.1415 0.1903 -0.1812 0.2221 0.9012 -0.3068 0.4173 0.9383 1.0000
T: lag2RuDH1992−1999USA
-0.1106 -0.0570 -0.0943 -0.0672 -0.1267 -0.1834 -0.1109 -0.1516 -0.1415 1.0000
U: lag2RuDH2000−2002USA
-0.0570 -0.0294 -0.0486 -0.0347 0.1432 -0.0946 -0.0572 0.1990 0.1903 -0.0570
V: INCAPH1992−1999USA
-0.0943 -0.0486 -0.0804 -0.0573 -0.1211 -0.1563 -0.0945 -0.1401 -0.1812 0.0923
W: INCAPH2000−2002USA
-0.0672 -0.0347 -0.0573 -0.0408 0.1687 -0.1114 -0.0673 0.1819 0.2221 0.0460
X: lagELCFUSA -0.1029 0.0870 -0.1320 0.1798 0.9365 -0.2360 0.3127 0.9049 0.9252 -0.1029
Y: lagCPIEF1992−1999USA
-0.1834 -0.0946 -0.1563 -0.1114 -0.2146 -0.3040 -0.1838 -0.2533 -0.2931 0.5227
Z: lagCPIEF2000−2002USA
-0.1108 -0.0571 -0.0945 -0.0673 0.3095 -0.1837 -0.1111 0.3627 0.4165 -0.0002
AA: lagINCAPFUSA 0.1268 -0.2400 0.0232 0.0292 -0.1944 0.1703 -0.2395 -0.3341 -0.3042 0.1268
BB: lagAPATENTFUSA -0.1351 0.1703 -0.1421 0.1814 0.9649 -0.2471 0.3288 0.9633 0.9409 -0.1351







X: lagELCFUSA 0.0870 -0.1320 0.1798 1.0000
Y: lagCPIEF1992−1999USA
-0.0946 0.5137 0.0143 -0.2190 1.0000
Z: lagCPIEF2000−2002USA
0.5161 -0.0945 0.4371 0.3100 -0.1837 1.0000
AA: lagINCAPFUSA -0.2400 0.0232 0.0292 -0.0977 0.1678 -0.2401 1.0000
BB: lagAPATENTFUSA 0.1703 -0.1421 0.1814 0.9171 -0.2279 0.3281 -0.2771 1.0000
Appendix D.
D.1 Panel regressions
TABLE D.1: OLS Panelregression with clustered standard errors on group level for
scenario B
Run 1 Run 1 Run 2 Run 2 Both runs
contribution contribution contribution contribution contribution
BH -0.367 -0.206 -0.400 -0.262 -0.315
(-0.66) (-0.46) (-1.94) (-1.52) (-1.40)
SBH -0.111 -0.187 -0.0389 0.0564 -0.0731
(-0.22) (-0.48) (-0.20) (0.33) (-0.35)
SBL -0.0889 0.186 -0.133 -0.0141 -0.0639
(-0.19) (0.56) (-0.21) (-0.03) (-0.21)
Lag contribution 0.371∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗
(5.61) (3.81) (5.93)
Lag average contr. 0.213 0.263 0.0878
(1.69) (1.94) (1.02)




cons 6.022∗∗∗ 3.509∗∗∗ 5.794∗∗∗ 3.466∗∗∗ 3.956∗∗∗
(22.54) (3.89) (31.86) (3.99) (7.03)
N 720 600 720 600 1320
NIndiv. 120 120 120 120 120
R2O 0.00341 0.214 0.00324 0.189 0.115
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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D.2 Contribution classes over rounds






































D.3 Instructions (English translation for treatment BH)
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment! Please read these in-
structions carefully, they are identical for all participants. For arriving on time you
receive a show-up fee of e2.50. In the experiment, you will earn additional money,
depending on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. During the course
of the experiment, all amounts are stated in ECU (experimental currency units). At the
end of the experiment, all earned ECU will be converted into cash and privately paid
out according to the following exchange rate:
1ECU = 0.10e
From now on, please do not talk to your neighbors, switch of your cell phone, and
remove unnecessary things from your desk. It is important that you follow these rules,
otherwise we have to exclude you from the experiment and any payment. In case you
have a question, please raise your hand, and we will answer your question privately.
The experiment will last for 6 rounds, and you will have to make a decision in each
round. You are randomly assigned to groups of 5 participants, which remain unchanged
for all rounds. At the beginning of the experiment, each participant of the group is
endowed with 65 ECU just once. Your task in each of the 6 rounds is to make a decision
on how you will use the 65 ECU.
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The decision problem
As already described, you are a member of a group of five participants, in which each
member is endowed with 65 ECU at the beginning. In each of the six rounds, you have
the possibility to contribute any integral number between 0 and a maximum of 10 ECU
to a joint account. The amount you have not contributed you may keep. After each
member has made a decision about his or her contribution to the joint account, the next
round starts, except for the sixth and last round.
The total income of each member of the group after the sixth round is calculated as
follows:
Income from the joint account = Sum of all contributions over six rounds x 0.4
plus the ECU not contributed during the six rounds:
Total Income = Income from the joint account + ECU not contributed
For example, if, after six rounds, the sum of contributions of all group members to
the joint account is 150 ECU, you and any other group member will receive an income
of 150 x 0.4 = 60 ECU from the joint account. Additionally, you and all other group
members will receive the respective ECU that have not been contributed to the joint
account. If, after six rounds, the sum of contributions of all group members to the joint
account is 150 ECU and you have not contributed 35 ECU, you will receive 60 + 35 = 95
ECU.
Thresholds
The total income at the end of round 6 also depends on whether the sum of contributions
to the joint account has reached certain thresholds after the critical rounds 2, 4, and 6.
The threshold for the sum of contributions after the second round is 50 ECU, after the
fourth round 100 ECU, and after the sixth round 150 ECU. If the sum of contributions
after a critical round does not reach the respective threshold, you will lose your total
income with a probability of 50%.
All necessary random draws are made successively after round 6 (for rounds 2, 4,
and six). This means you make a decision about your contribution to the joint account
six times but will be informed whether you lost your total income if a threshold has not
been reached after one of the critical rounds after the end of round 6. The result of the
random draws will then be displayed on your computer screen.
The probability of a total loss
If your group contributes less to the joint account than is required for the respective
thresholds after each of the three critical rounds (2, 4, and 6), you will lose your total
income with a probability of 1/2+ 1/2 ∗ 1/2+ 1/2 ∗ 1/2 ∗ 1/2 =875/1000(= 87.5%).
If your group contributes less to the joint account than is required for the respective
thresholds after two of the three critical rounds (rounds 2 and 4, 4 and 6, 2 and 6), you
will lose your total income with a probability of 1/2+ 1/2 ∗ 1/2 =75/100(= 75%).
If your group contributes less to the joint account than is required for the respective
threshold after one of the three critical rounds (round 2, 4, or 6), you will lose your total
income with a probability of 1/2(= 50%).
In case your group has reached the respective thresholds after each of the three
critical rounds (round 2, 4, and 6), you may keep your total income for good.




















87,5% 75% 50% 0%
If the threshold has been reached after each of the critical rounds, you and your
group members earn the income from the joint account (sum of contributions over six
rounds x 0.4) plus the ECU that you have not contributed.
If the sum of contributions to the joint account is less than 150 ECU after round
6, even though the thresholds have been reached after the other two critical rounds
before (i.e., one of the three thresholds), you and your group members will lose your
total income with a probability of 1/2 (50%). With a probability of 1/2 (=50%), you will
receive the income from the joint account (sum of all contributions over six rounds x
0.4) plus the ECU that you have not contributed. The probability of not losing the total
income is reduced analogously if more than one threshold has not been reached. After
each round you are told how much each member of the group has contributed to the
joint account.
Randomized Events
If thresholds have not been reached, it will be randomly decided whether you lose your
total income after round 6. One number out of 1 to 1000 is randomly drawn. A number
between 1 and 500 translates into a negative result (you lose your total income), while
a number between 501 and 1000 translates into a positive result (you do not lose your
total income). The number of random draws depends on the number of thresholds that
have not been reached. If necessary, we start with the threshold after round 2, followed
by, if necessary, the threshold after round 4, and finally, if necessary, the threshold after
round 6. After the six rounds, your total income, the results of potential random draws,
and your payoff (in e) will be displayed on the screen. After have finished reading
the instructions, please click Continue. You will then be asked to answer some control
questions.
Please answer the following control questions. The experiment will only start after
all participants have answered all questions correctly.
1. Each groupmember is endowed with 65 ECU. Assume that all five groupmembers
(including yourself) contributed 3 ECU to the joint account in each of the six
rounds.
(a) In which critical rounds is the threshold reached (please mark the correct
answer)?
Round 2 and or
Round 4 and or
Round 6 or
None of the three rounds
(b) With which probability will you lose your total income?
. . . . . .
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2. Each group member is endowed with 65 ECU. After the second round, a total 4
ECU have been contributed to the joint account. In the third round, a total of 20
ECU and in the fourth round a total of 26 ECU are contributed to the joint account.
After round 6, 165 ECU have been contributed to the joint account.
(a) After which rounds is the threshold reached (please mark the correct answer)?
Round 2 and or
Round 4 and or
Round 6 or
None of the three rounds
(b) With which probability will you lose your total income?
. . . . . .
(c) Assume all random draws are to your advantage. Which income do you
receive from the joint account?
. . . . . .
3. Each group member is endowed with 65 ECU. You contribute a constant amount
to the joint account in each of the six rounds. The other four group members
contribute the same amount to the joint account in each of the six rounds.
(a) What is the total income you will receive after round 6 if you and your group
members contribute 10 ECU to the joint account in every round?
. . . . . .
(b) With which probability will you lose your total income if you and your group
members contribute 0 ECU to the joint account in every round?
. . . . . .
4. A total of 155 ECU have been contributed to the joint account. After round 6, you
have 10 ECU left.
(a) With which probability will you lose your total income if only the threshold
after round 6 has been reached?
. . . . . .
(b) With which probability will you lose your total income if only thresholds
after rounds 2 and 6 have been reached?
. . . . . .
(c) What is your total income (in ECU), if all thresholds have been reached?
. . . . . .
Surprise restart (Instructions):
We are repeating this experiment once. You are once more assigned to a group of five
participants, which will remain unchanged for the six rounds. Because of the high
number of participants, it is unlikely that you will be assigned to the same group of five
participants with the same group members.
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E.1 Trade Structure
TABLE E.1: Automotive trade in 2007 for selected European countries
Germany United Kingdom Italy France Spain
Motor Cars Exports
In % of total exports
Intra+Extra EU-25 14.4 6.6 2.3 5.6 11.7
Intra EU-25 16.0 6.8 3.1 7.3 14.7
Extra EU-25 11.7 6.3 1.3 2.5 4.9
Exports in % of total intra EU-25 trade
Germany – 9.8 23.7 16.6 13.9
United Kingdom 24.1 – 14.8 14.4 13.6
Italy 17.6 15.4 – 15.3 11.1
France 12.4 7.1 16.8 – 41.9
Spain 12.3 13.9 13.0 20.0 –
Rest EU-25 33.6 53.8 31.6 33.7 19.5
Relative share of intra trade (exports) compared to extra trade
Intra EU-25 70.6 59.3 76.3 83.8 87.2
Relative share of extra trade (exports) compared to intra trade
Extra EU-25 29.4 40.7 23.7 16.2 12.8
Motor Cars Imports
In % of total imports
Intra+Extra EU-25 4.2 7.0 7.5 5.6 7.7
Intra EU-25 4.8 11.5 12.0 7.3 10.1
Extra EU-25 3.0 1.7 1.8 1.9 3.8
Imports in % of intra EU-25 trade
Germany – 45.3 44.9 36.3 48.9
United Kingdom 5.6 – 6.3 3.6 7.7
Italy 6.4 3.0 – 4.6 5.6
France 17.2 9.8 12.5 – 24.3
Spain 11.1 12.6 11.1 32.9 –
Rest EU-25 59.7 29.3 25.2 22.6 13.6
Relative share of intra trade (imports) compared to extra trade
Intra EU-25 74.3 88.7 89.3 89.6 80.6
Relative share of extra trade (imports) compared to intra trade
Extra EU-25 25.7 11.3 10.7 10.4 19.4
Quelle: Eurostat08 (2008), own compilation and calculations.
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E.2 Demand Structure
TABLE E.2: German consumer preferences in 2007 (demand) and comparative national
advantages with a focus on greenhouse gas emissions
Class Country Demand in % CO2/km




Lowest average emissions lower-middle German 155.4




Lowest average emissions upper-middle German 199.4




Lowest average emissions premium-vans German 172.5




Lowest average emissions middle Swedish 155.8




Lowest average emissions premium British 236.3




Lowest average emissions mini-vans Czech 157.5




Lowest average emissions Japanese 109.0




Lowest average emissions compact Japanese 134.4




Lowest average emissions SUVs Japanese 190.3
Quelle: KBA (2008b).
